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ABSTRACT 
The contemporary accounts of the semantic content of proper names fall into two 
broad categories-Millian views which maintain that the semantic content of a proper name is 
always its referent, and neo-Fregean views that maintain that in propositional attitude contexts 
the referent of a name is a sense or mode of presentation of its usual referent. I argue that 
neither of these two general pictures is correct and that proper names and other singular terms 
cannot be assigned a uniform semantic content. That is, proper names do not make exactly the 
same semantic contribution whenever they occur, and the contributions they do make cannot 
be captured by a general (and not merely disjunctive) function from context to content. 
I argue that the semantic contribution of proper names is highly context sensitive and 
that none of the contemporary accounts of proper names account for all their uses. I discuss a 
number of puzzling simple sentences due to Jennifer Saul and argue against the view our 
intuitions about the puzzle sentences can be explained in terms of the pragmatic implicatures 
of the utterances. Furthermore, careful attention to the puzzles shows in some cases the 
content contributed by the proper name cannot be specified by independent means The 
propositions expressed by means of such uses of names are such that the circumstances in 
which they are true do not have anything in common other than the fact that they are 
circumstances in which those propositions are true. These circumstances are instead tied 
together by overlapping relations of similarity. I suggest that the actual linguistic function of 
proper names is to make the practice of using a name salient, and that this practice then serves 
as input for a pragmatic process which takes account of extra-linguistic knowledge and other 
features of the context. 
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PREFACE 
The new no-theory theory 
Traditional approaches to proper names aim to provide an account of the contribution 
made by names to the semantic content of the utterances in which they occur. The view 
defended in this dissertation is a simple one-no theory of the semantic content of proper 
names and other singular terms can be given if such a theory is required to state the uniform 
semantic contribution that a proper name makes to the compound expressions in which it 
occurs. The semantic contribution made by proper names and other singular terms is not 
uniform. 
An expression can make a uniform semantic contribution to the sentences in which it 
occurs in one of two ways. One possibility is that it makes exactly the same contribution in 
each case. The view that the semantic properties of proper names are exhausted by their 
referents treats names as being of this type, since the contribution the name makes to each 
utterance in which it occurs will be the referent. The second possibility is that the expression 
is context-sensitive but there is a general rule which specifies its semantic contribution in each 
case. The semantic contribution of an expression of this sort differs from use to use, but its 
contribution is uniform in that there is a general (and not merely disjunctive) function from 
context to content. The account of the pronoun 'I' on which its semantic content on any 
occasion is the object picked out by the description 'the speaker', is a rule of this type. 
In what follows I argue that the semantic contribution of proper names (and also other 
singular terms) cannot be specified in either of these two ways. The problem with the first 
option is that the semantic content of names is context-sensitive. For example, if a political 
affairs reporter utters (1) during a newscast then what he has said-the semantic content of 
(I)-is the same as that of (2). 
(1) The constitution of the U.S. gives Clinton the right to appoint supreme court 
justices. 
(2) The constitution of the U.S. gives the president the right to appoint supreme court 
justices. 
It is natural to regard the semantic content of 'Clinton' in this context as being that of the 
description 'the president'. 
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This phenomena might suggest that proper names fall into the class of expressions 
which are context sensitive but nevertheless uniform in the sense outlined above. The problem 
for this approach is that it cannot accommodate either the diversity of semantic contributions 
made by names or the nature of some of those contributions. In particular, it cannot 
accommodate the contribution of proper names in sentences like (3) and (4) (where the 
Superman fiction is taken as fact). 
(3) Superman is more successful with women than Clark Kent. 
(4) Clark kissed Lois before Superman did. 
The difficulty, I will argue, is that the circumstances in which, for example, (4) is true do not 
have anything in common above and beyond the fact that they are circumstances in which (4) 
is true. These circumstances are instead tied together by overlapping relations of similarity. 
One common philosophical response to the phenomena discussed in this dissertation is 
that they fall into the domain of pragmatics rather than semantics. According to this view our 
intuitions about sentences like (1), (3) and (4) are intuitions about their assertibility or about 
the conversational implicatures of the utterances. Part of the view I defend in what follows is 
that this position cannot be maintained. The first problem is that our intuitions about 
sentences like (3) and (4) tum out to stand or fall with our intuitions about the traditional 
propositional attitude sentences like (5). 
(5) Lois believes that Clark cannot fly. 
This means that any semantic theory which takes opacity and other puzzles related to the 
propositional attitudes seriously must address the issues raised by sentences like (1)-(4). Thus 
the only theory which can consistently dismiss these examples is one which-like the naIve 
view defended by Scott Soames and Nathan Salmon-claims that our intuitions about 
utterances like (5) also concern assertibility and conversational implicatures rather than truth-
conditions. This view, however, can not be maintained because there is no account of the 
relationship between what is said by an utterance and what is merely implied by an utterance 
that will also support the view that we mistake our intuitions about the truth of implications 
for intuitions about the truth of the utterance itself. 
Ever since Frege philosophers of language have pursued an account of the semantics 
of natural language modeled on an axiomatic system. The task has been seen as one of 
specifying the right principles. and the right basic assignments of content to the primitive 
expressions. One consequence of acknowledging that some of those primitive expressions-
names and singular terms-cannot be assigned a uniform semantic contribution and in some 
cases cannot be assigned what we would normally think of as a semantic value at all, is that 
this project will have to be reexamined. However the adoption of the no-theory account of 
Preface 3 
proper names advocated here should not be seen as a defeatist approach. The inability to 
axiomatize the theory of meaning should not be seen as an inability to say anything about 
meaning at all. 
Precis of the chapters 
In chapter one I discuss the contemporary history of the semantics of proper names. I 
briefly rehearse the arguments in favour of the view that what is expressed by a sentence-its 
meaning or information content-is a structured proposition. I note that commitment to such 
propositions requires an account of how propositions are correlated with the sentences that 
express them. The natural and compelling approach is to maintain that there is a systematic 
correlation between the elements of a sentence (the individual words, their order, and the 
context) and the parts of the proposition that it expresses. However, once we give this answer 
we are committed to giving an account of what part of a proposition is correlated with each 
part of a sentence-that is, to identifying the information content of each kind of word. I 
examine the accounts of the information content of proper names offered by Frege and 
Russell and then discuss Kripke's critique of their shared descriptivism. 
In chapter two I consider a number of possible defenses of descriptivism and argue 
that whatever the virtues of wide-scope or rigidified descriptivism as an account of how the 
references of proper names are fixed, neither can provide an account of the information 
content of those names. I then introduce the main contemporary accounts of proper names and 
their behaviour in opaque contexts. The naIve theory maintains that the information content of 
names is exhausted by their referents and that substitution in the so-called opaque contexts 
actually preserves both truth and meaning. Neo-Fregeanism maintains that the information 
content of a name is a de re sense. The hidden-indexical account maintains that the 
information content of a name is its referent but that in the opaque contexts the name plays a 
pragmatic role in specifying certain unarticulated constituents the proposition expressed. The 
neo-Fregean hidden-indexical theory claims that the information content of a name is its 
referent but that in the opaque contexts the name also serves as a name of the de re sense by 
which the referent is grasped. The indexical theory of names claims that names do have a 
linguistic meaning but that their information content is just their referent and that in 
propositional attitude contexts pragmatic processes guide us in moving from the content of the 
that-clause to the content of the belief, which must include a de re sense ofthe referent. 
Chapter three introduces a number of relatively recent puzzles about the use of proper 
names. The first of these puzzles concerns the familiar problem of the use of names inside 
attitude ascriptions. In this case however the problem is not to explain the failure of 
substitution but the truth-conditions of the utterance. The second group of puzzles involve so-
called simple sentences-sentences in which no intensional operators of any sort appear. I 
argue that none of the proposed treatments of the simple sentences work. The main difficulty 
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is that they rely on a distinction between enlightened and unenlightened utterances, and this 
distinction turns out to be untenable. I then defend the claim that the simple sentence 
examples are to be taken just as seriously as the traditional puzzles about the propositional 
attitudes. One consequence of this is that the most tenable of the contemporary views of 
semantic content is the naIve view, since it treats all the counter~examples as involving 
intuitions about pragmatic rather than semantic features of language. 
It is occasionally thought that the difficulties of providing an account of the semantic 
content of proper names are a result of the framework in which the questions are pursued. In 
chapter four I discuss the claim that the difficulty is an artifact of both the Fregean 
quantificational framework and the assumptions made by the new theory of reference 
advocated by Kripke in Naming and Necessity. Jaakko Hintikka and Gabriel Sandu claim that 
the arguments offered by defenders of the new theory of reference are fallacious. On their 
view once we acknowledge this the behaviour of proper names can easily be accounted for. 
Furthermore, Hintikka and Sandu claim that this behaviour is perfectly natural-indeed, to be 
expected-once we approach natural languages by means of game-theoretic semantics. I 
argue that there are two problems for this view. First of all, Hintikka and Sandu have 
misunderstood the target of the arguments of the new theory of reference, taking them to be 
making an essentialist claim about the nature of singular terms rather than an empirical claim 
about the actual behaviour of proper names in natural languages. Secondly, despite its 
independent interest, game-theoretic semantics does not, as it stands, provide an adequate 
account of the semantics of proper names. 
Fregean quantificational theory has also recently been criticized by Gyula Klima, who 
claims that late medieval semantic theory provides a better account of the semantics of natural 
language and can solve a number of problems faced by current accounts. This claim is the 
subject of chapter five. Klima divides the anomalies of the Fregean quantificational paradigm 
into four broad categories: the problem of unrepresentable sentences; the problems of cross-
reference and anaphoric pronouns; the various opaque contexts, including the problematic 
propositional attitude contexts; and the mismatch between the syntax of first-order logic and 
that of natural language, and suggests that medieval semantic theory provides a solution to all 
four. I provide an overview of the semantic theory of the late medieval philosophers and 
discuss Jean Buridan's use of it to explain the failure of substitution in propositional attitude 
contexts. I then argue that while both medieval semantics and Buridan's treatment of attitude 
ascription is of considerable interest, the solution he provides is a version of what are now 
known as hidden-indexical treatments of belief. As a consequence his theory is no more 
successful in dealing with the puzzle about the attitudes discussed in chapter three than 
modern versions, and provides no solution to the simple-sentence puzzles. 
Having argued that the problem of proper names is not an artifact of the Fregean 
approach to quantification I return in chapter six to the question of whether the naIve theory 
provides an adequate account of names. The central claim of the naIve theory is that the our 
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intuitions about propositional attitude expressions and the simple-sentence counter-examples 
concern pragmatic features of language-in particular conversational implicatures-rather 
than the semantic content of the utterances in question. I argue that this distinction, despite its 
appeal, cannot be maintained in a way that provides support for the nai've theory. Defenders of 
the nai've view are correct to claim that there is no reason to think that native speakers of 
natural languages are sensitive to the distinction between semantically encoded and 
pragmatically imparted information. However, this distinction does not match up with the 
distinction between what is said and what is implied. Some aspects of what is said are 
pragmatically supplied, and some aspects of what is implied may be semantically encoded. I 
argue that the correct principle for determining whether a particular piece of information is 
part of what is literally said by an utterance is the availability principle, which states that 
speakers have conscious access to what is said by an utterance-i.e., its semantic content-
though they generally do not have access to what is semantically encoded by a sentence-i.e., 
its linguistic meaning. 
Since despite its appeal the naIve theory cannot be the correct account of the semantic 
properties of proper names, I return in chapter six to the puzzles of chapter three. I argue that 
the semantic contribution of proper names is highly context sensitive and not determined by 
any general rule or function from context to content, and thus that their can be no account of 
proper names that assigns them a uniform semantic content. I suggest that the actual linguistic 
function of proper names is to make the practice of using a name in a particular way salient, 
and that knowledge of this practice then serves as input for a pragmatic process which also 
takes account of extra-linguistic knowledge and other features ofthe context. 
I then show that this means that there cannot be a compositional theory of semantic 
content as that is frequently understood. That is, the way in which the semantic content of an 
complex expression is determined by that of its parts cannot be spelt out by finite means, 
since the content of some of the primitive expressions-that of proper names--cannot be 
specified by finite means. Since many philosophers would regard this consequence as a 
reductio of the no-theory view, I also discuss various arguments in favour of the existence of a 
finitely specifiable compositional theory of semantic content and conclude that they are 
largely unconvincing. 
Some may view the no-theory view as defeatist, and so I then argue that 
acknowledging the diversity and complexity of proper names is not tantamount to giving up 
on the philosophy oflanguage entirely. I conclude chapter six by arguing that not only is there 
no prospect of rehabilitating the distinction need to sustain the view that the problem cases 
introduced in chapter three represent peripheral uses that need not concern the philosopher of 
language, but that even if that distinction could be preserved the resulting theory would be of 
little interest. The dissertation concludes with a short set of remarks which highlight the key 
claims made within. 
6 
CHAPTER ONE 
Recent History 
The twentieth century debate over singular terms-proper names, demonstratives, 
some uses of pronouns, and on some views some uses of definite and indefinite 
descriptions-has been largely couched in terms of the question of whether singular terms 
have senses. On one side of the debate we find those siding with Russell and maintaining that 
the information content of a genuine singular term is simply its referent-that singular terms 
are, as Mill suggested, mere tags. On the other side we have those who maintain that the 
information content of a singular term includes (and sometimes: is exhausted by) a sense, a 
mode of presentation, or a way of thinking of an object. 
The view I argue for in what follows is that in fact none of the contemporary accounts 
of the semantic content of proper names and other singular terms is correct, and furthermore 
that there could be no account of this kind which explains the use of singular terms in natural 
language. I also argue that this result is neither as outrageous or as damaging to the project of 
philosophers of language as it might seem. 
This view is particularly controversial III light of what some see as a growing 
consensus about singular terms and indeed, in philosophy of language in general. In his recent 
anthology, Readings in the philosophy a/language, Peter Ludlow writes: 
the philosophy of language, or at least a core portion of it, has matured to the point 
where it is now being spun off into linguistic theory. If this is correct, then the 
philosophy of language is simply following in the tradition of other branches of 
philosophy that have been extruded into the natural sciences: physics, biology, and 
perhaps most recently, cognitive psychology (Ludlow 1997, xiii). 
A brief look at some recent literature might well suggest that Ludlow is right. Recent books 
by Mark Crimmins, Mark Richard, and Nathan Salmon all advocate the view that names are 
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directly referential combined with an account of propositional attitude contexts as involving 
modes of presentation, though they differ in their treatment of the mode of presentation as 
either semantically encoded or pragmatically imparted. I think however that there are good 
reasons to think this is an inadequate solution. 
The general framework in which the discussion that follows sits is a Lockean one. 
Locke's insight is that an account of language must at least be compatible with, and at best 
provide an explanation of, our use of the language (Locke 1690, book III). One standard to 
which an account of the semantics of natural language should be held is that it not make the 
way in which we actually use language inexplicable or surprising. Nor should it suggest that 
language is fundamentally unsuited for this purpose. The best argument in favour of this 
position is the fact that language is conventional. I take it that we are largely agreed that in 
some broad sense language is a conventional human construction, though this is compatible 
with there being some constraints on what kind of language a human being could construct. 
For example, some philosophers and linguists claim that human language should be regarded 
as constrained by a Chompskian universal grammar. None the less, there will be a broad range 
of options available to us within that constraint, and it seems perverse to suggest that we use a 
language fundamentally unsuited to the purpose to which we put it. Even, if, unlikely as it 
may seem, we did once have such a language, the conventionality of language ensures that we 
would be in a position to correct that mistake. 
This is not to say that there is no room for prescription in the philosophy of language, 
but just that such prescription depends on there being a descriptive account of the use and 
goals of language. Let me make the point clearer by analogy. Games and sports are clear 
examples of conventional activity, and in order to understand the practices of a group playing 
North American football one needs to understand what the rules and goals of the game 
actually are. However, once one understands what the goals and rules of the game are one 
may well be able to make suggestions to improve those rules. Indeed there are two codes for 
North American football, and if one asks a Canadian about the difference between the 
National Football League (NFL) code and the Canadian Football League (CFL) code are she 
will likely explain that the CFL is a faster game which is more enjoyable to watch and 
demands more athletic abilities of the players, etc. If this is true, then the CFL code may be 
more suitable for meeting the expressed goals of North American football, but that fact alone 
is not sufficient to make the CFL code a description of the activities of NFL teams. Similarly, 
it may become clear that in certain areas natural languages are more or less suited for 
achieving the goals of human language, and may have more or less tractable (or even 
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consistent) semantical properties, but this fact does not make an improved semantics a correct 
semantics for natural language. In short then, the general philosophical framework in which 
this investigation occurs assumes that language is more or less well suited for the task for 
which it is used. 
In the rest of this chapter I locate the question 'What is the semantic content of proper 
names?' against the background of twentieth century inquiries into the philosophy of 
language. I begin with a brief defense of the notion of a structured proposition and introduce 
the two basic questions of for the advocate of such propositions-what are their parts and how 
are they held together. I then discuss the views held by Frege and Russell on the former 
question, focusing on their accounts of proper names. Finally, I tum to Kripke's arguments 
against descriptivism, focusing on those aspects of his critique that are particularly relevant to 
questions about the semantic content of names rather than the means by which reference is 
fixed. 
1. Content 
Frege to Russell, 13 November 1904 
Mount Blanc with its snow fields is not itself a component part of the thought that 
Mount Blanc is more than 4,000 metres high. 
Russell to Frege, 12 December 1904 
I believe that in spite of all its snowfields Mont Blanc itself is a component part of 
what is actually asserted in the proposition 'Mont Blanc is more than 4,000 metres 
high' (Frege 1980, 163, 169). 
When this now famous exchange between Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell took 
place the debate about the nature of the information content of singular terms had already 
gone on (with some lulls now and then) for about 700 years, and the problem has continued to 
perplex philosophers of language in the 96 years since these words were written. The cynic 
may well conclude that this is just another confirmation of the uselessness of philosophy. 
What I will argue, however, is that the last 96 years have taught us something about the nature 
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of singular terms-surprisingly, it has taught us that there can be no account of their 
information content of the type both Frege and Russell sought. 
The common ground that lies between philosophers with a roughly Fregean view of 
singular terms and those of a roughly Millian orientation is this. Sentences are not the primary 
bearers of truth. The primary bearers of truth or falsity are propositions, and these are the 
things which are expressed by sentences (relative to a context). Propositions are the meanings 
or the information content of sentences-the things we say when we utter sentences and the 
objects of belief, disbelief, knowledge, doubt, and so on. However, the relation between 
sentences and the propositions expressed by them is not one of simple tagging. The 
proposition expressed by a sentence is a function of the meanings-the semantic content--of 
the parts of the sentence. The philosopher of language who wishes to give a semantics for 
natural language must then present an account of what kinds of semantic content are 
contributed by the various classes of linguistic items, and of how these are combined to 
produce the proposition expressed by a sentence. It is this project which concerns both Frege 
and Russell in the letters above, and it is in the light of this project that most of the debate 
surrounding singular terms has been conducted. 
1.1 Propositions 
As noted above, one major area of agreement between both Millians and Fregeans is 
that there are propositions and that they have structure. Some philosophers have been 
skeptical about the existence of propositions, viewing them as metaphysically suspect. To 
begin, then, I will say a few things about what propositions are and why we might think 
propositions exist. The considerations that follow are suggestive, rather than conclusive, and 
the remainder of the thesis assumes the existence of propositions. 
Semantics, on the view shared by both Millians and Fregeans, can be seen as 
concerned with three things-the meanings of expressions in the language, the truth values of 
particular uses of those expressions, and the significance of particular uses of those 
expressions (Crimmins 1992,6). Propositions are what are expressed by a particular use of a 
assertive sentence-a statement1--ofthe language. Furthermore, they are the ultimate bearers 
I Some philosophers use statement and proposition interchangeably. I find it useful, however, to have a compact 
word for assertive expressions, and statement is a natural term for this. Any particular use of a statement states 
something, and on the view being considered the proposition expressed by it is what it states. 
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of truth and falsity, and thus particular uses of statements will inherit their truth value from 
the proposition they express. Propositions are abstract entities that are either identical with or 
essentially tied to their truth conditions. One consequence of this view is that it becomes the 
task of semantics to explain how statements in the language are correlated with the 
propositions they expressed. 
1.1.1 Sentence tokens 
One common reason for positing propositions is that they provide a simple 
explanation of the truth and falsity of sentences. There are a number of difficulties with 
regarding sentences as the primary bearers of truth. First of all, one considering this view 
must determine whether by sentences we mean sentence types or sentence tokens. The second 
view is rare, but some philosophers have maintained that it is sentence tokens that are the 
primary bearers of truth value. Notably, the 14th century philosopher Jean Buridan 
maintained this view, for reasons having to do with the paradoxes of self-reference. His view 
was that: 
(1) The sentence numbered (1) in Chapter One of The Meaning and Use of Proper 
Names is false. 
has, if supposed true, contradictory consequences, and so should be ruled simply false. On the 
other hand, there are no contradictory consequences to supposing that (2) is false, so it is 
simply true. 
(2) The sentence numbered (1) in Chapter One of The Meaning and Use of Proper 
Names is false. 
According to Buridan, a sentence is true iff (a) things are as it says they are and (b) no 
contradictions follow from supposing it to be true. Both token (1) and token (2) of the 
sentence meet criteria (a), but only token (2) meets criteria (b) (Buridan Sophismata, ch.8i, 
This view might be thought to be further supported by the fact that an utterance of sentence 
(3) by me is true, but an utterance of that sentence type is false when said by anybody else. 
2 See Buridan 1966 and 1977 
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(3) I am the author of The Meaning and Use of Proper Names. 
Nevertheless, there are problems with the view that it is sentence tokens which bear truth 
value. Most notably, it seems to most of us that there would be truths (and falsehoods) even in 
a world in which there were no utterances at all. In a world just like ours except for the 
complete absence of language users, it will be true that water is H20, that kangaroos come 
from Australia, that there are no language users, and that there are no utterances. These last 
two examples are the most crucial because their truth depends on there being no utterances. 
Any utterance of them would be self-refuting. If it can ever be true that there are no 
utterances, then utterances cannot be the primary bearers of truth value. 
1.1.2 Sentence types 
Sentence types, however, fare no better. As noted above, there are many sentences like 
(3) which change truth value depending on context. If utterances of the sentence type 
corresponding to (3) get their truth value from that of their sentence type, then it seems that 
they must all have the same truth value, which they manifestly do not. Indeed, we would be 
reluctant to ascribe any truth value to the sentence type corresponding to (3). The usual 
response to this is to say that utterances of (3) are not actually all of the same type. We might 
instead maintain that my use of (3) is of the same sentence type as (4). 
(4) Nicole Wyatt is the author of The Meaning and Use of Proper Names. 
If we do so however, sentence types no longer consist of groups that exhibit lexical similarity, 
but are rather being individuated by some notion of what is said by an utterance-that is, what 
makes it plausible that (3) and (4) are of the same type is the intuition that they say the same 
thing, which is just to introduce the notion of a proposition. 
Indeed, the idea that different sentences can be used to say the same thing, and the 
same sentence to say different things on different occasions, is the primary reason for positing 
propositions. The English speaker who says 'two plus three equals five' has said the same 
thing as the French speaker who utters the natural translation of this, but if you and I both 
utter (3) we have not. What is said by an statement cannot be equated with either the utterance 
itself or the sentence type, but is some third thing-what philosophers call a proposition. 
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One final comment. The view which I am advocating-that there is no general answer 
to the question 'what is the information content of a singular term?'-may be seen as a further 
reason for skepticism about propositions. If, the argument goes, we are going to accept the 
existence of abstract entities, we must have an account of what those entities, and their 
constituents, are. If no account can be given, then accepting them is even more metaphysically 
undesirable. For example, without such an account it might seem to be a puzzle as to how to 
individuate them. (The worry here is analogous to Quine's concern about the number of 
possible men in the doorways (Quine 1948, 4).) I myself find the arguments for the existence 
of propositions compelling, and this leaves me with the difficulty of positing the existence of 
abstract entities that we cannot adequately describe.3 I think however that this is no worse 
than believing in quarks. Propositions have sufficient theoretical unity to justify our believing 
in them, even if it is not entirely clear what sort of entities they are. 
1.2 Structure 
As noted above, if propositions are what are expressed by particular uses of 
statements, then part of the job of the philosopher of language is to explain how statements 
are correlated with the propositions that they express. It is often thought that one general 
constraint on this project is that there must be a finitely specifiable systematic connection 
between the statements and the propositions. That is, given the infinite number of expressions 
possible in a natural language, it will only be possible to spe.cify the propositions associated 
with them if there is a systematic correlation between the elements of the statements (the 
individual words, their order, and the context) and the proposition expressed by them. It has 
seemed to many plausible to assume that we could only master language if there was such a 
systematic correlation (e.g., Crimmins 1992, 7). 
It is this project--of explaining the systematic correlation between the words in a 
statement and the proposition expressed by that statement that both Frege and Russell are 
engaged in on the occasion of the exchange quoted above. They have in common two further 
assumptions however-first, that what is contributed by a word to a proposition (its semantic 
3 This is not quite right. The problem, as will become clear in what follows, is that there seem to be some 
propositions that can only be described by means of the utterance(s) that expresses them. But this is also 
problematic. We may be able to individuate them, but their lack of independence from the utterances they are 
supposed to be the information content of might be thought to throw doubt on their theoretical utility. 
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content) is part of the resulting proposition. Those who think that propositions are sets of 
possible worlds, for example, still think that the word 'Clinton' makes a contribution to the 
proposition expressed by (5). 
(5) Clinton is human. 
However the information content of 'Clinton' is not part of the proposition-its parts are the 
possible worlds.4 Both Frege and Russell are committed to the view that the proposition 
expressed by (5) is composed of two parts-the information content 'Clinton' and that of 'is 
human'. 
The second thing on which Russell and Frege agree is that propositions must be bound 
together in some way-or to put in modem terms, that propositions must have some structure. 
The problem is that two statements might have exactly the same constituents, and yet 
correspond to different propositions. For example, (6) and (7) express different propositions, 
but have the same constituents-the information contents of 'Bill', 'Hilary' and 'loves'. 
(6) Bill loves Hilary. 
(7) Hilary loves Bill. 
1.2.1 Frege on binding 
Frege's view is that some of the constituents of propositions themselves contain the materials 
for binding together the proposition. The senses (information contents) of some words-
verbs, for example-are what Frege calls unsaturated. In this case, the sense of 'loves' is 
unsaturated, and it thus needs completion by both a subject and an object. 
4 This way of putting things is perhaps arguable. Fitch, for example, in his entry on singular propositions in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, suggests that propositions which are sets of possible worlds are singular 
propositions just in case the possible worlds themselves contain individuals (Fitch 1997). This view seems to rest 
on the implausible idea that if something r is a member of a set Ll, and, ex is part of r, then ex is part of Ll. But 
even when r is itself a set, and ex a member of it, it is not generally true that ex is a member of Ll. It is hard to 
make sense of what this claim amounts to if r isn't a set. Is my arm, for example, part of the set of all human 
beings? Clearly it is not a member of that set, but it is unclear how anything other than a member could be 
described as part of a set. 
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For not all parts of a thought can be complete; at least one must be 'unsaturated', or 
predicative; otherwise they would not hold together. For example, the sense of the 
phrase 'the number 2' does not hold together with that of the expression 'the concept 
prime number' without a linle We apply such a link in the sentence 'the number 2 falls 
under the concept prime number'; it is contained in the words 'falls under', which need 
to be completed in two ways-by a subject and an accusative; and only because their 
sense is thus 'unsaturated' are they capable of serving as a link. (Frege 1892b, 193) 
What differentiates (6) from (7) is that in each case the senses of 'Bill' and 'Hilary' complete 
different parts of the incomplete sense of 'loves'. 
1.2.2 Russell on binding 
In contrast, Russell's view on what binds the constituents of a proposition is unclear. 
He appears to reject Frege's view by suggesting that the contribution of the verb 'differs from' 
is just the concept of difference. 
Consider, for example, the proposition 'A differs from B'. The constituents of this 
proposition, if we analyze it, appear to be only A, difference, B. Yet these 
constituents, thus placed side by side, do not reconstitute the proposition. The 
difference which occurs in the proposition actually relates A and B, whereas the 
difference after analysis is a notion which has no connection with A and B. (Russell, 
1903,49) 
He goes on to say: 
Owing to the way in which the verb actually relates the terms of a proposition, every 
proposition has a unity which renders it distinct from the sum of its constituents. 
(Russell, 1903, 52) 
The puzzle is what Russell means by the term 'actually'. He cannot mean that the terms are in 
actuality related in the way specified by the verb-this is what it is for the proposition to be 
true, rather than what it is that binds the proposition together. But if he just means that the 
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proposition is actually unified then the question of how this unification takes place remains 
unanswered. 
In what follows I will simply assume that there is some account of what binds together 
the constituents of a proposition. While the question of what gives propositions structure is a 
more pressing question than most advocates of Millian and Fregean views seem to assume, 
my concern in what follows is with the nature of their constituents. Accordingly, I will simply 
follow the practice of representing propositions as ordered n-tuples of their constituents. The 
difference between (6) and (7) is thus represented by a difference in the order in which the 
information contents of 'Bill' and 'Hilary' occur in the n-tuples. 
1.3 Names and singular terms 
Suppose that one started thinking about the truth-conditions of sentences containing 
proper names, and that you came to the task without any prior philosophical commitments or 
knowledge of the philosophical problems associated with the task. It would be quite natural to 
conclude that a sentence like (8) was true just in case the property picked out by 'is a fast 
runner' was possessed by the person picked out by 'John'. 
(8) John is a fast runner. 
Our natural tendency, it seems, is to associate names with individuals and predicates with 
properties. Names appear to be associated directly with things, whereas predicates appear to 
be associated directly with a property-whatever that is-and only indirectly with the things 
that possess the property. This difference might well be seen to lie behind the fact that when 
you ask, in ordinary conversation, what the meaning of a proper name is the reply generally 
takes the form of giving some of the etymology of the name. If, for example, I tell you that 
the name 'Nipha" is a Plains Indian word that means snowflake, I am not telling you that it is 
correctly applied to snowflakes, but that it comes from a Plains Indian word for snowflake. In 
order to find out that the name is correctly used to pick out my sister the question that needs to 
be asked is not what 'Nipha' means, but who or what 'Nipha' is. Proper names it seems have 
reference but no meaning. 
This is certainly the thought that motivates Millian accounts of names as 'mere tags' 
for the individuals to which they refer: 
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A proper name is but an unmeaning mark ... 
When we predicate of anything its proper name; when we say, pointing to a man, this 
is Brown or Smith, or pointing to a city, that is York, we do not, merely by doing so, 
convey to the reader any information about them (Mill 1872, 22).5 
Nevertheless, proper names are used to convey information-they are used in sentences that 
express propositions. In as far as the semantic content of a sentence is composed in some way 
from the semantic content of its parts, the question which arises is what the contribution made 
by a proper name is. This question, which seems so simple, turns out to be remarkably 
difficult to answer. 
2. Frege and Russell 
Consider again (8). 
(8) John is a fast runner. 
It is natural, and indeed no doubt correct, to view (8) as true just in case the individual John 
has the property of being a fast runner. This parity between property on one hand and 
individual on the other may well lead to the thought that the information content of the name 
just is the individual to which it refers. This Millian strategy is especially appealing when 
combined with the thought that names have do not have meaning in the way that predicates 
do. Unfortunately it quickly runs in to difficulties. 
2.1 Frege 
The view outlined above is, in essence, the view which first occurred to Frege and 
which appeared in his writing prior to the appearance of the distinction between sense and 
reference. As Frege immediately saw, however, the view faces an crucial difficulty.6 
5 Mill himself applied this doctrine to proper names and names of attributes (e.g. whiteness, length) alone: "The 
only names of objects which connote nothing are proper names; and these have, strictly speaking, no 
signification" (Mill 1872, 21). By signification Mill here (following the mediaevals) means something like 
meaning as opposed to reference. 
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If we say 'The Evening Star is a planet with a shorter period of revolution than the 
Earth', the thought we express is other than in the sentence 'The Morning Star is a 
planet with a shorter period of revolution than the Earth'; for somebody who didn't 
know that the Morning Star is the Evening Star might regard one as true and the other 
as false. And yet the Bedeutung [reference7] of both sentences must be the same; for it 
is just a matter of interchange of the words 'Evening Star' and 'Morning Star', which 
have the same Bedeutung, i.e., are proper names of the same heavenly body (Frege 
1892b, 138). 
The problem arises most intensely for Frege in the case of identity statements, for a sentence 
of the form a = a is knowable a priori, whereas a sentence of the form a = b may well 
"contain very valuable extensions of our knowledge and cannot always be established a 
priori" (Frege 1892a, 151). If the only semantic value possessed by a name is its referent then 
we have two choices: the identity claim can be seen as relating the objects which are the 
referents of the names, or it can be seen as relating the two signs. Neither option satisfied 
Frege, for on the first the difference of cognitive value between a = b and a = a is mysterious, 
and on the second it would seem to assert something true only as a matter of linguistic 
convention rather than any scientific discovery (Frege 1892a, 151-152). Furthermore, as the 
quote from 'Function and Concept' (1892b) shows, this would not solve the more general 
problem. This problem is particularly acute for Frege as on his view the reference of a 
sentence is its truth-value, so that all true (false) sentences have the same reference-namely 
the true (false). 
6 Even prior to this Frege was aware of the puzzles of informativeness. However, prior to (1892a) and (1892b) he 
solved this problem by treating identity as a relation between the terms rather than a relation between objects 
7 Micheal Beaney (1997) has argued convincingly that there is no happy English translation for Bedeutung, and 
that those writing on Frege should perhaps adopt the practice of leaving it as an untranslated technical term. 
However, as my purpose here is merely to set the stage for what follows rather than engage in any substantive 
Frege scholarship I continue to use the standard term 'reference'. I have however used Beaney's translations (or 
adaptions of translations) in which Bedeutung remains untranslated. 
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2.1.1 Sense and reference 
Frege's solution is to introduce a separate level of semantic value-the sense of an 
expression. In the case of a name the sense is a mode of presentation of the object to which 
the name refers. However, each sense presents the object to which it refers in only one way, 
rather than in its totality (Frege 1892a, 152-153). Name, sense, and reference thus stand in a 
hierarchical relationship: 
The regular connection between a sign, its sense, and its Bedeutung is of such a kind 
that to the sign there corresponds a definite sense and to that in tum a definite 
Bedeutung, while to a given Bedeutung (an object) there does not belong only a single 
sign. The same sense has different expressions in different languages or even in the 
same language (Frege 1892a, 153). 
For a given name there will (ideally) be just one sense,s and for that sense just one reference, 
but the reference may be picked out by many senses and the sense by many names. 
This extra level of semantic value is possessed not just by names but by all 
expressions-including complete sentences. As such it provides a general solution to a group 
of related problems-the possibility of regarding sentences which differ only in the presence 
of different but co-referential names as differing in truth-value, the puzzle of the 
informativeness of some identity statements, and the question of how it is that utterances 
containing names without referents can be meaningful. 
Ordinarily an expression is used to talk about its reference, but it some contexts, such 
as when we quote someone (directly or indirectly) we instead use an expression to talk about 
its sense. In particular, when a sentence is part of a that-clause and placed within the scope of 
a propositional attitude, as in (9) or (10), the contribution it makes to the reference of the 
whole utterance is not its usual reference but its sense (Frege 1892a, 159-162). 
(9) Copernicus believed that the planetary orbits are circles. 
(10) I think that the planetary orbits are not circles 
8 Frege is of course acutely aware of what he sees as the defects of natural language-its context sensitivity and 
the fact that there may be multiple senses attached to a proper name by the members of a linguistic community. 
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In other contexts, such as (11) and (12) the situation may be more complicated and a sub-
sentence may do double duty referring both to its usual sense and its usual reference. 
(11) Alex fancies that the Y2K bug will cause chaos. 
(12) Carolyn recognizes that moral philosophy is important. 
These cases differ in that while in (12) the sub-sentence refers to its normal referent (in 
addition to its sense), the effect of the attitude verb in (11) is to cause the clause to refer to the 
negation of its usual referent (Frege 1892a, 169). Thus (11) has the force of (11') and (12) the 
force of (12'). 
(II') It's not the case that the Y2K bug will cause chaos and Alex believes that the 
Y2K bug will cause chaos. 
(12') Moral philosophy is important and Carolyn believes that moral philosophy is 
important. 
Positing senses thus provides an explanation of the truth-conditions of attitude ascriptions. 
Since the cognitive value of a sentence is not its reference but its sense it also explains how a 
= a can differ in cognitive value from a = h. Finally since a singular term can have a sense but 
no reference the theory provides Frege with a solution to the problem of empty names (Frege 
1892a, 153;157). 
2.1.2 Concept and object 
More needs to be said about what Frege takes the sense of a complete sentence or a 
predicate to be. Before I tum to this task, however, I need to explain what the references of 
predicates and sentences are. Sentences, as noted above, have as their references one of the 
two truth-values, the true or the false. This view, which may seem slightly odd to us, is 
perfectly natural given Frege's account of what a concept is and how the senses of 
sentences-what Frege called thoughts (i.e., propositions)-are bound together. 
In Frege's view a predicate picks out not a property as we usually understand it but a 
concept or function. What makes the referent of a predicate different from that of a name is 
that while the referent of the name is something complete in itself-an object-the referent of 
a predicate is inherently unsaturated. It, like a mathematical function, contains an empty place 
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which needs to be filled (Frege, 1891a, 137-139). Thus the referent of (13) is produced from 
two parts. 
(13) Caesar conquered Gaul. 
On one hand we have the individual Caesar (referred to by 'Caesar') and on the other the 
concept x conquered Gaul (referred to by 'conquered Gaul). In the case of the mathematical 
functions that Frege models his notion of concept on, the combination of the function with an 
argument forms a name-in this case the name of a truth-value. 
Consider, for analogy, the function x2• If this function IS combined with an 
argument-say 2-what results is not a name of some complex but a name of the number 
four. We express this by saying that 22 = 4. The case is similar with non-mathematical 
examples. 
(14) the father of Alfred Frege 
The parts of (14) refer to two things-Alfred Frege and the function the father of x. As a 
whole it refers to the value of the function for that argument-namely Gottlob Frege himself. 
In Frege's view the concepts picked out by predicates like 'conquered Gaul', 'is white' etc., are 
functions, not from objects to objects but from objects to truth-values. 
The sense of a predicate is thus a mode of presentation of the concept to which it 
refers, and if we are to take seriously Frege's claim that "not all parts of a thought can be 
complete; at least one must be 'unsaturated', or predicative; otherwise they would not hold 
together" (Frege 1892b, 193), the sense of the predicate must itself capture the essential 
incompleteness of the concept. Its important to note here that the thought, unlike the referent 
of a sentence, has parts. It is natural then to think of Frege's thoughts as composed of the 
senses of the various parts of the sentence which expresses it. Thus we have the following 
diagram from one ofFrege's letters to HusserI (Frege 1891, 149)9; 
9 Given the use of 'proposition' in the preceding discussion this diagram has been m?dified by replacing 
'proposition' with 'sentence' so as to avoid confusion. 
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sentence proper name concept word 
,.j, 
-!- -!-
sense sense sense 
of the of the of the 
sentence proper name concept word 
(thought) 
-!- -!- -!-
Bedeutung Bedeutung Bedeutung object 
of the of the of the ---+ falling under 
sentence proper name concept word the concept 
(truth value) (object) (concept) 
figure 1 
One of the essential differences between predicates or concept words and names is that the 
former have a fourth level corresponding to them-that is, they have an extension in addition 
to a reference. 
2.1.3 Thoughts 
One thing which should be emphasized is that despite Frege's use of the term 'thought' 
to describe the sense of a sentence, the senses of sentences, names, and predicates (or concept 
words) are not psychological things. Contemporary philosophers inspired by Frege sometimes 
speak of modes of presentation as ways of thinking of an object or identify them with the way 
in which we represent that object to ourselves. In contrast for Frege a sense is a very different 
thing from an idea or a sense impression. He writes: 
The idea is subjective: one man's idea is not that of another. There results, as a matter 
of course, a variety of differences in the ideas associated with the same sense. A 
painter, a horseman, and a zoologist will probably connect different ideas with the 
name 'Bucephalus'. This constitutes an essential distinction between the idea and the 
sign's sense, which may be the common property of many people, and so is not a part 
or mode of the individual mind (Frege 1892a, 154). 
This distinction is quite natural when we realize that Frege's notion of sense was developed in 
part because of the need to accommodate the cognitive differences between co-referential 
complex singular terms like definite descriptions. One of Frege's central examples in 'On Sinn 
and Bedeutung' (1892a) is, unsurprisingly, a mathematical one. Suppose, he says, that we take 
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a triangle and inscribe in it three lines, a, b, and c, running from the vertices to the midpoints 
of the opposite sides. We then see that the point designated by the description 'the intersection 
of a and b' is the same point as is designated by the description 'the intersection of band c' 
(Frege 1892a, 152). It is natural to think of these descriptions as providing us a method for 
identifying the point in question-a method that anyone could apply. The senses of the 
descriptions are not images or ideas of the point but specifications of it. As such they are 
available to anyone to use. Similarly, the thought which is the sense of a sentence serves as a 
route for detennining what its truth-value is. Frege's thoughts are propositions rather than 
ways of thinking of propositions. 
2.1.4 Names and semantic content 
Since for Frege the class of names includes all of what would now be called singular 
tenns-namely proper names, demonstratives, and pronouns-and also definite descriptions, 
the notion of the sense of a name provides a perfectly general account of the semantic content 
of such terms. Proper names and descriptions are for Frege of the same semantic class--each 
take objects as their referents and modes of presentation of those objects as their senses. The 
modes of presentation impose a condition which the referent satisfies-as Frege says, the 
sense of a name "serves to illuminate only a single aspect of the Bedeutung, supposing it to 
have one. Comprehensive knowledge of the Bedeutung would require us to be able to say 
immediately whether any given sense attaches to it. To such knowledge we never attain" 
(Frege 1892a, 153). Thus both names and definite descriptions have their references fixed as 
whatever satisfies that condition. Frege's view is a variety of what has come to be known as 
descriptivism-namely the view that the basic mechanism by with the references of proper 
names are fixed is the same as by which the references of descriptions are fixed. This of 
course does not commit him to saying that each proper name is equivalent to some definite 
description, and Frege nowhere endorses this view. 
2.2 Russell 
Russell disagreed with Frege's treatment of singular terms in two central ways. First of 
all, he opposed the bifurcation of semantic values, claiming that we cannot genuinely make 
sense of talk about meaning (i.e., sense) as opposed to reference or denotation (Russell 1905, 
49-51). Secondly, he rejected the view that descriptions were members of the same semantic 
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class as genuine singular terms. As is well known, Russell argues that definite descriptions are 
not genuinely referential terms-indeed that they are not genuine terms at all. In his view 
each sentence in which a definite description occurs expresses a proposition in which there is 
no element which corresponds to the description 'the so-and-so'. 
2.2.1 Definite descriptions 
The problem with treating descriptions as falling into the same semantic class as 
proper names like 'lohn' and demonstratives like 'this' is, in Russell's view, that it obscures the 
nature and structure of the description. 
This sort of phrase, 'The author of Waverley', is not a name because it is a complex 
symbol. It contains parts which are symbols. It contains four words, and the meanings 
of those four words are already fixed and they have fixed the meaning of the 'The 
author of Waverley' in the only sense in which that phrase does have any meaning. In 
that sense its meaning is already determinate, i.e., there is nothing arbitrary or 
conventional about the meaning of that whole phrase, when the meanings of 'the', 
'author', 'of, and 'Waverley' have already been fixed (Russell, 1918,244). 
Russell's point is that 'The author of Waverley', unlike 'Scott' or 'this', has meaningful parts 
and a structure, and its meaning is related to the meanings of the parts just as the meaning of a 
complete sentence is related to the meanings of its parts. Frege's view, which treats the 
semantic properties of 'The author of Waverley' as on a par with those of names and 
demonstratives, obscures this feature of descriptions. 
Russell's well known solution to both the problem of relating the meaning of the 
description to its parts and to the puzzles which motivated Frege's introduction of the notion 
of sense is his theory of descriptions. 10 On Russell's view the essential role of 'the' in definite 
descriptions is to indicate that there is a unique entity with the property that follows it. Thus 
an utterance of (14) has (14') as its content. 
10 The idea that the meaning of descriptions should be explained in terms of the meanings of their parts does not, 
admittedly, appear in the original paper 'On Denoting' (1905). However 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism' 
(1918) makes quite clear that by then Russell thought that the primary reason for not treating defmite 
descriptions as names was their structure. In this Russell was certainly correct. 
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(14) The author of Waverley is Scott. 
(14') There is one and only one author of Waverley, and that person is Scott. 
In general, where we have a sentence of the form 'the G is F, it should be properly expanded 
to a sentence of the form of (15), which has as its logical form (IS') (Russell 1905, 44; 51: 
1918,249-251). 
(15) There is one and only one x which is G, and that x is F. 
(15')::Ix \:Iy (Gx & (Gy -+ y = x) & Fx) 
In addition to elucidating the relationship between the meaning of a definite 
description and the meanings of its parts, Russell's theory solves three problems for definite 
descriptions (Russell 1905, 47-48). First of all, it solves the problem of how identity 
statements between two definite descriptions or between a definite description and a name or 
demonstrative can be informative. To continue with Russell's own example, it is no longer a 
puzzle how it is that (14) can express a different proposition from (16). 
(14) The author of Waverley is Scott. 
(16) Scott is Scott. 
Furthermore, since (14) expresses a different proposition from (16), the puzzle of how 
someone could believe (16) without believing (14), or be curious about the truth-value of (14) 
without having any interest in (16), is also solved. Finally, and perhaps from Russell's point of 
view most importantly, we have an explanation of how sentences containing definite 
descriptions which do not denote anything can be meaningful and thus have a determinate 
truth-value. Since the denotation of the description (the thing which satisfies it) does not 
appear as a constituent of the proposition expressed, the lack of a denotation does not render 
the sentence meaningless. 
2.2.2 Logically proper names versus ordinary proper names 
Russell contrasts definite descriptions with what he calls logically proper names. 
Logically proper names genuinely stand for things, rather than merely denoting them. The 
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meaning of the logically proper name is exhausted by the thing to which it refers. What 
enables Russell to avoid the puzzles of informativeness, attitude ascription, and empty names 
is his severe restriction on the circumstances in which a logically proper name can be used. 
Logically proper names can only be used to name those things-particulars-with which we 
are directly acquainted (Russell 1918, 200-202). Given that we are directly acquainted with 
something, in Russell's sense, then there is no possibility of not knowing that two logically 
proper names are co-referential, or of there being no referent for the name. However the 
things that we are directly acquainted with are limited to sense data and (perhaps) ourselves. 
It is often said that Russell thought that all ordinary proper names were merely 
abbreviated definite descriptions, and this is reasonably described as his official view. 
The names that we commonly use, like 'Socrates', are really abbreviations for 
descriptions ... We are not acquainted with Socrates, and therefore cannot name him. 
When we use the word 'Socrates', we are really using a description. Our thought may 
be rendered by some such phrase as 'The Master of Plato', or 'The philosopher who 
drank the hemlock', or 'The person whom logicians assert to be mortal', but we 
certainly do not use the name as a name in the proper sense of the word (Russell 1918, 
200-201). 
However it is worth emphasizing that Russell himself was not entirely happy with this 
account. He suggests that what we intend ordinary proper names to do is refer directly, but 
that we are frustrated in this by our lack of acquaintance with the object. 
It would seem that, when we make a statement about something only known by 
description, we often intend to make our statement, not in the form involving the 
description, but about the actual thing described. That is to say, when we say anything 
about Bismarck, we should like, if we could, to make the judgement ... of which he is 
a constituent. In this we are necessarily defeated ... But we know that there us an 
object B called Bismarck, and that B was an astute diplomatist. We can thus describe 
the proposition we should like to affirm, namely 'B was an astute diplomatist', where B 
is the object which was Bismarck. What enables us to communicate in spite of the 
varying descriptions we employ is that we know there is a true proposition concerning 
the actual Bismarck, and that however we may vary the proposition (so long as the 
description is correct) the proposition described is still the same. This proposition, 
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which is described and is known to be true, is what interests us; but we are not 
acquainted with the proposition itself, and we do not know it, though we know it is 
true (Russell 1910, 22-23). 
Russell's point here of course is that although on his view the propositions we express-the 
semantic content of our utterances--do not involve the individuals that are the denotations of 
the descriptions that abbreviate ordinary proper names, the propositions we are really 
interested in do. Thus, while the propositions we actually express by means of ordinary proper 
names are of the form 'the so-and-so ~'s', there is a difference (though not a semantic one) 
between ordinary proper names and descriptions. Ordinary proper names indicate our interest 
in the proposition of which the individual described is actually a part. 
2.3 Descriptivism 
The common ground between Frege and Russell views on proper names is their 
descriptivism. Despite Russell's views about genuine referring terms, his account of ordinary 
proper names has significant points of contact with Frege's. Both agree that descriptive 
criteria play an essential role in picking out the thing denoted (in Russell's terminology) by 
the proper name. Thus both agree that descriptions and ordinary proper names are in the same 
semantic class, although they do not agree on whether that class is the class of genuinely 
referring expressions. It is the notion that the referent of a proper name is whatever satisfies 
the properties associated with its sense--<Jr whatever satisfies the description the name 
abbreviates-that came under such devastating attack by Saul Kripke. 11 
II Wettstein (1991) argues that this commonality is incidental and that the real area of agreement lies in the idea 
that in order to refer to something we must have a cognitive fix on it. He writes "This is the traditional idea that 
if one is to speak or think about a thing, on must possess a discriminating cognitive fix on the thing, that 
something about one's cognitive state must distinguish the relevant item from everything else in the universe" 
(107). The issues are delicate, but I think to ascribe this view to Frege is a mistake. Frege has almost nothing to 
say about the cognitive states required in order for me to have an idea of one sense rather than another, and Frege 
is quite clear that a sense, whatever else it is, is not a cognitive state but the object of that state. The fact that the 
sense must determine the referent-and thus distinguish it from everything else in the universe-leaves open the 
possibility that the cognitive state needed to count as grasping a sense does not determine the sense. 
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3.The critique of descriptivism 
The hybrid Fregean-Russellian picture of a descriptive sense as the content of a proper 
name was not without its critics in the first part of this century, but it suffered its most serious 
set back as a result of Kripke's critiques in Naming and Necessity. The Millian view of names 
as directly referential was familiar as an alternative since at least Smullyan's 1947 review of 
Quine. Nevertheless, the content and formulation of the critiques made by Kripke in Naming 
and Necessity are a touchstone for contemporary treatments of names and the problems of 
semantic content. As John Burgess has described it, Kripke's discussion opens up the 
possibility of a third way--or perhaps many ways-between Fregean senses and Millian tags 
(Burgess 1998, 57).12 
In understanding both Kripke's own arguments and related arguments such as 
Putnam's twin-earth thought experiment, it is useful to distinguish between five different 
conceptions of sense (Oppy 1992,448-449). 
(a) senseI: a purely conceptual or totally descriptional representation which all fully 
competent speakers associate with a singular term 
(b) sense2: a set or cluster of properties which are mentally represented and which 
speakers (more or less) idiosyncratically associate with a singular term 
(c) sense3: the mechanism by which the reference of a singular term is semantically 
determined 
(d) sense4: the semantic content or information value of a singular term 
(e) senses: the reference of occurrences of singular terms which are embedded within 
the scope of verbs of propositional attitude, etc 
Now, while there is room for dispute over what Frege would have thought of senseI or sense2, 
it seems clear that he identified sense3, sense4, and senses.13 The pre-Kripke Millian view is 
12 Burgess thinks the first hints that there must be a third way can be found in Quine's responses to the early 
critics of his attack on quantification into modal contexts. 
13 Actually, it is not entirely correct to claim that Frege identifies senses with sense4, as it suggests that whenever 
a singular term occurs within the scope of a propositional attitude ascription it takes it's usual sense as a referent. 
However, this is not the case for singular terms within the scope of more than one propositional attitude 
ascription. Nonetheless, (e) could be reformulated to capture this, and we will only be concerned with single 
embeddings. 
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committed to holding that there is nothing corresponding to sense3, that sense4 is identical to 
the referent of the singular term, and seems further to be committed to the view that senseI 
and sensel, if they exist, are irrelevant to semantics. It is unclear what they might have wanted 
to say about senses. Naming and Necessity argues that there is no single notion that 
corresponds to senseI, sense3, and sense4 (or to sensel, sense3, and sense4), that names have 
nothing like senseI, and that the correct story to tell about sense3 is a causal one. I4 The key 
way in which Kripke differs from the early Millians is, as Burgess points out (Burgess 1998, 
61), in his acknowledgement of the existence of something corresponding to sense3. It is in 
this sense that Kripke's views represent a third way. Further, Kripke differs from both the 
early Millians and the later direct reference theorists in rejecting the view that the referents of 
the singular terms are their semantic contents (sense4), and remains neutral on the question of 
what, if anything, senses is (Kripke 1980, 20-21). In what follows I will focus of Kripke's 
arguments against the identification of senseI with sense3 and sense4, as it is these arguments 
which most influence the various contemporary views about the semantic content of singular 
terms. Accordingly, I will not have much to say about the arguments for a causal account of 
sense3 or those against the existence of anything like senseI. I begin with a brief survey of the 
familiar arguments from Naming and Necessity. 
3.1 The modal argument 
The target of the modal argument is the view that if the reference of a term is fixed by 
a description (i.e., that senseI (or sensel) is sense3), then it follows that that description is the 
meaning (semantic content) of the term (i.e, that senseI (or sensel) is sense4). Kripke's own 
example is not a proper name, but the term meter. Suppose that we allow that the reference of 
the phrase 'one meter' has been stipulated by someone as the length of a certain stick in Paris, 
S, at to. 
14 Oppy suggests that Kripke's target is just the identification of sense), sense3, and sense4. However, Kripke's 
examples generally involve a speaker who associates a description with a singular term, not some shared 
description associated with the singular term. The trouble is mainly that in Naming and Necessity Kripke does 
not adequately distinguish between sensei and sense2 (see Evans 1973, 1-2). 
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Even though he uses [the description] to fix the reference of his standard of length, a 
meter, he can still say, 'if heat had been applied to this stick S at to, then at to stick S 
would not have been one meter long. 
Well, why can he do this? ... a simple answer to the question is this: Even if 
this is the only standard of length that he uses, there is an intuitive difference between 
the phrase 'one meter' and the phrase 'the length of S at to'. The first phrase is meant to 
designate rigidly a certain length at all possible worlds, which in the actual world 
happens to be the length of S at to. On the other hand, 'the length of S at to' does not 
designate anything rigidly .... So we can say of this stick, the same way we would of 
any other of the same substance and length, that if heat of a given quantity had been 
applied to it, it would have expanded to such and such a length. '" There is no conflict 
between that counterfactual statement and the definition of 'one meter' as 'the length of 
S at to', because the 'definition', properly interpreted, does not say that the phrase 'one 
meter' is to be synonymous (even when talking about counterfactual situations) with 
the phrase 'the length of S at to' (Kripke 1980, 55-56). 
The point here is that the modal profile of (17) and (18) differ. 
(17) The length of S at to is the length of S at to. 
(18) The length of S at to is one meter. 
(17) is necessarily true, while (18) is contingent, and this is so because 'one meter' is a rigid 
designator-it refers to the same thing at every possible world-while the description 'the 
length of S at to' picks out different things in different possible worlds. The situation is 
parallel for proper names. For example, (19) is presumably contingent-Prior might not have 
been a philosopher at all. 
(19) If Prior exists, then he invented tense logic. 
If, however, inventing tense logic is part of the semantic content of the term 'Prior', then (19) 
is necessarily true. It is part of the meaning of the term 'Prior', that its referent invented tense 
logic. And so for any property that is proposed as part of the semantic content of a term. In 
general, for any non-trivial property ~, the sentence 'If Prior exists then he ~ed' will be 
contingent. So it seems that whatever the semantic content associated with 'Prior' is, it does 
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not have any impact on the necessity or contingency-the modal profile-of the sentences in 
which 'Prior' occurs. But if the semantic content associated with a name has no impact on the 
modal profile of sentences in which the name occurs, it cannot have any impact on their truth 
conditions. After all, contingency and necessity are properties that a sentence has in virtue of 
its truth and falsity in different circumstances (that is, in virtue of its truth conditions). And 
this is so even if the reference of the proper name is fixed by the description the ~. 
3.2 The semantic arguments 
Kripke's semantic arguments instead target the view that anything like sense2 plays the 
role of sense3. Thus they are designed to show that the descriptions associated with a proper 
name n by a speaker usually do not determine the referent of the name NN-the possession of 
a uniquely denoting description is not required for reference, and the speaker may refer to an 
object using NN even if the descriptions he associates with NN uniquely pick out some other 
object. 
The problem with requiring the possession of a uniquely denoting description for an 
object in order to refer to it is, Kripke points out, that there are many perfectly ordinary cases 
of reference in which this requirement is not met: 
most people, when they think of Cicero, just think of a famous Roman orator, without 
any pretension to think either that there was only one famous Roman orator or that one 
must know something else about Cicero to have a referent for a name (1980, 81). 
Most of us regularly successfully refer to people for whom we do not have such uniquely 
denoting descriptions. 
Secondly, the possession of a uniquely denoting description which one associates with 
a name does not ensure that that name refers to the object denoted by that description. That is, 
the properties we associate with the name NN and take to be uniquely possessed by an object 
0, can tum out to be instead uniquely possessed by an object 0' without 0' thus being the 
referent of NN. Suppose, to use the now famous example, that the description associated by 
most people with the name 'Godel' is 'the man who proved the completeness of arithmetic' and 
it turns out that instead the theorem was proved by Schmidt. If the description associated with 
the name does determine the referent, then it would follow that when most people used the 
name 'Godel' they would (a) refer to Schmidt and (b) intend to do so. But this seems wrong. In 
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such a case we would withdraw the claim that the description applied to Godel, but we would 
still call him 'Godel' (Kripke 1980, 83-85; 87f37). 
3.3 The epistemic arguments 
The final type of argument given by Kripke targets the view that the semantic content 
of the name (i.e., sense4) is a description, or some cluster of descriptions, which are associated 
with the name (i.e., senseI or sense2). Consider a sentence of the form (20). 
(20) If ~ exists, then ~ is ~. 
There is no doubt that sentences with the form of (20) are known to be true a priori. In 
particular, where d is a property then we can know 'If the d exists then the d is the d a priori, 
and where D is a set of properties we can know 'If the thing possessing most of the properties 
in D exists then the thing possessing most of the properties in D is the thing possessing most 
of the properties in D' to be true a priori. Now if the semantic content of a name NN is 
equivalent to a description or some cluster of descriptions-that is, if the name NN and the 
description in question are synonymous-then sentences of the form of (21) should also be 
synonymous. 
(21) IfNN exists, then NN is~. 
(Where ~ is the appropriate description.) But this, Kripke suggests, just doesn't seem to be the 
case. Even in a case where the referent of a name is the thing which satisfies the description it 
does not seem that I know a sentence of the form of (21) a priori: 
I think that my belief about Godel is in fact correct and that the Schmidt story is just a 
fantasy. But the belief hardly constitutes a priori knowledge (Kripke 1980,87). 
3.4 The twin-earth argument 
Advocates of description theories of various types often maintain that Kripke and 
subsequent opponents of Fregean views have failed to cast the net wide enough in considering 
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candidates for the content of proper names. IS It is in response to this sort of claim that Nathan 
Salmon has adapted Hilary Putnam's twin-earth thought experimentI6 to show that whatever 
the descriptive content associated with a proper name is, it is not sufficient to determine 
reference (Salmon 1986, 66-67). 
Imagine that in the far reaches of the universe there is a planet that, against all odds, is 
a perfect duplicate of earth--call it twin-earth. On this planet lives a woman, Aileen, who is in 
all respects lives a life identical to that of a woman (also called Aileen) living here on earth-
their streams of consciousness are qualitatively indistinguishable, and their brain matter 
passes through the same configurations in the same order. Each has a husband named Hubert, 
but where the earthly Hubert weighs precisely 74 kilos the alien Hubert weighs 74.000000001 
kilos-a difference in weight which has no effect on the qualitative aspects of Hubert-related 
experiences. For all intents and purposes the Huberts are indistinguishable. Suppose then that 
the woman simultaneously (and sincerely) utter the sentence 'Hubert weighs 74 kilos'. 
Suppose that the descriptive content of terms does determine their referent. Since the 
information content of the sentences uttered by the women is different-one concerns earthly 
Hubert and the other alien Hubert-then earthly Aileen and alien Aileen must be grasping 
different descriptive content when they use the term 'Hubert'. But how can this be? Surely the 
descriptive content which one is grasping is determined solely by one's purely psychological 
state. What else other than one's state of consciousness could determine what descriptive 
content one is grasping? However, the Aileens are qualitatively identical in every way. Most 
importantly they have the same stream of consciousness and the same configuration of brain 
matter. They are, we must conclude, in the same psychological state-the same state of 
consciousness. Since the Aileens attach exactly the same descriptive content to the term 
'Hubert', something other than that content must be determining the reference of the terms. 
In fact, not only does it seem that something other than descriptive content must 
determine reference, but also that there must be something more to the semantic content of the 
names than the descriptive content. After all, the two utterances of the string of symbols 
'Hubert weighs 74 kilos' have different truth values, and thus must encode different content. 
Since by hypothesis all of the other words in the sentence have the same content on twin-earth 
15 For example, Frank Jackson writes that: "The objections brought against the theory ... overlook obvious 
candidates to be the descriptions or properties that secure reference according to the theory" (Jackson 1998b, 1). 
16 See Putnam 1975. 
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as on earth, the two occurrences of the string of symbols 'Hubert' must encode different 
content. 
3.5 The error argument 
There are other views which respond to the twin-earth argument and its relatives by 
ascribing some descriptive content to names without maintaining that this content fixes the 
referent (i.e., they give up the identification of sense3 and sense4).17 For example, it might be 
maintained that the content of a proper name was the ordered pair consisting of the referent 
itself and a description associated with the name or a way of thinking about the referent. The 
error argument is targeted against this sort of view. It assumes that the conceptual content that 
we associate with a name may include varying amounts of error-indeed, that it could be 
completely erroneous. Suppose then that the content we associate with the name 'Plato' fits 
Aristotle far better, due to a series of copying errors. The conceptual content we associate 
with 'Plato' is erroneous. Nevertheless, the sentence 'Plato wrote the Phaedrus' would not 
encode any false information. It would be simply true. The fact that the conceptual content of 
the name 'Plato' does not actually fit Plato is irrelevant. However, since the conceptual content 
of the name is erroneous, and the sentence 'Plato wrote the Phaedrus' is simply true-the 
information it encodes concerning Plato contains no error. The conceptual content cannot 
form any part of the information semantically encoded by 'Plato wrote the Phaedrus'. and thus 
cannot contribute to its truth conditions (Salmon 1986, 69-70). 
3.4 The moral 
There have been various attempts to defend the view that a description of some sort 
fixes the reference of a proper name, and also to defend the view that this description is in fact 
one that individuals are (perhaps implicitly) in possession of that descriptionY However, 
much of the appeal of descriptivism was that it provided an account of the semantic content of 
a name which both ascribed different content to different co-referential names and provided a 
candidate for the referent of names in propositional attitude contexts that supported the 
intuition that those contexts were opaque. Given this, it is Kripke's modal arguments which 
17 This is the sort of view advocated in Putnam 1979. 
18 For a recent example of both see Jackson 1998b. 
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are most devastating to the hybrid view. 19 If even on the assumption that the reference of a 
name is fixed by a description that description cannot be the semantic content of the name, 
then a Fregean sense does not solve the puzzle that motivated it-the problem of the apparent 
informativeness of identity statements between co-referential names. 
Whether a causal theory of the type advocated by Kripke or some form of 
descriptivism provides the right account of how the reference of a proper name is fixed, we 
still need to give an account of the semantic content of proper names. Kripke himself remarks 
that, despite the arguments of Naming and Necessity, sentences which differ only in the 
presence of different co-referential proper names are not in his view completely 
interchangeable, and considers the question of what propositions are expressed by sentences 
like (22) and (23) a vexing one (Kripke 1980,20-21). 
(22) Hesperus is Hesperus. 
(23) Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
It is to the contemporary answers to Kripke's vexing question that I now tum. 
19 Given various difficulties with the a priorila posteriori distinction, and the debate over their relationship to the 
analytic/synthetic and necessary/contingent distinctions, a descriptivist who can answer the modal argument has 
various option open to deal with the epistemic arguments. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The contemporary views 
The contemporary accounts of the semantic content of proper names have two 
common assumptions. They agree that proper names, whatever their other properties, are rigid 
designators-that is that proper names designate the same individual in every possible world. 
Furthermore, they agree that an account of proper names must give some answer to Frege's 
puzzle about the cognitive significance of identity statements involving different co-
referential names. Advocates of the various views also maintain that Frege was at least correct 
in claiming that the way in which an object is presented to someone can make a difference to 
the beliefs that they form. Beyond this there is little agreement. However the contemporary 
views can been seen as falling into two broad classes. Millian views which maintain that 
names are directly referential and that their semantic content is exhausted by their referents, 
and neo-Fregean views which retain the idea that proper names have associated senses. 
In what follows I summarize six contemporary accounts of names. I begin by arguing 
that even if descriptivism can be defended as an account of the means by which the reference 
of a proper name is fixed it cannot serve as an account of the semantic content of names. I 
then turn to views which do provide an account of the semantic content of names. Two of 
these-the naIve theory and the hidden-indexical theory-are Millian accounts. NaIve 
theorists maintain that co-referential names are substitutable without change in either 
semantic content or truth-value in all contexts, including propositional attitude ones. In 
contrast defenders of the hidden-indexical account suggest that while in such contexts the 
semantic content provided by the name is just its referent, the semantic content traceable to 
the use of the name goes beyond this, and it is this latter content that is affected by 
substitution. In contrast the two Fregean accounts-neo-Fregeanism and the neo-Fregean 
hidden-indexical theory--defend the view that the semantic content of the name is something 
like a Fregean sense, though they differ over the mechanism by which this sense is provided. 
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Finally the sixth account-the indexical view of names-attempts to integrate the intuitions 
underlying both views. 
1. Descriptivism reborn? 
One key element of the modal argument is the conclusion that proper names appear to 
be rigid designators. Descriptivists have revised their theories in one of two ways in response 
to this attack--either proposing that names are equivalent to descriptions which are required 
to take wide-scope over modal operators in sentences in which they occur, or proposing that 
names are equivalent to rigidfied descriptions. 1 Both of these options have their difficulties. 
1.1 Wide-scope descriptivism 
The first option, wide-scope descriptivism, can correctly account for the truth 
conditions of sentences like (6). 
(6) Necessarily, Prior is the inventor of tense logic. 
o [(p = (the x: Tx)] 
On the wide-scope view there is no reading of (6) on which it is equivalent to (7). 
(7) It is necessary that: the inventor of tense logic is the inventor of tense logic. 
o [(the x: Tx) = (the y: Ty)] 
Instead the descriptive content of the proper name is semantically required to take wide-scope 
over the modal operator, so that (6) is always equivalent to (8). 
(8) The inventor of tense logic is necessarily the inventor of tense logic. 
(the x: Tx) [0 (x = (the y: Ty))] 
I The first option is defended in Dummett 1981. The second option is discussed favorably in Jackson 1998b and 
critically in Recanati 1993. 
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However, the modal argument as expressed above is concerned not with the truth conditions 
of sentences containing modal operators, but with the modal profile of sentences containing 
names. The claim is that the modal profile of (9) and (10) differ. 
(9) Prior is the inventor of tense logic. 
(10) The inventor of tense logic is the inventor of tense logic. 
In particular, it intuitively seems that (10) will only be false in worlds where there is no 
unique inventor of tense logic but true otherwise, whereas (9) would be false in (among 
others) worlds in which Godel invents tense logic and Prior remains in the New Zealand 
Armed Forces for his entire career. However, since neither (9) or (10) contain modal 
operators, the wide-scope analysis seems unable to account for them. 
Indeed, Francois Recanati has suggested that once we consider (9) and (10) we are in a 
position to realize that descriptions given wide-scope over modal operators also do not 
designate rigidly (Recanati 1993, 9-10). When the description is given wide-scope over the 
modal operator in (8), the sentence says that the person who is the inventor of tense logic in 
the actual world is also the inventor of tense logic in every other world. But, as Recanati puts 
it, the sentence "does not tell us which world is supposed to play the role of 'the actual world'; 
with respect to any world w, the actual world will be that very world wIt (Recanati 1993, 9). 
Recanati's point is that while (6) and (8) may have the same truth conditions when considered 
in this world, they, just like (9) and (10), have different modal profiles. When considered with 
respect to the world in which Godel invented tense logic, (8) is true iff Godel is the inventor 
of tense logic in every relevant possible world, whereas it seems that (6) would still be judged 
to be true iff Prior was the inventor of tense logic in every relevant possible world. Relative to 
the Godel world, (8) is equivalent not to (6), but to (11); 
(11) Necessarily, Godel is the inventor oftense logic. 
Michael Dummett has suggested that the problem with the claim that (9) and (10) 
differ is that there are no pre-theoretic intuitions about the modal profile of sentences 
(Dummett 1981, 582). Instead, when asked about the modal profile of (9) and (10) we rely on 
our intuitions about sentences with modal operators-sentences like (6), (12), and (13). 
(12) Possibly, Prior is the inventor of tense logic. 
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(13) At a world w, Prior is the inventor of tense logic. 
In each of these cases the modal operator will force the descriptive content of 'Prior' to take 
wide-scope, whereas the parallel sentences involving two description will have two readings, 
thus giving rise to the intuition that modal profile differs. Thus the wide-scope analysis 
accounts, in Dummett's view, for all the genuine intuitions about names in modal contexts 
(Dummett 1981, 577-579). 
Presumably Dummett would extend his account to cover Recanati's claim that (6) and 
(8) differ in modal profile, claiming that in this case the only genuine intuitions in question 
are intuitions about (14) and (15). 
(14) Necessarily, necessarily, Prior is the inventor oftense logic. 
(15) Necessarily, the inventor oftense logic is necessarily the inventor of tense 
logic. 
The thought that (8) might differ from (6) is on this view merely a consequence of the fact 
that (15) can have two readings-one on which it is equivalent to (15') and one on which it is 
equivalent to (15"). 
(IS') 0 [(the x: Tx) [0 (x = (the y: Ty))]] 
(15") (the x: Tx) [0 0 (x = (the y: Ty))] 
Since the wide-scope view will treat (14) as equivalent to (15"), Dummett can claim that all 
the intuitions are accounted for. Unfortunately the claim that we have genuine pre-theoretic 
intuitions about (14) and (15) but not about the modal profile of utterances is starting to look 
more and more implausible. It seems that it is now open to an advocate of the modal argument 
to point out that (14) and (15") differ in modal profile, thus forcing a defender of the wide-
scope analysis to maintain that we are giving answers based solely on our intuitions about 
sentences with three iterated modal operators, and so on. Furthermore, it is utterly unclear 
what the origins of our intuitions about sentences with modal operators are if it is not the 
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consideration of what would be the case in counterfactual circumstances, and this kind of 
consideration can equally well be applied to the modal profile questions? 
Indeed, the modal profile objection can be reworked to evade Dummett's strategy 
entirely. We have been phrasing the objection in terms of the truth and falsity of the sentence 
in different possible worlds, and it is this that Dummett claims we have no intuitions about. 
Dummett surely cannot maintain that we have no pre-theoretical intuitions about the truth-
conditions of sentences like (9) and (10). However the intuitions exploited in the modal 
profile argument seem just to be intuitions about the truth conditions of the sentences 
involved. We could have put the objection by saying that in the case of (9) there is a single 
individual-namely Prior-such that (9) will be true in a world w just in case that individual 
is the inventor of tense logic in w, whereas for (10), there is no single individual such that (10) 
will be true in w just in case that individual is the inventor of tense logic.3 But in this 
formulation the use of the theoretical notion of possible worlds seems incidental. What is 
essential is that (9) is true just in case a particular individual is the inventor of tense logic, 
whereas (10) is true just in case there is a single inventor of tense logic. Nor is this difference 
merely a feature of the fact that (10) is an identity statement between two terms. The problem 
can be seen just as clearly with respect to a far more mundane example adapted from 
Recanati. 
(16) The prime minister of New Zealand might have been a member of the 
National Party. 
(17) Helen Clark might have been a member of the National Party. 
There is a unique individual x such that (17) is true just in case x is a member of the National 
Party, but there is not a unique individual y such that (16) is true just in case y is a member of 
the National Party.4 
2 Of course the question of which counterfactual situations are relevant is a genuine one which resulted in 
substantial disagreement about the domain of the possible throughout the history of philosophy-see Knuuttila 
1993 and Wyatt 2000. The multiplicity of intuitions about which counterfactual states of affairs are relevant 
means that Dummett cannot have recourse to the claim that iterated modalities collapse, as this is only the case 
for relatively strong modal logics. 
3 This is parallel to Recanati's formulation of the objection (1993, 9). 
4 It should be pointed out that I am assuming that the description in question is attributive rather than referential. 
Since the claim of the descriptivist is that the referent of the name is whomever satisfies the associated 
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1.2 Rigidified descriptions 
This line of criticism can also be extended to the second option, that of treating names 
as rigidified descriptions. Recanati's observation that sentences in which descriptions are 
given a wide-scope reading do not indicate which world is the actual world is just as 
applicable to sentences containing rigidified definite descriptions. Compare (17) to (18). 
(18) The actual prime minister of New Zealand might have been a member of the 
National Party. 
Just as in the case of wide-scope descriptivism, (18) will be true with respect to a world w just 
in case whomever is the prime minister of New Zealand in w is a member of the National 
Party in some possible world. In a world WI in which Jenny Shipley was (re)elected, (18) will 
be true just in case Shipley is a member of the National Party in some possible world w'; in a 
world W2 in which Richard Prebbl~ was elected, (18) would be true iffPrebble is a member of 
the National Party in some possible world w'; and with respect to this world, (18) is true just 
in case Clark is a member of the National Party in some possible world w' (Recanati 1993, 9). 
In contrast, with respect to any possible world w, (17) will be true just in case Clark is a 
member of the National Party in some possible world w'. 
1.3 Soames' revised modal argument 
Recently, in the article "The Modal Argument: Wide Scope and Rigidified 
Descriptions" Scott Soames has offered additional reasons for concluding that neither wide-
scope descriptivism nor rigidification offer a successful response to the challenge of the 
modal argument. As Soames acknowledges, the main motivation for proponents of the two 
descriptivist strategies is a desire to simultaneously explain both the behaviour of proper 
names in modal contexts-their apparent rigidity-and their behaviour in propositional 
attitude contexts-the possibility of failure of substitutivity. Because the wide-scope 
descriptions are the semantic content of names (i.e., sense4) sentences with different co-
description (or whomever best satisfies the associated cluster of descriptions), and that this description (cluster of 
descriptions) is the semantic content of the term, then this assumption seems in order. 
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designative names will have different semantic contents, and if the object of the propositional 
attitudes is identified with these semantic contents then substitution failure in such contexts is 
explained.5 Accordingly, his strategy is to show that for each strategy one of the desideratum 
is not met. 
Soames reconstructs Kripke's argument as follows: 
(i) Proper names are rigid designators. 
(ii) Therefore, proper names do not have the same meanings as non-rigid descriptions. 
So, if N is a proper name, and D is a non-rigid description, then the sentences N is F 
and D is F typically do no have the same meaning, or express the same proposition. 
(iii) Since the descriptions commonly associated with names by speakers are non-
rigid, typically the meanings of names are not given by those descriptions. So, ifN is a 
name and D is a description associated with N by speakers, then the sentences N is F 
and D is F typically do not have the same meaning, or express the same proposition 
(Soames 1998, 2). 
Soames suggests that our prima facie reason for accepting the first premise of the modal 
argument-that names are rigid designators-is our endorsement of the principle (GR) (in 
this case for the name 'Aristotle'). 
GR. There is a certain individual x, such that for every possible world w, the proposition 
that Aristotle was a philosopher is true at w iff x was a philosopher at w, ... and so on 
for other propositions expressed using the name 'Aristotle'. 
On the view which analyses proper names as wide scope descriptions, our inclination to 
endorse (GR) is explained in terms of a simulated rigidity principle (SR i). We replace the 
name 'Aristotle' with a non-rigid description, 'the G', which picks out Aristotle in the actual 
world, and which is required to take wide scope over all modal predicates, operators, and 
quantifiers in the same sentence. 
5 This may be accomplished by treating names as referring to their semantic content in propositional attitude 
contexts (i.e., by identifying the description as sense5) or by treating the attitude as sensitive to the semantic 
content of the sentence following the 'that'. For our purposes these are merely notational variants. 
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(SR i) There is a certain individual x, such that for every possible world w, the proposition 
that the G was a philosopher is true at w iff x was a philosopher at w, ... and so on for 
other propositions expressed using the name 'Aristotle'. 
Soames gives the content of (SR i) more explicitly in (SR ii). 
(SR ii) [the y: Gy] (there is a certain individual x, such that for every possible world w, the 
proposition that y was a philosopher is true at W iff x was a philosopher at w, ... and so 
on for other propositions expressed using the name 'Aristotle'.) 
On this account then, (GR) is true because (SR ii) is, and not because the name 'Aristotle' is a 
rigid designator. As described, this strategy works by denying the first premise of the modal 
argument, and providing an alternate explanation for the apparent rigidity of proper names. 
1.3.1 The basic argument against wide-scope descriptivism 
Soames' basic argument against the wide-scope analysis is as follows. He presents us 
with the following argument: 
(P 1) The proposition that if n is F, then something is both F and G = the proposition that if 
the Gis F, then something is both F and G. 
(P2) The proposition that if the G is F, then something is both F and G is a necessary truth. 
o (the x: Gx) [Fx ~ 3y (Fy & Gy)] 
(C) The proposition that if n is F, then something is both F and G is a necessary truth. 
o [Fn ~ 3y (Fy & Gy)] 
This argument, argues Soames, is valid, having the grammatical form (I). 
(I) (i) a = b 
(ii) a is a necessary truth 
(iii) b is a necessary truth 
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The problem, as he sees it, for the wide-scope analysis is that on its account (C) is equivalent 
to (C'). 
(C') The G is such that the proposition that if it is F, then something is both F and G is a 
necessary truth. 
(the x: Gx) 0 [Fx -)0 3y (Fy & Gy)] 
Since the wide-scope analysis gives takes n to be equivalent to a description, the G, which is 
given wide scope over any modal operators in sentences in which it occurs, it must read (C) as 
(C'), and (C') may well be false (when G is not an essential property of the thing in question). 
Therefore it must characterize the argument in question as invalid. 
Soames' correctly assumes that traditional wide-scope descriptivism is without 
question committed to the truth of(Pl).6 His precise statement ofthe view is that where n is a 
name, S(n) a sentence containing an occurrence of n, d is a description, and S(d) the result of 
substituting an occurrence of d for each occurrence of n, wide-scope descriptivism holds that: 
the proposition expressed by Sen) is the proposition expressed by Sed), on an 
interpretation in which each occurrence of d (that replaces an original occurrence of n 
in Sen)) is given wide scope over every modal operator, modal predicate, and modal 
quantifier in Sex), except those for which doing this would involve removing d from 
the scope of some propositional attitude verb (Soames 1998, 5) 
Soames is careful to note that he is assuming no particular theoretical account of propositions. 
Rather, he assumes merely that propositions are expressed by sentences, bear truth values, and 
are the objects of attitudes. For his purposes in the paper under discussion then, propositions 
is just a name for those things, which he takes to be one of the pre-theoretical commitments of 
every day speech (Soames 1998, 5). Whether or not propositions are a commitment of pre-
theoretical speech, the notion there is something which is expressed by a sentence and that 
what is contributed by name to whatever is expressed by a sentence and bears a truth value 
(sense4) is a description is a commitment of standard descriptivist views. However, this does 
bring attention to the fact that this version of Soames argument rests on the assumption that 
6 For a non-traditional version of the view that is immune to Soames' argument, although not without its own 
difficulties, see Chapter 6. 
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the content attributed to proper names can be captured by definite descriptions. Some 
advocates of the wide-scope analysis have denied this, advocating a view on which the 
content of a proper name picks out the referent by means of some property or properties for 
which there is no synonymous description. Soames offers a variation on his basic argument 
designed to show that even with this modification the wide-scope analysis does not attribute 
the correct semantic content to sentences containing names.7 
1.3.2 The variation 
Soames begins by observing that advocates of the inexpressible descriptions view of 
proper names sometimes subscribe to the further "strange and desperate doctrine" that we 
cannot assess the modal profile of propositions expressed by sentences containing names 
(Soames 1998, 8). Recall that on this view we can say that In is F expresses a proposition, 
namely, the proposition that n is F. We can assess it's truth and falsity. What we cannot do, 
according to this view, is ask about its truth and falsity in different possible worlds. If we try 
to do this we end up asking about the truth or falsity of sentences in which modal operators 
occur-sentences in which the conceptual content takes wide-scope. As Soames describes it, 
this changes the question: 
We intended to ask about the truth value in w of the proposition expressed by n is F. 
We ended up asking about the truth value in w of the Russellian proposition consisting 
not of the descriptive content of n together with the property F, but of the individual 
denoted by that descriptive content in the actual world, together with the property F 
(Soames 1998, 8). 
This seems a bit like damning the descriptivist for her success. The challenge set the 
descriptivists by the modal argument was to explain the behaviour of proper names in modal 
contents. On Soames account the inexpressible descriptions theory does one better. Not only 
does her account explain the modal behaviour of names, but it gives exactly the same account 
of this modal behaviour as does the Russellian, while preserving the opaqueness of 
propositional attitude contexts. Soames chooses to describe this situation as attempting to ask 
one question and instead asking another. We might equally well say that on the inexpressible 
7 e.g. Dummett 1981, Appendix to Chapter 5. 
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descriptions theory questions about the truth value in w of the proposition 'n is F just are 
questions about: 
the truth value of in w of the Russellian proposition consisting not of the descriptive 
content of n together with the property F, but of the individual denoted by that 
descriptive content in the actual world, together with the property F (Soames 1998, 8). 
As becomes clear in the sequel however, Soames does not think the inexpressible 
descriptions theory supports this modal account. While we cannot, he admits, express the 
proposition that n is F in any other way, we can describe that proposition. It is the proposition 
expressed by the sentence 'n is F. We may then go on to ask the supposedly unaskable 
question: What is the modal profile of the proposition expressed by 'n is F? 
Soames then exploits our ability to describe these propositions in the following 
argument. He asks us to consider claims (19) and (20) in light of premise (PIa). 
(PIa) The proposition that n is F = the proposition expressed by the sentence 'n is F. 
(19) The proposition expressed by the sentence 'n is F is true at world w. 
(20) The proposition that n is F is true in world w. 
(PIa) is, as Soames says, undeniable. On the wide-scope analysis the name n will take wide-
scope over the modal operator 'true in world w', and thus (20) will be true just in case the 
individual picked out by the content associated with n in the actual world is an individual who 
is F at world w. However, since in (19) the phrase 'the proposition expressed by the sentence 
'n is F' is acting as a description of the semantic content, it seems that (19) must be 
characterized as true iff the semantic content of n picks out an individual in w who is Fat w. 
Despite the fact that the inference from (19) and (PIa) to (20) and the one from (20) and (PIa) 
to (19) are valid, the wide-scope view treats them as invalid (Soames 1998, 9). 
1.3.3 The argument against rigid descriptions 
In section 1.2 I extended an argument of Recanati's to show that sentences in which 
descriptions of the form 'the actual ~' occur do not have the same truth conditions as the 
sentences which result from substituting a co-referential proper name for the description. 
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Soames' argument against the view that the semantic content of names is equivalent to 
rigidified descriptions is targeted instead at the view that treating rigidified descriptions as the 
semantic content of proper names give the right results for propositional attitude contexts. In 
this case we hold the context fixed so that the actual world is the same throughout. Soames 
argues as follows (Soames 1998, 15): 
(PI) It is possible to believe that Aristotle was a philosopher without believing 
anything about the actual world Aw. In particular, agents in other possible worlds 
believe that Aristotle was a philosopher without believing anything about the actual 
world. 
(P2) Necessarily, one believes that the actual ~ was a philosopher iff one believes 
something about the actual world Aw-namely that the unique ~ in Aw is a philosopher. 
(Cl) It is not the case that necessarily one believes that Aristotle was a philosopher iff 
one believes that the actual ~ was a philosopher. 
(P3) If the content of 'Aristotle', as used in a context C, were identical to the content of 
'the actual ~' as used in that same context, then: 
(i) the contents in C of 'Aristotle was G' and 'The actual ~ was G' would be the 
same, 
(ii) the propositions expressed in C by 'a believes that Aristotle was G' and 'a 
believes that the actual ~ was G' would be necessarily equivalent, and 
(iii) C 1 would be false. 
(C2) The semantic content of 'the actual ~' (relative to a context) cannot be the content 
of the name 'Aristotle' (relative to that context). 
That is, even if we hold the context in which the reference of the indexical 'actually' is to be 
evaluated constant, the contribution of names to the object of a propositional attitude cannot 
be the same as the contribution of a rigidified definite description. Since the whole motivation 
of the descriptionist account is to identify the semantic content of names (sense4) with the 
object of the propositional attitudes (senses) in order to explain opacity, the descriptionist will 
not wish to deny that the content of the description is the object of the attitude. In short, if we 
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are to allow attributions of propositional attitudes to individuals in counterfactual situations 
(as we surely want to) we cannot identify the content of names with rigidified descriptions. 8 
2. The naiVe theory 
Millianism is the view that names are directly referential-that is, that the only 
contribution they make to the information content of sentences in which they occurs are their 
referents. The underlying idea is that names are mere tags for their referents-tags that 
provide no information about how the referent is conceived or what properties it might have. 
Defenders of what has been dubbed the naiVe view maintain that Millianism is true, and that 
our intuitions regarding the substitution of co-referential terms in belief contexts are simply 
mistaken. This approach to the counterexamples to the direct reference view has been strongly 
defended by Nathan Salmon and Scott Soames. Soames and Salmon simply bite-the-bullet 
and accept that in each case the paired sentences express the same proposition, have the same 
truth conditions, and deem our intuitions to the contrary to be faulty.9 
2.1 Pronouns and iterated substitution 
Supporters of the naIve view bolster their case by pointing out that we often do allow 
substitution of co-referential names into propositional attitude contexts. Imagine that the 
logician Ruth Marcus (also known as Ruth Barcan) is attending a conference and overhears a 
philosopher she doesn't know saying: 
(21) I believe that Ruth Barcan invented the new theory of reference. 
Later, she and I are talking when he walks past, and Marcus reports to me (who knows her as 
Ruth Marcus) that: 
8 Frank Jackson, a defender of rigidified descriptivism as a theory of the reference of proper names, has said in 
conversation that the right response for the defender of descriptivism is to simply deny that the semantic content 
of a sentence is the object of the propositional attitudes. 
9 Thus the naIve view identifies both sense4 and senses with the referent of the name, and remain in principle 
neutral on sense3. As we shall see, they judge sensez to be irrelevant to semantics proper but accord it a role in 
the pragmatic implicatures of utterances. 
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(21 *) He believes that I invented the new theory of reference. 
Later, I report to you, again while the man walks past, that: 
(21 * *) He believes that Ruth Marcus invented the new theory of reference. 
It seems, argues the naIve theorist, that in each case exactly the same information is 
reported-that my report is a faithful account of what our unnamed philosopher believes-
even if he does not know that Ruth Barcan and Ruth Marcus are one and the same person. But 
if the same information is conveyed, then the same information must be associated with the 
names and pronouns. The simplest account of this is that they are all directly referential. 
Indeed, the phenomena of pronoun substitution in attitude contexts was marshaled by 
Mark Richard to produce an argument known as the steamroller (1983). Richard produces a 
case in which our intuitions about the truth-values of various belief sentences are purported to 
unreliable. In the case, A is talking on the telephone to B. A also sees, out of his window a 
phone booth which, together with its occupant, is about to be crushed by a steamroller. What 
A doesn't know is that B is the occupant of the phone booth. Explaining what he is seeing, A 
tells B: 
(22) I believe that she is in danger. 
There is no doubt that A would not affirm and furthermore would sincerely deny (26). 
(23) I believe that you are in danger. 
Richard argues that if we assume, as is reasonable, that (22) is true then we must also treat 
(23) as true, despite A's denial. Suppose that B, seeing a man up in an office building waving 
his arms about in a panicked fashion, utters (24). 
(24) The man watching me believes that I am in danger. 
Since (22) is true, (24) is also. (We assume, for simplicity only, that A is the only man 
watching B.) A is now in a position to report what she has said from his perspective. Of course 
he can't do this using (24), but instead uses (25). 
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(25) The man watching you believes you are in danger. 
Since (24) is true, (25) certainly is. Now while A doesn't believe it, (26) would also be true if 
uttered by him. 
(26) I am the man watching you. 
Since there is no reason to think that the position occupied by 'the man watching you' in (25) 
is opaque, (23) follows from (25) and (26). Since they could be truly uttered by A, so could 
(23). 
Indeed similar reasoning can be applied to cases involving proper names. Consider 
again (21 )-(21 * *), but suppose this time that the unnamed philosopher does not know that 
Ruth Barcan and Ruth Marcus are one and the same. 
(21) I believe that Ruth Barcan invented the new theory of reference. 
(21 *) He believes that I invented the new theory of reference. 
(21 **) He believes that Ruth Marcus invented the new theory of reference. 
If I can truly report his belief with (21 * *), there seems no reason to deny that he can truly 
utter (21 ***). 
(21 * * *) I believe that Ruth Marcus invented the new theory of reference. 
The point of these arguments (which we shall call context-hopping arguments) is to 
show that we have conflicting intuitions, and that not all of them can be right. If we are to 
accommodate the intuition that each move in the steamroller is valid, we must deny that the 
intuitions about the falsity of (23) are reliable. This is exactly the approach of the naIve 
theorist. 
2.2 Pragmatic implicatures 
The main challenge for the naIve view is to explain where the intuitions come from. 
The common explanation is that the conversational implicatures of the different sentences are 
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different. For example, while (27) and (27*), have the same information content, in many 
contexts they pragmatically imply the truth of (28) and (28*) respectively. 
(27) Hammurabi believes Hesperus is seen in the evening. 
(27*) Hammurabi believes Phosphorus is seen in the evening. 
(28) Hammurabi would assert the proposition that Hesperus is seen in the evening 
using his term 'Hesperus'. 
(28*) Hammurabi would assert the proposition that Hesperus is seen in the evening 
using his term 'Phosphorus'. 
It is, claims the advocate of the naive view, the falsity of (28*), not that of (27*) that drives 
our intuition that (27*) differs in truth value from (27). 
Neither Soames or Salmon have much to say about the nature of the pragmatic 
implicatures involved, but they do suggest that in general what gets implicated is information 
about the mode of presentation by which the subject grasps the proposition believed (Soames 
1987b: Salmon 1986). Salmon, who spells this view out in the most detail, claims that the 
binary relation of belief is in fact the existential generalization of a ternary relation BEL. BEL 
is a relation among believers, structured propositions, and something else (Salmon 1986, 111-
113).10 The nature of the things serving as the third relaturn of BEL is something Salmon 
treats as a question needing further investigation. However, whatever they are, they provide a 
means by which we may grasp propositions, so that BEL is such that: 
(i) 'A believes p' may be analyzed as 3x[A grasps p by means ofx & BEL(A, p, x)] 
(ii) A may stand in BEL to p and some x by means of which A grasps p, without 
standing in BEL to p and all x by means of which A grasps p. 
and 
(iii) 'A withholds belief from p' may be analyzed as 3x[A grasps p by means of x & 
-, BEL(A, p, x)] (Salmon 1986, 111). 
10 Salmon remains neutral on the exac,t nature of BEL, maintaining only that the naiVe view is committed to there 
being some such relation. His favoured example of such a relation is the relation of disposition to inward 
agreement when taken in a certain way. 
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Salmon's position is that since our purpose in attribution belief is to inform a hearer about 
how the subject stands in relation to a proposition, in cases where the subject's dispositions 
depend upon the way the proposition is taken we have reason to convey that information as 
well. However, as the predicate 'believes' is semantically inadequate for that purpose, we must 
do so pragmatically. The choice of the that-clause has pragmatic implications about the way 
in which the subject understands the proposition in question. We may deny (27*), but 
nevertheless the attribution in question is strictly and literally true. 
3. Neo-Fregeanism ll 
Some neo-Fregeans have reacted to the difficulties of descriptivism by denying that 
the relation between a sense and its referent need be one of satisfaction. In place of the 
descriptive modes of presentation criticized by Kripke and others they have offered the notion 
of a de re mode of presentation or de re sense. De re modes of presentation have three 
characteristic properties: first, their reference is determined relationally, rather than 
descriptively, second, the condition which determines their reference is truth-conditionally 
inert-that is, it is not one of the truth conditions of a thought containing a de re sense that the 
reference-determining condition be met-and third, they do not exist unless the referent does 
(i.e., they are object dependent). 12 
On this view then, the contribution of a proper name to the semantic content of a 
utterance in which it occurs will be a de re mode of presentation of the referent of the name. 
Since the connection between the name and the de re sense is not truth-conditionally relevant, 
the utterance will have the correct modal profile and will not be subject to the error argument. 
Furthermore, since the referent of the de re sense is determined relationally, there is adequate 
motivation for saying that twin-Aileen is talking about twin-Herbert rather than Herbert-
only twin-Herbert is in any relation to her modes of presentation. In fact, advocates of de re 
senses are in a position to say that the sense grasped by twin-Aileen is different from the sense 
grasped by Aileen, since on their view senses are object-dependent and individuated in terms 
of their objects. The sense grasped by twin-Aileen would not exist to be grasped unless twin-
Herbert did. However, since it is possible for an object to be presented to you by more than 
II This entire section owes a great deal to Francois Recanati's lucid discussion (1993, esp. chapters 2, 11, and 
12). 
12 See Recanati 1993, chapters 2,3,6, and 7: McDowell 1977; 1984: Evans 1981; 1982 chapter 1. 
Chapter 2: The Contemporary Views 52 
one de re mode of presentation, positing de re senses will allow the neo-Fregean to explain 
the failure of substitution in propositional attitude contexts in terms of a difference of 
semantic content between utterances differing only in which co-referential name is used. 
Different names can be associated with different de re modes of presentation. 
The notion of a de re sense is so far somewhat obscure. Some neo-Fregeans have 
advocated a two-component picture on which the content of a singular term is composed of 
both the referent and a descriptive mode of presentation of the object.13 Together they form 
the de re sense and can be represented by an ordered pair, so that the propositions expressed 
utterances involving them are what Schiffer calls quasi-singular propositions (Schiffer 1987, 
182).14 This account is strongly opposed by McDowell and Evans, who maintain that de re 
senses depend on the object for their existence and individuation without actually including it 
(Evans 1982: McDowell 1984; 1986). However, McDowell allows that de re senses can be 
grouped into classes: 
Particular de re senses, each specific to its res, can be grouped into sorts. Different de 
re senses (modes of presentation) can present their different res in the same sort of 
way: for instance, by exploiting their perceptual presence (1984, 220). 
The main difference between the two views is that while on the two-component view the 
descriptive mode of presentation can exist and be grasped even when the object of the de re 
sense does not, on the McDowell-Evans view there is no part of the sense that exists 
independently of the object. As a result the two versions will treat cases of empty names very 
differently. However they are similar enough that where the distinction between the two 
versions ofneo-Fregeanism does not matter I will treat them as one view. IS 
13 e.g. Peacocke 1981 and Bach 1987a, though note that what we are calling de re modes of presentation are not 
Bach's de re modes of presentation but tokens of them. This view is opposed in McDowell 1979;1984. 
14 A quasi-singular proposition is contains an ordered pair consisting of the referent and it's mode of presentation 
where a singular proposition would contain only the referent. The truth-conditions of such a proposition are the 
same as that of the corresponding singular proposition. 
15 For arguments against the tenability of the McDowell-Evans view see Recanati 1993 chapters 11 and 12. One 
issue which he does not discuss is that the notion of de re sense is left utterly obscure by McDowell and Evans. 
McDowell, for example, says that you can express, but not state, the sense of a proper name by means of some 
clauses that state the referent, like "'Hesperus' stands for (denotes) Hesperus", whereas a clause like '''Hesperus' 
stands for (denotes) Phosphorus" would merely state the referent (McDowell 1977, 174-177). In the same article 
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4. The hidden-indexical theory 
One approach to proper names that has been explored by a number of authors is to 
explain the behaviour of proper names in various opaque contexts by positing parts of the 
proposition which are not syntactically indicated but pragmatically provided. 16 
On, for example, Mark Crimmins' account of the semantics of the attitudes, sentences 
like (29) are to be understood as having unarticulated constituents (1992). 
(29) Amelia believes that Lewis Carroll is an English novelist. 
On Crimmins' view belief is a ternary relation between the believer (Amelia), the proposition 
believed (Lewis Carroll is an English novelist), and a mental representation, and so (29) does 
not express a complete proposition (ceritus paribus for other propositional attitudes). Just as 
the sentence 
(30) It is raining. 
does not express a proposition unless completed by a contextually supplied place and time, 
(29) must be completed by a contextually supplied mental representation. The question, then, 
is how is it supplied. In the case of (30) the unarticulated constituents are usually the place 
and time ofthe utterance, so that (30) is correctly read as: 
(3~') It is raining {here} {now}. 
However this is not always the case. We could well imagine the weather forecaster saying 
"And now to tomorrow's weather in Perth. It's raining." In this case (30) is properly completed 
as: 
he notes that this theory of sense does not explain but merely reflects failures of substitution (McDowell 1977, 
190-191), all of which leaves the notion even more obscure. 
16 A version of the hidden-indexical theory was first advanced in this century by Shiffer (1977). A version of it is 
also offered in Richard 1990. 
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(30") It's raining {in Perth} {tomorrow}. 
Crimmins' proposal is that in attributions like (29) the words used to express the proposition 
are pragmatically involved in specifying the unarticulated mental representation-though 
their force may be modified by other contextual features, just as (30'), the default reading, can 
be transformed into (30"). On this view, then the correct account of (29) is (29') (where ~ is 
contextually supplied). 
(29') Amelia believes that Lewis Carroll IS an English novelist {via a mental 
representation <\> } . 
By itself this doesn't tell us much. What is ~? On Crimmins view, a mental representation is 
composed of the concrete cognitive particulars, since on his view what is reported are not 
ways of believing but particular instances of believing (Crimmins 1992, 35-53). Thus belief 
ascriptions involving a proper name NN claim that there is a particular notion of the referent 
ofNN involved in the believer's mental representation. Other versions of the hidden-indexical 
theory (HIT), such as that offered by Richard (1990), instead claim that the unarticulated 
element is something more abstract. What the accounts have in common is that they explain 
the relationship between the words used in the belief ascription and the nature of the 
unarticulated element in terms of a contextually provided mapping. 
Consider an example where you and I are discussing Amelia's performance on an 
exam which asks "Was Lewis Carroll English?". I might utter (29) in order to convey that she 
will answer that question correctly. This means that whatever unarticulated element is 
operative must be one that Amelia associates with the name 'Lewis Carroll'. If, on the other 
hand, I am discussing Amelia's adoration of the gentleman whose painting is over my desk, 
but Amelia does not know that this is a painting of Carroll at all (in fact she thinks Lewis 
Carroll is an American poet), the relevant unarticulated element will be that she has associated 
with the picture, and not those associated with the name 'Lewis Carroll'. (For simplicity's sake 
I am concentrating on the unarticulated element associated with Lewis Carroll, and ignoring 
those connected with being English and being an novelist.) 
There are afew important points to note about HIT. First of all, supporters of hidden-
indexical views of the type outlined above subscribe to a Millian account of names. That is, 
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they think the semantic content of the name is exhausted by its referent. Secondly, they 
subscribe to what is sometimes known as the principle of semantic innocence. 
Semantic innocence (S1): 
Embedding an expression in a propositional attitude construction does not change the 
meaning or reference of the expression. 
S1 is maintained because the hidden-indexical VIew distinguishes carefully between the 
following two principles of direct reference (Crimmins 1992, 11). 
Direct reference (DR): 
The semantic content of a use of a name in any statement is the object it denotes. 
Direct contribution (DC): 
The contribution to the semantic content of a statement traceable to the use of a name 
is simply the object it denotes. 
Hidden-indexical views endorse DR but not DC. The mode of presentation <I> in (29') is 
traceable (via pragmatic reasoning) to the use of the name 'Lewis Carroll'. 
(29') Amelia believes that Lewis Carroll IS an English novelist {via a mental 
representation <I> } . 
Similarly, the time and place specifications of (30') are traceable to the fact that (30) was 
uttered on a particular morning. 
(30) It is raining. 
(30') It is raining {here} {now}. 
Nevertheless, we should not conclude that any part of the mode of presentation <I> is part of the 
semantic content of the name 'Lewis Carroll', anymore than we would conclude that the fact 
that an utterance of (30) was made on a particular day and at a particular place has the 
semantic content of the indexicals 'here' and 'now'. No doubt the reason we are tempted by the 
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first conclusion and not the second is because names, but not facts, are the right sorts of things 
to have semantic content. 
Accordingly, defenders of the hidden-indexical theory are in agreement with defenders 
of the naIve theory about the behaviour of proper names outside propositional attitude 
contexts. Furthermore, since Salmon and Soames have also claimed that the relationship 
between a believer and the proposition believed is in fact a three-way one mediated by some 
mode of presentation, the two views are largely in agreement about the cognitive facts. They 
disagree solely over whether a specification of the third element in the cognitive relation 
referred to by 'believe' is part of ordinary attitude ascriptions. 
5. Neo-Fregean HIT 
Both HIT and the naIve theory advocate the thesis of direct reference-this is what· 
makes them neo-Russellian rather than neo-Fregean theories. However, Graeme Forbes 
advocates a version of neo-Fregeanism that is similar to the hidden-indexical theory (Forbes 
1990; 1993; 1996; 1997). 
Forbes' view is that we associate de re senses with proper names in connection with 
mental dossiers of information about an object. When we take a name NN to stand for a 
particular object we label the dossier concerned with that object with NN. The cognitive 
significance of the de re sense of the name is then captured by the description 'the subject of 
this dossier', where the dossier picked out by 'this' is of course the one labeled NN. 17 Despite 
this, Forbes does not take the Fregean view that in the context of a propositional attitude a 
name refers to it's usual sense. Instead, it assimilates belief ascriptions to Quine's classic 
Giorgione example: Giorgione is so-called because of his size, Giorgione is Barbarelli, but it 
is false that Barbarelli is so-called because of his size. Substitution fails in this case because 
the logophor 'so-called' refers to the word 'Giorgione', even though 'Giorgione' itself has its 
usual reference. Forbes position is that in an attitude ascription there is an implicit logophor, 
so that (29) is correctly expanded as (31) which is in tum interpreted by (32). 
17 The description captures the cognitive significance of the sense of the name, but in Forbes view is not the 
sense. He says that "the sense of a description may encapsulate the sense of a singular term without there being 
any literal sameness of the sense of the senses of the description and the term. This would happen when the sense 
of the description is structured and the sense unstructured" (Forbes 1990, 537). However, capturing the 
cognitive significance of the sense as it is cognitive significance which affects belief and other attitudes (Forbes 
1990, 537-539). 
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(29) Amelia believes that Lewis Carroll is an English novelist. 
(31) Amelia believes that Lewis Carroll is an English novelist, so-labeled. 
(32) The abstract situation of Lewis Carroll being an English novelist is such that 
Amelia believes her so-labeled way of thinking about it. 
An abstract situation is simply a singular proposition (Forbes 1997, 110). Ways ofthinking of 
such propositions are of course senses or modes of presentation. Accordingly, we can set 
aside the Amelia's ways of thinking about the property of being an English novelist in order to 
focus on the proper name by representing (29) via (33). Where S is a meaningful expression 
lSI is the sense ofthat expression, and 'N conecates senses such that where the sequence SS' is 
a meaningful expression, Sense(SYSense(S') is the sense of the sequence SS'. 
(33) Lewis Carroll is such that for Amelia's so-labeled way of thinking of him a, 
Amelia believes aA/is an English novelist!. 
A sense is so-labeled by a name NN just in case NN is a linguistic counterpart of the name 
the believer uses to label the dossier associated with a. The linguistic counterpart relation, 
like the mapping involved in Crimmins' account, is determined by features of the context. 
6. The indexical theory of names 
The indexical view of names is defended by Francois Recanati as part of an attempt to 
combine the intuitions about referentiality and cognitive significance which motivate the 
naYve and neo-Fregean views, respectively. There are, he argues, two essential intuitions 
about the nature of referential terms which must be respected by any account of indexicals 
and proper names (Recanati 1993, 38-39). The first intuition concerns what is required to 
understand a referential term: 
Intuition one: Where t is a referential term, a hearer does not understand what is said 
by an utterance of G(t) unless she can identify the referent of t. 
Chapter 2: The Contemporary Views 58 
In order to identify the reference, in the sense Recanati has in mind, you have to be able to 
equate what is picked out by the descriptive content of the term with an object about which 
you have independent information. For example, if I utter "He is a spy", you do not 
understand what I have said if you do not go beyond the descriptive content (which perhaps 
can be captured by: a salient male) and identify the referent as the man you see across the 
room, or the man you saw when he passed us in the stairwell, or John who we both work with. 
Likewise, you cannot understand an utterance of "I am in Australia" merely by knowing that 
"I" refers to the speaker-you must, in addition, know who the speaker is. This, on Recanati's 
view, is one of the essential contrasts between referential terms and definite descriptions. 
You can understand an utterance of "The Governor General of Canada was born in Hong 
Kong" without having any idea who Canada's Governor General is. 
The second intuition about referential terms is more familiar-it concerns the truth-
conditions of utterances containing them. 
Intuition two: Where t is a referential term, any mode of presentation which is part of 
the linguistic meaning of t is not part of the semantic content expressed by an 
utterance containing t. This is because the referent of t satisfying the mode of 
presentation is not part of the truth-conditions of such an utterance. 
For example, according to this intuition, if I utter "You are in Australia" to Martin, my 
utterance is true if and only if Martin is in Australia. That Martin is the addressee is not part 
of the truth conditions of my utterance. It is this intuition which is brought to our attention by 
the modal and error arguments and by the context hopping examples. 
If we attempt give an account of indexicals that respects these intuitions, we will see 
that their linguistic meaning has an undeniable descriptive component. For example, 'I' refers 
to the speaker, 'you' to the addressee, and so on. Indexicals have what Recanati dubs a 
linguistic mode of presentation, which helps the hearer identify the reference-that is, the 
linguistic mode of presentation facilitates the identification that intuition one suggests is 
necessary for understanding an utterance containing a referential term. Nonetheless, if we are 
to respect intuition two, we cannot treat this mode of presentation as part of the semantic 
content of utterances containing indexicals. Indexicals have the distinctive feature that aspects 
of their linguistic meaning have the role of identifying their referent but do not enter into the 
truth conditions of the propositions expressed by utterances involving them. We can 
understand this, Recanati suggests, if we notice that indexicals not only present their referent 
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as satisfying their associated mode of presentation, but also present that satisfaction as 
incidental (Recanati 1993, 26-31). 
We can see that indexicals must have this feature, argues Recanati, if we reflect on the 
nature of referentiality. Particular uses of proper names and indexicals are, as we have 
observed earlier, rigid designators-they refer to the same thing in every possible world. They 
are not the only rigid designators, however. Descriptions such as 'the cube root of 27', 'the 
even prime', and 'the actual teacher of Alexander' are also rigid designators. They all satisfy 
the definition of rigidity put forward by Christopher Peacocke (1975, 110): 
t is a rigid designator (in a language L free of both ambiguity and indexicals) if and 
only if: 
there is an object x such that for any sentence G(t) in which t occurs, the truth (falsity) 
condition for G(t) is that <x> satisfy (respectively, fail to satisfy) G( ). 
In this paper Peacocke takes his definition of rigid designation to capture the essential feature 
of proper names gestured to by Mill's idea of a mere tag, but Recanati argues that equating 
rigid designation with referentiality is a mistake (Recanati 1993, 11-12). As noted above, 
many descriptions are rigid designators as defined by Peacocke. Nevertheless, the link 
between the description and its reference is still what Kripke calls a 'qualitative' one. The 
description 'the cube root of 27' refers to 3 because 3 has the property of being the cube root 
of27. Its rigidity is in some sense a matter of accident-it is, as Recanati puts it, rigid de facto 
rather than de jure. 
If referentiality is not captured by rigidity, how are we to define it? Recanati looks to 
the idea captured by intuition one above. The reason why 'the cube root of 27' is not 
referential is because we can understand an utterance containing it without knowing that it 
refers to 3-and for that matter, without consciously realizing that it refers rigidly. In contrast, 
suggests Recanati, understanding a utterance containing a referential term requires identifying 
the referent of that term (Recanati 1993, 15). It is this feature of referentiality which leads 
philosophers to think that an utterance containing a referential term without a reference fails 
to express a proposition at all. However, the very notion of a referential term without a 
reference requires Recanati to offer a definition of what it means for a term to be of the 
referential type: 
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A term is (type-)referential if and only if its linguistic meaning includes a feature, call 
it 'REF' by virtue of which it indicates that the truth-condition (or, more generally, 
satisfaction-condition) of the utterance where it occurs is singular (Recanati 1993, 17). 
Of course, as reflection on the linguistic meaning of indexicals shows, referential terms may 
have a mode of presentation as part of their linguistic meaning. Accordingly, where t is a 
referential term with a linguistic mode of presentation, O(t) indicates that: 
There is an object x which is F (=mode of presentation), such that the utterance is 
satisfied if and only if x satisfies O( ) (Recanati 1993, 18). 
It is in this sense that indexicals present the satisfaction of the descriptive portion of their 
linguistic meaning as incidental to the truth conditions of the utterance. An utterance of ' I am 
in Canberra' indicates that there is an x such that x is the speaker of the utterance, and that the 
utterance is true iff x is in Canberra. the mode of presentation makes the referent contextually 
identifiable and REF ensures that the truth conditions are singular. 
6.1 The indexical view 
It is often said that proper names have no character or linguistic meaning, or at least no 
meaning beyond their references. The motivation of such claims is the contrast between 
proper names and common nouns, or proper names and indexicals. In order to be a chair an 
object must possess certain properties, and in order to be the reference of a particular 
utterance of 'you', I must be the addressee of that utterance. In contrast, I may bestow a proper 
name on whatever object I like. Recanati cannot accept that names have no linguistic. 
meaning, for as referential terms they must at least convey the feature REF. The closest he 
can come to accepting the view that names have no linguistic meaning is to accept (A) 
(Recanati 1993, 137): 
(A) The meaning of a proper name is nothing over and beyond REF. By virtue of its 
meaning, a proper name NN indicates that there is an x such that an utterance S(NN) is 
true iff x satisfies S( ), but it does not present this entity in a particular way. Hence a 
proper name has no 'meaning' in the sense of a (linguistic) mode of presentation of the 
reference. 
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One serious problem with (A), however; is that according to it all names are equivalent in that 
they serve only to indicate the speakers referential intention (Recanati 1993, 137). But this 
cannot be right-it does make a difference, as Recanati points out, whether I use the name 
Cicero, or Aristotle, or Arthur. Utterances of 'Cicero was bald' and 'Aristotle was bald' are 
importantly different. There are conventions associating proper names with particular 
individuals (often with more than one). While knowledge of who is conventionally associated 
with each name is not required for linguistic competency, knowledge that there are such 
conventions surely is. Someone who does not know that a use of 'Cicero' can refer only to 
things with which it is conventionally associated is importantly ignorant about the 
grammatical category of proper names. It is the realization that such knowledge is required 
that is captured by the metalinguistic view that a proper name NN means 'the thing called 
NN'. 
This insight can be accommodated, argues Recanati, when we see the parallels 
between indexicals and proper names. In the case of indexicals the linguistic meaning 
provides a clue to identifying the referent as well as the information that the satisfaction-
conditions are singular. We capture what is correct about both the metalinguistic and the 
directly referential views by recognizing that the linguistic meaning of proper names also 
plays this dual function. In virtue of having the feature REF, proper names indicate that the 
satisfaction-conditions of utterances in which it occurs are singular. In addition, a proper 
name provides a clue to identifying the reference-namely, that the referent is associated with 
the name in question by a social convention. On the indexical view then: 
a proper name NN occurring in an utterance 'NN is G' indicates that there is an entity 
x, called NN (linguistic mode of presentation), such that the utterance is true iff x is G 
(Recanati 1993, 140). 
Metalinguistic views are sometimes criticized as viciously circular, so it is important to note 
that Recanati's view does not suffer from this flaw. It would be circular if the linguistic mode 
of presentation-called NN-claimed that the object bore this particular token of NN. This 
would identify as the reference of a particular token NN whatever is the reference of that 
token, and provide no help in identifying the object in question at all. However, on Recanati's 
view the linguistic mode of presentation identifies the reference of a particular token ofNN as 
an object conventionally bearing the name type NN. 
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It is this feature of the indexical view which gives it the virtue of providing a better 
account of names born by multiple bearers than any of it competitors. The examples given to 
illustrate Recanati's view of indexicals were all of indexicals strictly speaking. However, the 
account also applies to indexicals construed broadly-i.e., to demonstratives and 
demonstrative phrases. For example, an utterance of 'that is G' indicates that there is an entity 
x, which is the contextually salient object some contextually determined distance away 
(linguistic mode of presentation), such that the utterance is true iff x is G. Similarly, an 
utterance of 'this cup is G' indicates that there is an entity x, which is the contextually salient. 
cup within a certain contextually determined range of the speaker (linguistic mode of 
presentation), such that the utterance is true iff x is G. As we can see, the linguistic meaning 
of these utterances requires among other things, that the hearer determine which object is the 
contextually salient one. According to Recanati, this same pragmatic process is at work in 
names. The hearer is required to identify the referent, and is guided by the linguistic mode of 
presentation-it is an object called NN. Where there are multiple objects called NN, the 
referent is the contextually salient object. This allows Recanati to avoid the unparsimonious 
view that when two objects apparently share a name there are in fact two discrete word-
types,18 which happen to be homonyms, and have an easy explanation of the naturalness with 
which names are transformed into predicates: 'He doesn't look like a Fred'; 'The Saras went 
out together'. 
6.2 Thoughts 
I said earlier that Recanati's view attempts to combine naive direct reference with the 
insights of the metalinguistic view and that of the neo-Fregean. So far, however, the indexical 
view does not seem to capture the neo-Fregean claim that co-referential names can have 
different cognitive significance. In particular, since the truth conditions of utterances 
containing names are singular, it seems that (32) and (33) and the like will still have the same 
truth conditions. 
(32) Linda believes that Mark Twain was an American novelist. 
18 Indeed, if one wishes to treat names as indexicals rather than like indexicals, Recanati's view is compatible 
with claiming that there is a single abstract indexical-PN-which corresponds to all proper names and has the 
meaning: an instance ofPN refers to the bearer of that instance (1993, 142). 
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(33) Linda believes that Samuel Clemens was an American novelist. 
To understand Recanati's solution, we must recall the first intuition about referential terms: 
where t is a referential term, a hearer does not understand what is said by an utterance of G(t) 
unless she can identify the referent of t. This is reflected in the fact that referential terms 
present the satisfaction-conditions of utterances in which they occur as singular. However, we 
cannot recognize a singular proposition except under some mode of presentation or other. 
That is, the cognitive content of an utterance-the thought I think when I correctly understand 
it, must involve some way of thinking of the referent of the singular term. Even Salmon and 
Soames, defending the naive view, acknowledge that we cannot think about singular 
propositions except under some mode of presentation (Salmon 1986, 111). Recanati endorses 
the neo-Fregean view that thoughts with singular truth conditions are those in which we think 
about objects by means of de re modes of presentation. 
The complete thought expressed by an utterance has frequently been distinguished 
from the truth-conditional content of the thought. 19 This is, for example, the import of Perry's 
distinction between his thinking 'I am making a mess' and his thinking 'John Perry is making a 
mess. In both cases he believes the same thing, but he does it in virtue of being in different 
belief states (Perry 1979, 47-49). Thus there seems to be a distinction between 'narrow 
content' (Perry's belief state or role) and the truth-conditional content of the thought, and this 
distinction parallels that between the linguistic meaning of a utterance and its semantic 
content. There will thus be four entities associated with a given utterance (Recanati 1993, 65-
66): 
(a) the linguistic meaning of the sentence 
(b) the semantic content of the utterance 
(c) the truth-conditional content of the thought 
(d) the narrow content of the thought 
On Recanati's view it is characteristic of literal communication that (b) and (c) can be 
equated-the semantic content of an utterance is the truth-conditional content of the thought. 
It may then seem natural to identify (a) and (d), and this identification can be found Perry and 
19 Even McDowell and Evans can do this, though of course on their view the word content is a misnomer-what 
is being discussed are just the truth-conditions of the thought. 
Chapter 2: The Contemporary Views 64 
also in Kaplan's treatment of the notion of character (Perry 1977; 1979: Kaplan 1978b). 
Recanati's position is that this is a mistake-he argues that the linguistic meaning of a 
sentence cannot be identified with the narrow content. 
6.3 Linguistic modes of presentation versus psychological modes of presentation 
As we have seen, Recanati's treatment of indexicals and names sees their linguistic 
meaning as including linguistic modes of presentation (LMPs)--clues to the identification of 
the referent. He ascribes these modes of presentation the following properties (1993, 69). 
(L 1) They are conventionally determined by the rules of the language. 
(L2) As a consequence of (L 1), LMPs are constant. A word with a LMP has the same 
LMP in every context. 
(L3) In the case of indexicals, the LMP specifies a relationship between the token and 
the referent (e.g., the utterer of this token, the time at which the token is uttered). They 
are token-reflexive. 
The mode of presentation that is involved in the propositional attitudes cannot be one which 
meets (Ll)-(L3). To see why, Recanati asks us to consider Kaplan's case where I see a 
reflected image of someone whose pants are on fire in the window, but do not realize that the 
person in question is me. I say: 'Her pants are on fire' and I entertain the belief that that 
woman's pants are on fire. Perhaps I look around to see where she is to help, or perhaps I 
laugh, but when I realize that that woman is me my behaviour changes. I might shout 'My 
pants are on fire', and I almost certainly start doing something to put them out. Can this be 
explained by positing a relationship between me and the linguistic mode of presentation 
associated with 'I'? 
I do not think so .... I might possibly believe that the pants of the person who utters T 
[a particular token of '1'] are on fire, without realizing that I am the person who utters 
T, and therefore without behaving as I do when I realize that my pants are on fire .... 
This shows that the psychological mode of presentation that occurs in my belief that 
my pants are on fire ... differs from the linguistic mode of presentation associated 
with the word 'I'. ... Yet, if we tum from the though expressed by the utterance to the 
linguistic meaning, we have no reason to deny that the reference of 'I' is presented as 
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being the speaker, ... All this poses no problem if we accept that the mode of 
presentation of the reference in the thought (psychological mode of presentation) is 
different in principle from the mode of presentation of the reference at the level of 
linguistic meaning (linguistic mode of presentation) (Recanati 1993, 71-72) 
Psychological modes of presentation (PMPs) do not on Recanati's view possess any of the 
three characteristics of LMPs (1991, 72-76). The PMPs associated with indexicals are 
certainly not token reflexive, as is called for by (L3). The way in which I think of myself, or 
now, or here, is inherently subjective, but the relationships specified by (L3) are objective 
relationships between the token and the referent of the token. Given any objective description 
of myself I can fail to know that I satisfy the description, as pointed out in the passage above. 
PMPs also fail to meet (L2). When I utter 'My pants are on fire' I think of myself-i.e., I use a 
first-person mode of presentation. In contrast, when you hear me utter 'My pants are on fire' 
you do not use a first-person PMP. But in both cases the LMP is the same-'the speaker' 
(1993, 73-75). Recanati concludes that the failure of (L2) implies a failure of (L1) for PMPs, 
though of course this is not to deny that there is some correlation between PMPs and the 
words of natural language. 
6.4 Attitude ascriptions 
Given the distinction between the linguistic meaning of an utterance, its semantic 
content, and the thought expressed by the utterance, Recanati offers the following account of 
attitude ascriptions. In an attitude ascription the that-clause refers to the content of the 
ascribed belief. However, the relationship between the embedded sentence of the that-clause 
and the referent is not just context dependent, like the reference of 'I' or 'now', but 
fundamentally underdetermined, like the reference of a demonstrative pronoun such as 'that 
man' or 'this'. That is there is no rule or 'character' which, given the context, determines what 
the reference is. Instead, Recanati proposes that the reference of the that clause is determined 
contextually but constrained in two ways (Recanati 1993,355-56): 
(i) the top-down constraint: the reference must be a plausible candidate for the status 
of content of the ascribed belief (more generally: for the status of argument for 
whatever predicate is involved in the sentence). 
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(ii) the bottom-up constraint: the reference must be recoverable from the embedded 
sentence, i.e., it must be possible and easy to reach a content satisfying constraint (i) 
by 'interpreting' the embedded sentence. 
The important process in the context of attitude ascriptions involving names is enrichment 
from the singular proposition that is the semantic content of the embedded sentence to the 
quasi-singular proposition that is an appropriate object of belief. This enrichment will of 
course be guided by the relationships between the linguistic modes of presentation associated 
with the singular terms and the psychological modes of presentation discussed above. 
7. The common ground of contemporary semantics of names 
Part of the common ground for advocates of the contemporary accounts of names is, 
as noted above, commitment to the idea that names are rigid designators, a view which is one 
of the central claims of what has become known as the new theory of reference. They are also 
agreed that in the truth-conditions of simple sentences that do not include any attitude verbs 
are singular. That is, even on neo-Fregean views according to which the proposition expressed 
by a singular sentence like (34) contains a de re mode of presentation of Samuel Clemens, 
(34) is true just in case the individual Clemens is an American writer. 
(34) Samuel Clemens is an American writer. 
Finally, while the accounts discussed above differ considerably over the correct 
implementation of this idea and its role in the semantics of propositional attitude ascriptions, 
they do agree that attitudes towards propositions must involve modes of presentation or ways 
of thinking of a proposition, and that information about those modes of presentation is at least 
sometimes part of what is communicated by an attitude ascription. In the next chapter I 
introduce some counterexamples that suggest that these shared assumptions are largely 
incorrect. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The counterexamples 
The varIOUS treatments of names and the puzzles of informativeness and the 
propositional attitudes introduced in the previous chapter all face known difficulties and 
objections. l I shall not discuss them all here. Instead I want to focus on a collection of 
recently introduced examples of utterances that none of the contemporary theories introduced 
above can accommodate. 
I begin with discussion of a puzzle about the attitudes, due to Jennifer Saul, that 
presents roughly the same difficulty for every theory. This puzzle is particularly pernicious in 
that even on the assumption that co-referential proper names cannot be substituted in attitude 
contexts it is very difficult to explain the truth-conditions of the puzzle sentence. I then move 
away from the traditional attitude puzzles to discuss and elaborate on two groups of simple 
sentences that exhibit opacity with respect to co-referential proper names. I discuss attempts 
to accommodate these intuitions offered by Graeme Forbes and Joseph Moore and argue that 
neither of the accounts work. Both accounts depend on a distinction between enlightened and 
unenlightened utterances of the sentences and only explain substitution failure in the 
enlightened cases. The problem with this is that our anti-substitution intuitions also extend to 
the unenlightened contexts. As a result, any view that exploits such a distinction will have to 
provide a separate account of the source of the intuitions about unenlightened contexts. 
I For objections to the naive view see Chapter 7: Crimmins 1992, 1-34 (esp 33-34): Richard 1990 125-128. For 
objections to neo-Fregeanism see Richard 1990, 61-85: Recanati 1993, 63-77 (The essence of Recanati's 
objection is discussed in section 6.3 of Chapter 2.). For objections to Russellian HIT in general see Oppy 1992. 
For objections to Richard's version of HIT see Crimmins 1992, chapter 2: Soames 1995. For objections to 
Crimmins' version of HIT see Bach 1993a. For objections to neo-Fregean HIT see Crimmins 1993: Richard 
1993. For objections to the indexical theory of names see Wilson 1995. For objections to Russellian views in 
general see Recanati 1993, chapters 8 and 9. 
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I then argue that any semantic theory must treat the traditional cases of attitude 
ascription and the simple sentences (in both enlightened and unenlightened varieties) as on a 
par with each other. However, the difficulties faced by Forbes and Moore will arise for all the 
varieties of neo-Fregeanism, all the hidden-indexical views, and also for Recanati's indexical 
account of names. I conclude that the naIve view has the advantage, since it treats all of the 
intuitions in question as reflecting pragmatic features of the utterances rather than the 
semantic content encoded by them. 
1. Attitude trouble for everybody 
In a series of recent papers Jennifer Saul has raised some difficulties for various views 
of how propositional attitude ascriptions interact with proper names (1998: 1999a: 1999b). A 
central case in her argument is that of Lydia, the beginning philosophy of language student. 
Lydia finds her first class very confusing, but does take herself to have learned something 
about the history of astronomy. She returns from her first class to report to her friend Martina 
what she has learned by uttering (1). 
(1) No ancient astronomers believed that Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
Neither Lydia nor Martina know very much about history, and they assume that the ancient 
astronomers used the names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus,.2 Nevertheless, Lydia has learnt that 
Hesperus and Phosphorus are co-referentiaL Consequently she knows that there is something 
crucial about how the astronomers held their beliefs, and she conveys this to Martina. 
The question that Saul raises is: what situations would Lydia and Martina count as 
counterexamples to her claim? It seems clear, given their knowledge of the co-referentiality of 
the terms and their belief that Lydia has said something true, that neither Lydia nor Martina 
would count ancient astronomer's beliefs in the self-identity of Venus as a counterexample. 
However it seems that they would count the ancient Babylonians, who had made the requisite 
discovery, as a counterexample. This is so despite the fact that the Babylonians would have 
expressed their belief by means of a sentence in Akkadian, which, while correctly translated 
as 'Hesperus is Phosphorus', does not use the names in question. 
2 Either because they think that the ancient astronomers all spoke English, or because they think that 'Hesperus' 
and 'Phosphorus' are not English words but words in the single language spoken by all the ancient astronomers. 
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The Babylonians are not the only candidate counterexamples however. Suppose that 
there was an ancient astronomer whose language lacked translations for 'Hesperus' and 
'Phosphorus'-perhaps because the language had no names at all for heavenly bodies. 
Nevertheless, this astronomer could make the discovery we would intuitively describe as the 
discovery that Hesperus is Phosphorus-that is, the astronomer could discover the 
astronomical facts, and express them by means of drawings, or by means of utterances that 
translate to 'the first heavenly body I see in the evening is the same as the last heavenly body I 
see in the morning'. Both Lydia and Martina would count this astronomer as a 
counterexample, even if they did not know about the associations between the names 
'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' and evening and morning appearances, respectively. 
Finally, suppose that there was another astronomer in a culture whose language does 
not include names for heavenly bodies, but that this astronomer did purely theoretical work 
based on charts of the seasonal cycles of heavenly bodies that were prepared by others. This 
astronomer made a discovery that she would express by uttering a sentence which translates 
as 'the heavenly body taken to have this cycle (indicating one chart) is the same as the 
heavenly body taken to have that cycle (indicating a second chart)'. Since the heavenly body 
in question is Venus, she would intuitively be counted as a counterexample to Lydia's claim, 
even though she had no idea that one cycle was associated with morning appearance and one 
with evening appearances, and even though Lydia and Martina, who don't know about the 
associations between the names and times of day, certainly don't know that the morning 
appearances and evening appearances occur at different times of the year. What is needed 
therefore is an account of Lydia's utterance that counts all three astronomers as 
counterexamples without counting beliefs in the self-identity of Venus as counterexamples. 
1.1 The naIve view 
Recall that Salmon's proposal in Frege's Puzzle was that the predicate 'believes' picks 
out the existential generalization of a ternary relationship between a proposition, a believer, 
and something by means of which we may grasp propositions, which we will call a guise. The 
relation between belief ascriptions and BEL is as follows: 
(i) 'A believes p' may be analyzed as 3x[A grasps p by means ofx & BEL(A, p, x)] 
(ii) A may stand in BEL to p and some x by means of which A grasps p, without 
standing in BEL to p and all x by means of which A grasps p. 
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and 
(iii) 'A withholds belief from p' may be analyzed as :3x[A grasps p by means of x & --, 
BEL(A, p, x)] (Salmon 1986, 111). 
The explanation of our belief ascription practices is twofold. First, belief ascriptions carry 
pragmatically provided information about the guise under which the proposition is believed. 
Soames suggests that there is a pragmatic principle to the effect of: stay as close to the words 
of the agent as is possible (Soames 1987b, 117-119). This is justified by the observation that 
information about how something is believed is often just as (if not more) important for the 
prediction of behaviour than information about what is believed, and there is a general 
pragmatic requirement that cooperative speakers give as much information as is required. 
Accordingly Salmon and Soames suggest that an utterance of (2) will generally convey 
something like (2*). 
(2) Lois believes that Clark can fly. 
(2 *) Lois believes that Clark can fly under a guise like 'Clark can fly'. 3 
Since (2*) is false, (2) appears false also. 
Second, we regularly affirm sentences like (3) because we mistake not believing for 
withholding belief, as characterized by (iii). 
(3) Lois doesn't believe that Clark can fly. 
Thus we read (3) as (3*), which is of course true. 
(3 *) Lois withholds belief from the proposition that Clark can fly under a guise like 
'Clark can fly'. 
The trouble with this account is that it merely tells us that what is implicated by (2) and (3) is 
only 'something like' (2*) and (3*), and further, that the guise in question is 'like' the sentence 
3 Strictly speaking (2*) should read: Lois stands in BEL to the proposition that Clark can fly under a guise like 
'Clark can fly'. Since there is generally no danger of confusion I will continue to use 'believes' for both the 
ordinary binary relation and the ternary BEL. 
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used in the belief report. However, guises are not sentences, and so the relationship requires 
some elucidation. 
1.1.1 Lydia and the naIve view 
Salmon gives a further suggestion in Frege's Puzzle to the effect that a belief report 
carries the conversational implicature that the believer understands and would verbally assent 
to his or her version of the sentence in question (Salmon 1986, 115). On this view then, (2) 
implies (2**), and (4) implies (4*). 
(2**) Lois understands and would assent to 'Clark can fly'. 
(4) Hammurabi believes Hesperus is seen in the evening. 
(4*) Hammurabi understands and would assert his translation of the sentence 
'Hesperus is seen in the evening'. 
This proposal won't do however, as the Lydia example shows-neither the linguistically 
impoverished astronomer nor the season cycle astronomer have a translation of the sentence 
'Hesperus is Phosphorus' in their language, and so there is no sentence that they understand 
and verbally assent to that bears the appropriate relation to the that clause used to specify the 
proposition. 
Perhaps however the specifics of the implications of belief utterances are more 
particularized than the suggestion above. That is, perhaps the reason Salmon and Soames have 
not spelt them out is that in general there is no one thing or kind of thing that is implicated by 
a belief ascription. As Saul points out this seems quite plausible-"we sometimes care about 
what sentences the believer would assent to, we sometimes care about what the believer 
thinks regarding the physical appearance, or conversational charms, of those discussed in the 
reports, and so on" (1998, 377-378). Can a particularized proposal of this sort give the right 
answer for Lydia and the astronomers? 
The standard Gricean account of particularized pragmatic implicatures are that they 
arise from the audience's assumption that the speaker is being cooperative-to be precise, that 
they are making their "conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange" in which they are 
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participants (Grice 1975, 158-9).4 What is implied is whatever the audience must take the 
speaker to believe in order to preserve this assumption. In particular, the implications that 
arise from (1) will be determined by the participant's judgements about what information is 
relevant for the conversational purposes. 
It is easy to see that this approach won't work. The pragmatic account will explain 
why astronomers who believe in the self-identity of Venus don't count-both Lydia and 
Martina are aware of the importance of the use of two co-referential names in the belief 
ascription. However, their ignorance of both the circumstances of the introduction of the 
terms 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' and the facts of history ensure that they cannot make 
judgements that will accommodate the other counterexamples. We have already seen that 
even on the charitable assumption that Martina takes the implication to be that no ancient 
astronomer would assent to their translation of 'Hesperus is Phosphorus' the linguistically 
impoverished and seasonal cycle astronomers are ruled out as counterexamples. And it is a 
charitable assumption, given her and Lydia's belief that the ancient astronomers used the 
terms in question. 
Saul suggests that we might suppose that instead Martina takes Lydia to be trying to 
convey that no astronomers held the belief in question in any way associated with either the 
terms 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' or morning and evening appearances. This is of course 
implausible given Lydia and Martina's shared ignorance about the origins of the terms 
'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus'. However, even this unmotivated assumption rules out the 
seasonal cycle astronomer (Saul 1998, 380-381), and so gives the wrong results. 
1.1.2 Dispositions 
In her original paper on the naIve view, Saul suggested that the answer was to exploit 
the dispositions of the speaker in the account (Saul 1998, 382-387). On this version the 
conversational implicature of a sentence of the form A believes that S, will be, as on the 
original sketch, that A believes that S under a guise similar to S, but the relation 'similar to S' 
will be specified in terms of speaker dispositions: 
4 I discuss Grice's pragmatic theory and its descendents, including relevance theory, in some detail in chapter 7. 
While I put the points here in terms of Gricean pragmatics, this is inessential, and similar points would apply to 
an attempt to treat the implicatures in terms of relevance theory. 
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A guise counts as similar to'S', for the purposes of a particular belief-reporting 
utterance, just in case the speaker· would take it to be an appropriate guise for the 
purposes of her utterance (upon being sufficiently informed) (Saul 1998, 383). 
However in later papers Saul herself has pointed out that this approach can't work. Like all 
dispositional accounts this approach falls down when faced with idiosyncratic agents of 
various kinds. In particular, the dispositional account will give the wrong results when faced 
with certain theoretically driven speakers. Saul offers two examples: Jon, the behaviorist, and 
Ethel, the naive theorist (Saul 1999a, 44-47). 
The behaviorist 
Jon, the devout behaviorist, does not believe in mental representations. On the 
dispositional account the pragmatic implications of Jon's belief ascriptions will depend on 
which guises-that is, which mental representations-he takes the that-clauses in his 
ascriptions to be similar to. However, Jon won't take his that-clauses to be similar to any 
mental representations. He will never agree that a particular guise will be similar enough to 
falsify his utterance of (1), because he will never agree that there are any guises to be 
compared. 
The obvious approach to Jon is to modify the theory so that the implication is put in 
terms of assent to utterances-a given belief attribution, A believes that S, will imply that A 
would assent to an utterance similar to S, where the relation of similarity is specified in terms 
of what utterances Jon would (when suitably informed) count as appropriate. 5 
Another approach is to put the theory in terms of what Jon would think if he did 
believe in guises-in other words, if he did believe in the basic posits of the theory of the 
mind underlying the naive views' explanation of both the nature of belief and the apparent 
failure of substitutivity. However the weakness of both these treatments shows up when we 
consider Ethel. 
5 Saul discusses the examples in connection with Richard's version of HIT, which is explicitly committed to the 
claim that belief reports mention mental representations. Accordingly, she does not discuss the treatment of Jon 
the behaviorist that I suggest here. 
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The naive theorist 
Ethel believes that Salmon and Soames' account of the attitude attributions is right. 
Accordingly, she will count any translation which preserves the Russellian semantic content 
of her that-clauses as correct, and count any guise of the proposition named by the that-clause 
as appropriately similar to hers. As a result of Ethel's dispositions her belief ascriptions will 
not have the purported pragmatic implicatures about how the proposition is believed. In 
Ethel's mouth (1) will be falsified by believers in the self-identity of Venus. But surely this 
cannot be right-believing in the naIve theory doesn't do away with the intuitions that the 
pragmatic account is designed to explain. If it did the task of the naIve theory would be 
considerably easier. 
We do not want to solve this problem by means of the second approach suggested by 
Jon, as this promises to build up a long list-we now would state the pragmatic implicatures 
in terms of what speakers think if they were adequately informed, didn't believe in 
behaviorism, and didn't believe in the naIve theory, and we may well have to add other 
conditions as other problem cases arise. The account begins to look ad hoc. 
Saul discusses and rejects one final approach to the problem of Ethel. We might ask 
her to specify the 'similar to S' relation in terms of what sentences are misleading, since the 
naIve theorists account allows that certain belief ascriptions do mislead. Unfortunately, this 
approach is viciously circular-the pragmatic theory is supposed to explain why the 
utterances are misleading, and it cannot do so by relying on the dispositions of speakers who 
are adequately informed, don't believe in behaviorism, and have been asked to respect the 
intuition that certain strictly true belief ascriptions mislead. Saul notes that in asking Ethel to 
specify the relation in terms of what would mislead, we are trying to genuinely communicate 
with her what is needed, but this: 
sounds suspiciously like 'terms which could lead her to give answers which accord 
with our intuitions'. This suspect hand-waving cannot really be avoided: we must keep 
our statement general enough to accommodate all the various cases which might arise, 
or risk falling into ad hoc listing as we did above (Saul 1999, 46). 
1.1.3 The failure of the naIve view 
Actually, the failure of the naIve view to accommodate Lydia should not have been all 
that surprising. Consider (1) again. 
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(1) No ancient astronomers believed that Hesperus was Phosphorus. 
What could the pragmatic implications of (1) be like on the naIve view? Lydia is using (1) to 
claim that the ancient astronomers didn't believe something-an type of utterance that the 
naIve view claims is standardly confused with the claim that the ancient astronomers withheld 
belief from the proposition under some guise. 
(1 *) 3y \Ix [Ax -+ x grasps p by means ofy & -, BEL (x,p, y)] 
(1 **) \Ix (Ax -+ 3y x grasps p by means ofy & -, BEL (x,p, y)] 
Accordingly, Lydia must be implying either that (1 *) is true-that there is some one guise 
under which all of the ancient astronomers failed to believe the proposition--or that (1 * *) is 
true-that for each ancient astronomer there is some guise that they failed to believe the 
proposition under. In addition in either case her that-clause will imply something about the 
particular guise(s). What Saul's example shows is that Lydia is not implying (1 *)-the guises 
under which the Babylonians, the linguistically impoverished astronomer, and the seasonal 
cycle astronomer believe that Hesperus is Phosphorus are all different. However, in order for 
Lydia to be pragmatically implying (1 **) she must somehow be able to communicate what 
guise she has in mind for each ancient astronomer using just one that-clause-an even more 
impossible task given her lack of information about those astronomers and the astronomical 
facts. 
1.2 Quasi-singular propositions 
On both the neo-Fregean view and Recanati's indexical account the proposition that 
Lydia claims no ancient astronomer believes will be a quasi-singular one-that is, it will 
contain two different truth-conditionally irrelevant ways of thinking of Venus. 6 Thus neither 
view will have difficulty with the intuition that an ancient astronomers belief in Venus' 
6 Strictly speaking a quasi-singular proposition is only the object of the belief on the two-component view of de 
re senses, since such propositions include the referent. However, nothing I have to say in this section depends 
upon the referent appearing in the proposition. Additional approaches available to the two-component view are 
discussed in the following section. 
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identity with itself is not a counterexample. Such a belief would be an attitude towards a 
quasi-singular proposition containing the same mode of presentation twice over. However, the 
other counterexamples are more problematic. On the neo-Fregean approach the de re senses 
associated with singular terms will differ from individual to individual, and so will the quasi-
singular propositions expressed by sentences including them. In extensional contexts this 
doesn't matter, as the truth conditions are singular. However it does create a problem for 
ascribing shared beliefs, as is done in (1). 
Presumably a claim such as Lydia's must be treated as making a claim about attitudes 
towards a certain kind of quasi-singular proposition-one with the same singular truth 
conditions and the same structure. In this case, we might reasonably require, on the basis of 
Lydia's intentions, that the quasi-singular proposition include two different de re senses of 
Venus. The Babylonian's belief that Hesperus is Phosphorous can, since it would naturally be 
expressed using their two names for Venus, be treated as a quasi-singular proposition of 
similar structure to that expressed by our sentence 'Hesperus is Phosphorus'. One might then 
be tempted to suggest that Lydia's utterance claims that no ancient astronomer endorsed a 
singular proposition with that structure. However this approach will not accommodate the 
linguistically impoverished astronomer. This astronomer's belief does not seem to involve a 
quasi-singular proposition at all, but is instead an attitude towards the proposition expressed 
by 'the first heavenly body I see in the evening is the same as the last heavenly body I see in 
the morning'. 
One might insist that despite his impoverished language the astronomer in question 
does have an attitude towards an appropriate quasi-singular proposition. That is, one might 
maintain that it is a feature of our cognitive structure that we form de re modes of presentation 
of each object of our acquaintance. The approach to de re senses that associates them with 
mental dossiers in which we record acquired information about an object would support this 
position.7 While the astronomer's language may prevent him from uttering a sentence with the 
quasi-singular content in question, the neo-Fregean might maintain that he nonetheless does 
believe a quasi-singular proposition with appropriate structure. 
The seasonal cycle astronomer, who knows the heavenly bodies only by means of the 
charts others provide her, may seem a less plausible candidate for possessing de re senses of 
Venus, but the dossier metaphor may well seem to allow for it in her case as well. She two· 
7 The dossier idea originates in Evans 1982. The subject of a particular dossier would be determined relationally, 
perhaps via a causal story, rather than satisfactionally. 
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may organize the descriptions she associates with each body (e.g. the heavenly body with this 
chart, the one Sarah discovered, etc.) into dossiers of information, and those dossiers may 
well, as a matter of the cognitive architecture or practices of human beings, operate as de re 
senses. So perhaps she too believes a proposition that is quasi-singular, is true just in case 
Venus is identical with itself, and contains two different de re modes of presentation of 
Venus. 
The problem with this treatment is that it requires that the astronomers in question 
believe some quasi-singular proposition, and while it is not impossible that the astronomers in 
question do understand and endorse an appropriate proposition, it seems desperate to insist 
that they must. If it turns out that the proposition believed by the seasonal cycle astronomer 
really is that expressed by 'the heavenly body taken to have this cycle (indicating one chart) is 
the same as the heavenly body taken to have that cycle (indicating a second chart)" and that 
either she has no de re modes of presentation for Venus or that she for some reason fails to 
believe the appropriate quasi-singular proposition, it seems that Lydia and Martina would still 
count her as a counterexample to Lydia's claim. 
1.2.1 The two-component picture 
Both Recanati and the neo-Fregean who is willing to treat the de re sense as an 
ordered pair composed of the referent and a ordinary mode of presentation have another 
option. Instead of treating Lydia's claim as requiring that counterexamples involve individuals 
who endorse a quasi-singular proposition with an appropriate structure, he can instead 
approach it by means of the ordinary mode of presentation. Lydia's utterance is falsified by 
any belief which as its content a proposition with the same truth-conditions as the proposition 
named by the that clause and which is either a quasi-singular proposition involving two 
different de re modes of presentation of Venus or a purely general proposition which includes 
two different ordinary modes of presentation of Venus. However, not just any ordinary mode 
of presentations will do. After all, a ancient astronomer who believed that the heavenly body 
seen this morning by his cousin is the same heavenly body as that seen yesterday morning by 
his sister has two ways of thinking of Venus-indeed, he may even have two different 
dossiers, each of which has one of the descriptions above as its sole content. However this 
ancient astronomer would not count as a counterexample to Lydia's claim. 
In order to exploit the two component picture in this way we must put some constraint 
on the ordinary modes of presentation that can be involved in either a quasi-singular 
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proposition or a general proposition. How is this constraint specified? The obvious candidates 
are the intentions of the speaker and the interests of the audience, but as our discussion of the 
naIve view's problems with the Lydia example showed, this will not solve the problem. The 
neo-Fregean is in no better position. 
1.3 The hidden-indexical view 
Since hidden-indexical views rely on speaker intentions and audience interests to 
specify the missing third part of the content of a belief ascription, it is no surprise that they 
suffer from the same difficulty in dealing with Lydia's utterance (Saul 1999a: 1999b). 8 As 
noted in chapter two, hidden-indexical views differ in part in virtue of what they take the third 
part to be-for Crimmins belief ascriptions generally specify a particular mental 
representation, whereas in Richard's account they instead place constraints on the kind of 
mental representation that can be involved in the belief. Since Crimmins' account treats 
generalized belief ascriptions like that involved in (1) in terms of constraints on notions rather 
than in terms of the specification of notions, and so is importantly similar to Richard's in as 
far as (1) is concerned, I shall give the details of the problem in terms of Crimmins' view 
alone. The general difficulty applies equally to Richard's account, though the details differ. 
Forbes' neo-Fregean version of HIT, with its dependence on a contextually specified linguistic 
counterpart relation, will have similar difficulties if it depends on speakers intentions and (or) 
audience interests to determine the relation. If it does not, then Forbes owes us an explanation 
of what contextual features it does depend on (Saul 1999a, 30f6). 
1.3.1 Crimmins' account 9 
Crimmins treats a typical belief ascription as specifying both the propositional content 
of the belief and the mental state which realizes the belief. The that-clause names the content, 
while the mental state is the unarticulated constituent which is contextually supplied. The 
mental state, like the proposition which is its object, possesses structure-where the 
proposition contains individuals the mental state contains notions, and where the proposition 
contains properties the mental state contains ideas. Notions (which will be my focus in what 
g Richard's version of HIT is discussed in Saul 1999a, Crimmins' in Saul 1999b. 
9 See Crimmins 1992; Crimmins and Perry 1989. 
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follows) can be specified in two ways-they may be provided as a constituent of the 
proposition expressed by the belief report, or the proposition expressed may be an existential 
claim that there is some notion meeting certain conditions that is involved in the belief. This 
latter phenomenon is of course what it operative in generalized belief reports such as that 
made by Lydia. 
Regardless of whether the notions are provided or merely constrained by the belief 
ascription, the mechanism by which they are introduced involves providing conditions 
(Crimmins 1992, 182; 190). This conditions either determine which notions are provided or, 
where the notions are merely constrained, appear as part of the propositional content of the 
belief report. The providing conditions are descriptions of notions, where either the notion 
satisfying that description or the description itself forms part of proposition expressed by the 
report. lO 
Providing conditions arise out of the context of the belief report. Normally this will 
not require much work on the part of speakers or audience, as Crimmins proposes that there 
are a number of standard providing conditions used in belief reporting. These include being a 
normal notion, being a de dicto notion, being a notion linked to a particular perception or 
action, and being a self-notion (Crimmins 1992, 158-168). A self-notion is simply that special 
notion which each of us has of ourselves. A de dicto notion is one associated by the believer 
with a particular word or expression. A notions may be linked to a particular perception or 
action in cases where that action or perception is object-directed. For example, when we see 
someone toss a rock up and down, we may reasonably conclude that they have some 
perceptual notion of the rock that is involved in her action. In contrast, when we see someone 
absent-mindedly kick a rock as they walk past it is very unlikely that they had any perceptual 
notion of the rock-they probably had no idea it was there when they moved their leg. 
Normal notions are more difficult to pick out, but also more important, in that being a 
normal notion of something is the default providing condition for a belief report. Crimmins 
writes that: 
What counts as normal depends at least on the intents and purposes of the discourse, 
and the community among which the agent is being considered by the participants in 
10 To be more precise, the providing conditions are clusters of descriptions, not all of which necessarily need to 
be met by a given notion in order for it to be the notion provided in a given belief report (Crimmins 1992, 168-
169). However it will not matter for our purposes if we speak as if there were just one providing condition. 
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the dialogue. It is a vague condition, but usually the presupposition that the an agent 
has a normal representation of a certain relation or individual is unproblematic ally 
obvious (Crimmins 1992, 158). 
Part of what characterizes a notion as normal relative to a given community is to have normal 
beliefs associated with that notion and normal abilities to recognize the person it is the notion 
of (Crimmins 1992, 92-98). For example, Crimmins suggests that almost every U.S. citizen 
will have a normal notion of Ronald Reagan that "is associated with the properties being tall, 
being an actor, being a Republican, being called 'Reagan', and so on" (97). Other notions 
may be normal relative to much smaller communities-e.g. the normal notion of W. V. O. 
Quine possessed by analytic philosophers, the normal notion of Jenny Shipley possessed by 
New Zealanders, or the normal notion of Alex Wynne possessed by members of the 
University of Canterbury Department of Philosophy. 
1.3 .2 Lydia and Crimmins' providing conditions 
Normal notions will simply not do for Lydia's utterance of (1). 
(1) No ancient astronomers believed that Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
Normal notions of Hesperus, what ever they are in the linguistic community in question, are 
also normal notions of Phosphorus. 11 However, The most natural intention to ascribe to Lydia, 
given her belief that the ancient astronomers used the words 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' is 
that of invoking a de dicta notion. However, this will not do, given that she would count the 
Babylonians, with their Akkadian names, as a counterexample. A natural modification would 
be to allow her to intend to invoke the providing condition that the notion be a de dicta one 
involving either the words 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' or any translation of them into 
1! Crimmins explicitly acknowledges that we rely on the fact that it is highly unlikely that an individual can have 
two notions of an individual that are both nonnal (Crimmins 1992, 97). However, even if we generally had two 
nonnal notions of Venus then Lydia will have to intend more than just that the notion of Venus in each spot in 
the mental representation be a nonnal one if she is to make an utterance that is not falsified by beliefs in the self-
identity of Venus. Nor is it sufficient for her to intend merely that there be two notions involved, as we saw in 
the neo-Fregean case. 
Chapter 3: The counterexamples 81 
appropriate languages. On this account however, the linguistically impoverished astronomer 
would not count as a counterexample (Saul 1999b, 365). 
We could accommodate the linguistically impoverished example in one of two ways. 
We could, as Saul suggests, construe Lydia as giving a providing condition that calls for a 
notion associated with either the appropriate translation for 'Hesperus' or appearing in the 
evening and then a providing condition associated with either the appropriate translation for 
'Phosphorus' or appearing in the morning (Saul 1999b, 366). Alternatively, we could modify 
Crimmins' account slightly and interpret her as giving the providing condition that the notion 
be the notion normally associated with the word 'Hesperus', as the notion normally associated 
with 'Hesperus' in the community of philosophers of language could reasonably be construed 
as involving evening appearances, and similarly for 'Phosphorus' and morning appearances. 
The idea here is that just as there are notions that are normal notions of an individual there are 
notions which are the normal de dicto notions for a given name. However, both of these 
approaches come at a price. In the first instance we must allow that Lydia can intend and· 
communicate to Martina providing conditions that she knows nothing about. In the second we 
must say that she can refer to a notion that is normal in certain respects even when neither she 
nor her audience has a normal notion. 
This second choice is perhaps less implausible. However, neither of these approaches 
will accommodate the seasonal cycle astronomer. I suspect that very many philosophers of 
language do not know that the morning and evening appearances of Venus occur on different 
days, never mind in different seasons. 12 So we must resort to a complicated providing 
12 One might object that the community of philosophers of language is simply the wrong community. Instead, 
Lydia might defer to historians of astronomy, counting as her providing condition whatever providing condition 
they took to be relevant. There are two problems with this. First of all, while historians of astronomy might seem 
to be the appropriate experts here, there are cases in which there seem to be no experts. Saul discusses the case of 
the Portland Bistro and the FBI, based on the case of Alice Metzinger, a Portland bistro chef, who some years 
ago revealed that she was in fact the bank robber Katherine Ann Power, then a noted member of the FBI's most 
wanted list (Saul 1999b, 361-364). Saul asks us to imagine that Alice Metzinger's employees are devotes of the 
most wanted list, and that some time before the revelations they have a light-hearted conversation in which one 
of them makes the following claims about his colleague, Ray. 
(a) Ray believes that Alice Metzinger is wanted by the FBI. 
(b) Ray believes that Katherine Ann Power is wanted by the FBI. 
These attributions cannot be invoking normal notions, for reasons parallel to the Lydia case. However, reflection 
on the truth-conditions shows that they the speaker is not attributing de dicto notions. Suppose that Ray was just 
hired by the senior waiter and does not know Alice's name, but has seen incriminating evidence sticking out of 
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condition that involves constraints Lydia doesn't know about. Just as in the case of the naIve 
view and the neo-Fregean view, we can only accommodate our intuitions about the 
counterexamples at the price of attributing intentions to Lydia that it seems she just cannot 
have. 
2. Dressing like Superman 
The case of Lydia and the astronomers, perplexing as it is, is of a familiar kind. 
Problems with attitude reports have a history going back to the medievals. It is generally 
thought that the treatment of proper names and other singular terms in sentences that do not 
contain any attitude verbs is without difficulty. Recently Saul and Anne Bezuidenhout have 
introduced a number of apparently simple sentences that are associated with the same anti-
substitution intuitions that have been so difficult to account for in the case of the propositional 
attitudes. I begin with some puzzling sentences due to Saul (1997). In each case there seem to 
be circumstances where the first sentence seems true but its companion false (here and 
throughout the Superman fiction should be treated as fact). 
(5) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Superman came out. 
(5*) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Clark Kent came out. 
(6) Clark Kent always arrived on the scene just after one of Superman's daring 
rescues. 
(6*) Superman always arrived on the scene just after one of Superman's daring 
rescues. 
(7) Dan dresses like Clark Kent. 
(7*) Dan dresses like Superman. 
(8) She made a date with Superman, but found herself having dinner with Clark Kent. 
(8*) She made a date with Superman, but found herself having dinner with Superman. 
her bag and formed the belief that she is wanted by the FBI. We would intuitively count that as, to the ascriber's 
surprise, verifying (a). However, it is implausible to think that there are any relevant experts in this case. 
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(9) Clark was in despair because Lois had fallen for Superman. 
(9*) Superman was in despair because Lois had fallen for Superman. 
Suppose that (5) is a true description of the events outside the Metropolis office of the Daily 
Planet. Substitution produces (5*), which seems false. Similar intuitions arise for (6)-(9), but 
in none of these cases can this be explained by the presence of a propositional attitude verb. 
There are no attitude verbs in (5}-(8), and the problematic substitution in (9) is in the subject 
position and thus not within the scope of the attitude verb. 13 
Saul's second group of sentences are even more pernicious-in each case the second 
sentence seems not just false but necessarily so. 
(10) Superman is more successful with women than Clark Kent. 
(10*) Superman is more successful with women than Superman. 
(11) Batman is more resistant to bullets than Bruce Wayne. 
(11 *) Batman is more resistant to bullets than Batman. 
(12) Lois kissed Superman before she kissed Clark Kent. 
(12*) Lois kissed Superman before she kissed Superman. 
(13) I never made it to Leningrad, but I visited St. Petersburg last week. 
(13 *) I never made it to Leningrad, but I visited Leningrad last week. 
(14) He hit Clark Kent once, but he never hit Superman. 
(14*) He hit Clark Kent once, but he never hit Clark Kent. 
Furthermore, whatever is going on in these cases doesn't depend on either the speaker or the 
audience being unaware of the relevant identities. Prima facie it seems that the names in these 
13 Crimmins claims that treating the subject terms of the belief attribution in ( c) as opaque is the right treatment 
of Richard's steamroller argument (Crimmins 1992,32). 
(c) The man watching you believes you are in danger. 
On his view the subject term can sometimes play a role in pragmatically determining the unarticulated 
constituent of propositional attitude reports. Given the plausibility of this approach on his and similar accounts it 
is fair to say that (9) and (9*) are not problems for HIT. 
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sentences are making importantly different contributions to the truth conditions of these 
sentences. 
What should we say about these sentences? Defenders of the naIve view are perhaps in 
the best position in this respect, as they can consistently claim that the anti-substitution 
intuitions involved are in fact mistaken. In fact, the existence of such intuitions in what might 
seem to be extensional contexts might well be seen to support the view that such intuitions are 
based on confusion and best accounted for in terms of pragmatics, notions of assertability, and 
conversational implicature. 
Advocates of the hidden-indexical account, neo-Fregean views, or the indexical theory 
of names are in a more difficult position. Of course it is open to them to simply deny that the 
intuitions in question are correct, and to maintain that they should be given a pragmatic 
explanation. But we are then entitled to ask why the intuition that these pairs of sentences 
differ in truth value is to be taken less seriously than the intuition that attitude ascriptions like 
(15) and (15*) differ in truth value. 
(15) Lois believes that Superman can fly. 
(15*) Lois believes that Clark Kent can fly. 
For the moment let us assume that the substitution failure (SF) in (5)-(14) should be 
accommodated in the semantics by any account that attempts to accommodate the SF in (15). 
(I will return to this issue in section 4 of this chapter.) Can any of the accounts we have 
discussed be extended? Graeme Forbes has attempted to extend his version of HIT to Saul's 
examples, and Joseph Moore has defended a contextualist account of these sentences that 
could be accommodated by the indexical account of names. 
2.1 Forbes and ways of dressing 
On Forbes' version of the hidden-indexical account belief ascriptions contain an 
implicit logophor. Accordingly, (15) is correctly interpreted by (15F). 
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(1SF) The abstract situation of Superman's being able to fly is such that Lois believes 
her so-labeled way of thinking of it.14 
Thus the words in the that-clause refer to the abstract situation-for the neo-Russellian, the 
singular proposition-but SF occurs because the logophor 'so-labeled' in tum refers to them. 
Substitution of co-referential terms doesn't change the reference of the term, but it does 
change the reference of 'so-labeled'. The labeling relation between that-clauses and ways of 
thinking is context sensitive. Forbes exploits the fact that just as the relationship between 
abstract situations (or singular propositions) and ways of thinking of them is one-to-many, so 
is the relationship between individuals and ways of presenting themselves in order to explain 
(S), which on his view is correctly expanded as (SF) (Forbes 1997). 
(S) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Superman came out. 
(SF) Clark Kent, so-attired, went into the phone booth, and Superman, so-attired, came 
out. IS 
In (SF) the first 'so-attired' has the same referent as 'attired in the "Clark Kent" manner', and 
SF occurs because substitution of 'Superman' would change its referent to 'attired in the 
"Superman" manner' (ceteris paribus for the second 'so-attired'). Saul was quick to point out 
that this treatment in terms of ways of dressing can not be expanded to cases like (16) (Saul 
1997b). 
(16) Clark went to the fancy-dress party as Superman. 
14 Abstract situations are Forbes' analogue of singular propositions-in particular they are the bearers of modal 
properties (Forbes 1989). 
15 The logical form of (5F) will be that of (d). Forbes treats 'so-attired' as elliptical for 'attired in the so-labeled 
way'. Labeling is a contextually determined relation between names and ways of dressing. Some irrelevant 
details have been abstracted away from. 
(d) Clark went into p & (the a: a is labeled so)[heCiark was attired in a] & then (Superman came out ofp 
& (the a: a is labeled so)[hesuperman was attired in a]) 
On this account the reference of 'so' is fixed by the context-in particular by the intentions of the speaker. Thus 
(d) represents the linguistic meaning of (5F), but it does not express a complete proposition until the context is 
fixed. 
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In order to accommodate a case like (16) Forbes must generalize from ways of dressing to 
something like ways of presenting oneself-in the case of (16) Clark presents himself as 
Clark, despite the fact that he is wearing the attire usually associated with presenting himself 
as Superman. 
2.1.1 Modes of self-presentation 
One problem with this is that it is hard to understand what ways of presenting oneself 
might amount to. Saul makes this point in her reply to Forbes, in which she observes that the 
obvious candidates for explaining modes of self-presentation all fall down in some way (Saul 
1997b, 115-117). It is not a matter of how others think of you, as Clark can present himself as 
Clark even when no one else is around. Nor can it be a matter of how you think of yourself, as 
it seems that Clark can attempt to present himself as Clark and fail-perhaps because he has 
forgotten to remove the cape and tights, or perhaps because he is caught melting a lock with 
his x-ray vision. Dispositions to behave in particular ways might seem a good candidate, but 
this won't in general do either. As Saul says, "sometimes Superman doesn't behave like 
Superman" (1997b, 117). When, as frequently happens to superheroes, the villain uses a 
device to cause Superman to destroy the city instead of save it, we still want to say that it is a 
Superman mode of self-presentation. 
Forbes acknowledges this difficulty but writes: 
I do not think that this exhausts the field. A certain extraterrestrial leads a double life. 
In one life, he must conceal the fact that he comes from another planet, that he has 
extraordinary powers, and so on. In the other life, he must at least conceal the 
existence of his first life. And at the changeover points, he must be careful not to be 
observed. This much is obvious, and shows we have the conception of a single 
individual who puts on one performance for some stretches of his life and a different 
performance for others. In our example, these stretches are bounded by changeover 
points which are typically, but not necessarily and not merely, marked by a change in 
costume. However, either performance can itself embed an imitation of someone 'else', 
and this 'other' person can even be the other 'self .... It is important [to the fancy-dress 
party case] that donning the Superman costume does not occur at a changeover point, 
but is an integral part of a stretch of the 'Clark' performance (Forbes 1999,89). 
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This passage is certainly an accurate description of our understanding of the situation, but it 
doesn't answer Saul's question. It amounts to admitting that we can't say what modes of self-
presentation--or persona, as Forbes dubs them-are, but insisting nonetheless that our grasp 
of the situation amounts to a grasp of the idea of a persona. The danger is that without some 
more specific account of what a persona amounts to we have no idea what the identity or 
existence conditions for persona are. As a consequence, we are in danger of interpreting tacit 
reference to personas in whatever way will save our intuitions.16 
2.2 Moore's reference-shifting account 
One approach to these sentences that Saul considers briefly and then rejects is to treat 
'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' as referring to temporal stages of Clark in (5) but to the 
individual in (17) and (18) (Saul 1997 a, 104-105). 
(5) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Superman came out. 
(17) Clark Kent is Superman. 
(18) Clark Kent can fly, although he conceals this fact. 
Saul rejects this account on the grounds that the reference-shifting claims needed to support it 
are simply too extreme to accept. However, a version of this sort of view has subsequently 
been defended by Moore (1999). 
16 The use of the more general notion of a persona to treat examples like (16) also raises some technical 
difficulties for Forbes' account. 
(16) Clark went to the fancy-dress party as Superman. 
Forbes renders (16) as (16F). 
(16F) Clark, so personified, went to the fancy-dress party attired in the way labeled 'Superman'. 
However, the logical form of (16F) and relatives such as (e) (see note 17) cannot be captured by a temporally 
ordered conjunction, as was done for (SF) (see note 15). 
(e) While talking on the phone to Superman, Lois looked through the window at Clark Kent. 
As a result, Forbes resorts to an adverbial account including quantifying over events (1999,90). Thus the logical 
form of (16F) is rendered as (t) (where e is a variable ranging over events, the labeling relation is contextually 
determined, and some details are abstracted away from): 
(t) (some e: e is an attending)[Clark is the agent of e & p is the goal of e & (the a: a is labeled 
so)[heclark is personified as a in e] & (the 13: 13 is labeled 'Superman')[heCiark is attired in 13 in ell. 
In short, Forbes proposal has become very complicated very quickly. 
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On Moore's account the proper names in opaque readings of (5) do not pick out the 
individual Clark but distinct aspects of him. Aspects are not modes of presentation (self or 
otherwise )--indeed, they are not psychological or representational entities at all. Instead, 
aspects are parts of the world that have much the same properties as individuals do. They 
walk around, are successful with women, are kissed and resist bullets poorly, and so on. For 
the moment let us accept the existence of aspects in order to explain Moore's account. His 
reading of (5) is (5M). 
(5M) Clark/Superman's Clark-aspect walked into the phone booth and his Superman-
aspect walked out. 
Now the relationship between aspects of individuals and the individuals is a complicated one. 
Some properties of aspects are ipso Jacto properties of individuals. Walking is one of these, so 
(5M) entails (but does not assert) (19). 
(19) The individual Clark/Superman walked into the phone booth and the individual 
Clark/Superman walked out. 
The idea that an aspect cannot walk without the individual of whom it is an aspect walking 
arises, claims Moore, from the nature of walking (Moore 1999, 95). In contrast, (10), read as 
(10M), does not entail the necessarily false (20). 
(10) Superman is more successful with women than Clark Kent. 
(10M) Clark/Superman's Superman-aspect is more successful with women than 
Clark/Superman's Clark-aspect. 
(20) The individual Clark/Superman IS more successful with women than the 
individual Clark/Superman. 
On Moore's view this disparity arises because the relative romantic success of an individual's 
aspects is analogous to the lengths of her limbs. It is not mysterious, he writes, to allow "that 
Lois's left leg is longer than her left arm, although Lois is not, of course, longer than herself' 
(Moore 1999, 95). In this Moore seems right-aspects, if they are to be allowed at all, are 
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something like parts of an individual (though not temporal or physical parts), and it is no news 
. at all that not all the properties of a part are properties of the whole. 17 
One final thing to note about Moore's proposal is that it preserves a kind of secondary 
reference to the individual who is the usual referent of the name. This is important because it 
allows for a smooth treatment of anaphoric reference. On Moore's account the pronoun 'he' 
picks up on the secondary reference of 'Superman" in (21), just as 'she' picks up on the 
secondary reference of 'Lois's left arm' in (22) and 'it' picks up on the secondary reference of 
'the engine's carburetor' in (23) (Moore 1999,98-99). 
(21) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Superman came out, but he didn't look 
happy. 
(22) Lois's left arm was sore, so she went to the doctor. 
(23) The engine's carburetor was missing, so it didn't run very welL 18 
2.2.2 The metaphysics of aspects 
So, what are aspects? In Moore's view aspects are "primitive, irreducible, and ... 
somewhat indeterminate entities" that are demanded by our pre-reflective conceptual scheme 
(Moore 1999, 103). It is tempting to explain them in terms of collections of properties, but at 
best these collections can serve to model the aspects, as aspects, but not collections of 
properties, can walk around, write for the newspaper, and have varying degrees of romantic 
success. Importantly, aspects cannot be anything like Forbes' persona if these require any sort 
of mental life or ability to present, as this cannot accommodate sentences like (13). 
(13) I never made it to Leningrad, but I visited St. Petersburg last week. 
17 Aspects are not temporal parts or collections of them because temporal parts simply won't do the job. Imagine, 
for example, that Clark talks to Lois on the phone in his Superman aspect while sitting at his desk in the Daily 
Planet. If Lois raises the blinds on her office we might truthfully utter (e). 
(e) While talking on the phone to Superman, Lois looked through the window at Clark Kent. 
18 Sometimes the anaphoric reference is to the primary referent, as in (g) and (h): 
(g) Superman is more successful with women than Clark Kent, but they are both unsuccessful with 
men. 
(h) The engine's carburetor was missing. It had been stolen. 
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Indeed, to accommodate (13) and sentences like it Forbes adopts Moore's aspects in place of 
his persona (Forbes 1999). 
Moore apparently sees aspects as something which are inherently tied up with the 
semantics of our language. While he maintains they exist independently of us, he also 
suggests that due to their role in conversation they can be of varying degrees of completeness 
and are often vague and underspecified. As a result, there may be no answer to Saul's question 
about whether a showering Clark/Superman is a showering Clark-aspect or not (Saul 1997a, 
104), and (5) might have an indeterminate truth value if Clark/Superman enters a beach-side 
phone booth and emerges clad only in purple swim trunks (Moore 1999, 104). That is, there 
may be no answer to the question 'which aspect do purple trunks go with?'. 
All of this may seem to leave us without much of an account of aspects and some 
worrying metaphysical commitments. Moore defends his reliance on them by making three 
points (Moore 1999, 104-105). First, he maintains that similar entities will be required by any 
account that attempts to accommodate an assertive difference between the paired sentences 
above, even if that account locates the difference in pragmatic features of the assertion. 
Second, it seems that aspects, or something like them, may be required by other parts of the 
semantics of natural language-in particular to make sense of our talk of appearances, guises, 
voices, moods, etc. Finally, he thinks that we talk about aspects in flexible and variable ways, 
and that this flexibility ipso facto means that very little can be said about aspects in general, 
though we may well be able to talk about particular aspects in great detail. 
2.2.3 Aspects and the indexical view of names 
One interesting feature of Moore's account is that it can be smoothly incorporated 
within the indexical view of names advocated by Recanati. Recall that on Recanati's account 
the linguistic meaning of a proper name is such that: 
a proper name NN occurring in an utterance 'NN is G' indicates that there is an entity 
x, called NN (linguistic mode of presentation), such that the utterance is true iff x is G 
(Recanati 1993, 140). 
Since Moore's view is that among the entities called Clark there are both the individual 
Clark/Superman and the Clark-aspect of that individual, and since that aspect is a bit of the 
world to which we can directly refer, it seems open to the defender of Recanati's view to 
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accommodate the simple sentences by means of the reference-shifting account. Sentences 
containing singular terms would still express singular propositions, but instead of these 
containing individuals, they would contain aspects. 19 
2.3 Speaking to the unenlightened 
One problematic feature of both accounts which attempt to accommodate SF in simple 
sentences semantically is they distinguish between enlightened and unenlightened contexts of 
utterance for (5) and (5*). In enlightened contexts, the speaker (and perhaps the audience) 
knows about the identity in question and is able to form intentions to refer to persona or 
aspects of individuals and thus use (5) to talk about Clark/Superman's different identities. In 
contrast in unenlightened contexts, the speaker is ignorant of some crucial identity and will 
intend to refer to individuals with their use of the names, and thus when they utter (5) it does 
not differ in truth conditions from (5*). 
Forbes supports this gulf between the unenlightened and the enlightened by 
considering an utterance of(24) (Forbes 1999, 88). 
(24) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, but Superman, not Clark, came out. 
He maintains that if an unenlightened speaker-say Lois-utters (24), she will, upon learning 
about the relevant identity, withdraw the statement, having seen the contradiction. In contrast, 
the enlightened speaker's utterance of (24) will have similar content to their utterance of (5), 
and since by hypothesis they already know about the relevant identity, they will not withdraw 
the statement upon being reminded of it. Moore, with whom the distinction originates, says 
further that on his view an utterance of (5) by the unenlightened Lois will be true, but have the 
same truth conditions as (5*), while her utterance of (10) will, like (10*), be false (Forbes 
1999, 93-94). 
(5) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Superman came out. 
(5*) Clark Kent went into the phone booth, and Clark Kent came out. 
19 What is essential to singular propositions is that they contain something other than ways of thinking about 
things. 
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(10) Superman is more successful with women than Clark Kent. 
(10*) Superman is more successful with women than Superman. 
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Forbes, and Moore appear to accept without question that we can unproblematic ally treat (5) 
as semantically identical to (5*) in unenlightened contexts, and that an utterance of (24) by an 
unenlightened speaker would be withdrawn when she became enlightened. 
This just seems to be mistaken. Lois communicates something different with an 
utterance of (5) than she does with (5*), even if both she and her audience are ignorant of the 
relevant identity. Imagine that Lois is being interviewed by a detective after an explosion and 
a rescue by Clark/Superman. He asks Lois to say what happened just before the daring rescue, 
and she replies she glanced over her shoulder and saw Clark enter a phone booth. Our 
detective asks what occurred next, and Lois explains that there was an explosion, she rushed 
across the street to help, and a few minutes later when someone called out "There's 
Superman", she looked back and saw Superman emerge. Seeking clarification, the detective 
says, "So who entered the phone booth and who came out?" and Lois replies with an utterance 
of(5). 
Admittedly (5) itself is a little awkward, but we can easily imagine Lois uttering 
simple sentences that contain something like it as a part, like (25). 
(25) Clark entered the phone booth, and then the building exploded, and then later 
Superman came out of the phone booth. 
Now a suitably enlightened Lois will not need to withdraw (25) due to the middle clause, and 
we have no reason to judge that clause false. So for our purposes (25) is not importantly 
different from (5). However, Lois's utterance communicates something to the hearer that an 
utterance of (25 *) would not. 
(25*) Clark entered the phone booth, and then the building exploded, and then later 
Clark came out of the phone booth. 
The detective who heard (25*) could reasonably ask "so when did Superman arrive?", but this 
would be an odd question if Lois had just uttered (25). Nor does it seem that an enlightened 
Lois would withdraw either (5) or (25)--indeed, she might well endorse them again, saying 
"so that explains why so little time passed between Clark going into the phone booth and 
Chapter 3: The counterexamples 93 
Superman coming out". So we have to account for this in some way. Since Forbes and Moore 
are committed to saying the difference is not a difference in semantic content, they must 
explain it by means of some other aspect of what is communicated-that is, by means of 
pragmatics?O 
I think this much is uncontroversial. The question is, if (5) and (5*) communicate 
something different regardless of whether the context of utterance is enlightened or 
unenlightened, why should the explanation of the difference in enlightened contexts posit a 
difference in semantic content, while the explanation in unenlightened contexts posits only a 
difference in pragmatic implications? 21 
2.4 The enlightened speaker and the sex-scandal 
In her (1999c) Saul offers and extended criticism of aspect/persona based accounts. 
Her worry is that due to the distinction between the enlightened and the unenlightened 
speaker and the emphasis on speaker intentions, Moore and Forbes will be forced to accept 
some rather unpleasant consequences. Consider the following situation: 
A certain White House intern leads a double life. In one life, she must conceal the fact 
that she visits the President in his private office at night, that she has 'improper' 
relations with him, and so on. In the other, she must at least conceal the existence of 
20 Moore perhaps misses this because there are not many contexts in which we can imagine uttering (5*)--he 
notes that it and (10*) are "odd sentences to utter in any context. Their utterance, ... , might well change the 
semantic presuppositions of the context, or (depending on how we individuate contexts) bring about a new 
context" (Moore 1999, 94f6). However I think (5*), though not of course the inconsistent (10*), looses a great 
deal of its strangeness in the context of a police interview in which a higher degree of precision is expected. Part 
of the remaining strangeness of (5*) arises because we would normally replace the second occurrence of the 
name with a pronoun. The reason (25*) sounds more natural because the intervening clause, combined with the 
demand that people in police interviews avoid any possible ambiguity, makes the reuse of the name less jarring. 
21 Moore suggests that some of our intuitions are to be explained by the difficulty of imagining a single context 
in which one could utter either (5) or (5*)--a task which is even more difficult for (10*). As a result we shift 
contexts without intending to, or imagine what he calls a mixed context--one in which the enlightened speak to 
the unenlightened, or vice versa. Moore says that in mixed contexts an utterance of (5) would really express two 
propositions--one a claim about Clark/Superman, and one a claim about his aspects (Moore 1999, 96). I think 
the police interview context is sufficiently well-developed to rule out either shifting contexts or mixed 
contexts-the police detective is as much in the dark as Lois. 
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her first life. And at the changeover points (say, entering the Oval Office on the 
weekend) she must be careful not to be observed (Saul 1999c, 108).12 
This description, invoking as it does Forbes' description of the Superman story, seems to 
allow us to make sense of two aspects of Monica Lewinsky. The first, which Clinton no doubt 
referred to as 'Miss Lewinsky', engages in the standard tasks of an intern and is merely 
casually acquainted with the President. The second, 'Monica', has a much more intimate 
relationship with Clinton. Saul's worry is that on Forbes' or Moore's account Clinton could 
exploit this fact to ensure that his utterance of (26) was not a lie. 
(26) I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky.23 
As long as Clinton intends to refer to the 'Miss Lewinsky' -aspect or persona it seems that he 
can avoid the charge that he lied. It is after all true that he never had sexual relations (by 
anyone's definition) with Monica Lewinsky in her 'Miss Lewinsky'-aspect. But this just seems 
wrong. Clinton could not evade the charge of lying in this way. 
Saul considers various approaches, including putting constraints on speaker's 
intentions, making the context dependent on the audience's enlightenment rather than the 
speaker's, and ruling that the utterance does not express anything truth-evaluable in a context 
in which there are both unenlightened and enlightened participants (Saul 1999c, 109-111). 
Her criticisms of all these approaches are well taken. However she does not consider the one 
option which Moore actually proposes for mixed contexts: "a sentence uttered in this mixed 
context might assert two different propositions, for the context is really, as it were, a 
combination of the two" (Saul 1999, 96). On this interpretation Clinton lied because the 
context was one in which his utterance of (26) expressed two propositions-that he did not 
have sexual relations with Monica Lewinsky in her 'Miss Lewinsky'-aspect, and that he did 
not have sexual relations with the individual Monica Lewinsky. It's not clear that there is any 
22 The facts: President Clinton was accused of having an affair with Monica Lewinsky, a White House intern, in 
January of 1998. He did not admit to the affair until August of that year. The question of whether Clinton had 
actually lied about the affair was the focus of much of the public attention. 
23 The sentence, from Clinton's January 1998 press conference, is as Saul notes a little odd (1999, 109f5). One 
natural reading has 'Miss Lewinsky" referring to the addressee while 'that woman' refers to some other person. 
Like Saul, I will assume that this reading has been somehow ruled out. 
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way for Forbes to adapt this proposal to fit with his semantic account, but Moore does seem to 
be able to evade Saul's critique. 
2.5 Simple sentences and demonstratives 
Another group of problem cases has been offered by Anne Bezuidenhout (1996). Her 
cases do not concern names, but those supposedly paradigmatic examples of directly 
referential terms, demonstratives. Bezuidenhout advocates a neo-Fregean view on which the 
propositions expressed by utterances using singular terms will involve de re modes of 
presentation of the referents of those terms. However, unlike Evans, McDowell, Peacocke and 
Forbes, Bezuidenhout argues that de re modes of presentation must be truth-conditionally 
relevant-that is, that propositions differing only in that they contain distinct but co-
referential de re modes of presentation can differ in truth value. Key to her case are a number 
of conditionals. 
Suppose that in (27) and (27*) the demonstratives all refer to the same boy, but that 
while all occurrences of 'this boy' are associated with the boy visually presented to the 
participants in the conversation, the occurrence of 'that boy' is associated with a boy (met 
yesterday) who the participants have been discussing. 
(27) This boy is this boy. 
(27*) This boy is that boy. 
On both the neo-Fregean and the neo-Russellian accounts of demonstratives (27) and (27*) 
will have the same truth-conditions. On the neo-Russellian view they will both express the 
same singular proposition, while on the neo-Fregean view they will express different quasi-
singular propositions with the same truth-conditional content. Now consider the same 
situation, but suppose that one of the participants in the above conversation-John--does not 
yet know that the visually presented boy and the boy under discussion are one and the same. 
In this context in seems that (28) is false and (28*) true. 
(28) If this boy is this boy, John will be surprised. 
(28*) If this boy is that boy, John will be surprised. 
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If (27) and (27*) have the same truth-conditional content, how is it that (28) and (28*) have 
different truth-values, since they differ only in the substitution of (27*) for (27). 
One possible approach to (28) and (28*) is to claim that the clauses containing the 
demonstratives are in fact, appearances not withstanding, inside the scope of the attitude verb. 
That is you might treat the form of (28) and (28*) as being 'If ... , then John will be surprised 
at that' (Bezuidenhout 1996, 152). However, this fix will not work for all her examples. 
Consider (29) and (29*). 
(29) If the boy lifts this, John will think the boy is strong. 
(29*) If the boy lifts that, John will think the boy is strong?4 
Imagine that you are standing with John viewing a room in which there are apparently two 
dumbbells, one real and one Styrofoam, and a young boy. You and John reasonably judge that 
(29) and (29*) are true and false respectively. However, unbeknownst to both you and John 
there is just one dumbbell which, due to some careful effects, you are perceiving from two 
angles-one of which reveals that it is a fake. Despite the fact that there is just one dumbbell, 
it still seems that (29) is true and (29*) false. If they differ in truth value, however, it can only 
be because 'this' and 'that' are making different contributions to the information content of the 
sentences-and since their referent is the same this must be conceptual content. 
Perhaps the antecedent of (29) and (29*) is also somehow within the scope of the 
attitude verb. Since the object of John's attitude is specified, it cannot be a simple implicit 
reference demanded by the form of attitude ascriptions, as was proposed for (28) and (28*). 
Instead, it must be something more complicated. Bezuidenhout suggests that the most 
plausible account is to claim that (29) and (29*) have the form 'If ... , and John is aware of 
that, then John will think the boy is strong' (Bezuidenhout 1996, 153). 
The plausibility of this account of the form of (29) and (29*) rests on the idea that if 
we are to understand there to be a causal relation between the event of the antecedent and the 
event of the consequent we must take John to be aware of the antecedent in some way 
(Bezuidenhout 1996, 153). Bezuidenhout argues, however, that (29) and (29*) come apart in 
truth value even of we understand them to be simple material conditionals. To dramatize the 
point, she asks us to imagine that there is a machine in the room which detects the 
24 Bezuidenhout's original examples used 'If the boy can lift ... ', but this formulation seems to weaken rather than 
strengthen her subsequent treatment of them as material conditionals. 
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physiological changes which occur in John's body when he is surprised?5 Whenever the 
. changes occur a light on the machine flashes. After the boy apparently lifts a real dumbbell 
the light flashes, but when he apparently lifts a fake one the light stays dark. You and John 
reasonably judge that the material conditionals (30) and (30*) are true and false respectively: 
(30) If the boy lifts this, the light will go on. 
(30*) If the boy lifts that, the light will go on. 
Bezuidenhout's claim is that smce we understand (30) and (30*) without 
understanding the causal connection between the boy's actions and the behaviour of the 
machine, we must be able to understand (29) and (29*) without understanding the causal 
connection between the boy's actions and John's behaviour. Therefore, she concludes, we can 
understand (29) and (29*) as without reading into them the clause 'and John is aware of that' 
(Bezuidenhout 1996, 153). One difficulty with this is that while it does seem that (30) and 
(30*) can be read as simple material conditionals, we are much less inclined to count them as 
actually differing as truth value. Ifwe read (29) and (29*) in this way then it seems reasonable 
to think that they have the same truth value in every case. In the case where boy does appear 
to lift a real dumbbell both (29) and (29*) are true, as it is true that John thinks the boy is 
strong. If the boy doesn't appear to lift either a real or a fake dumbbell then they are again 
both true, since the antecedent is false. Finally, if the boy appears to lift a fake dumbbell but 
not the real one, then they are both false, since the consequent will be false. It is only on the 
causal interpretation of the conditional that we have the intuition that (29) and (29*) come 
apart in truth value. 
Despite this problem the case of the surprise detecting machine might allow us to 
construct a version of Bezuidenhout's example that does not suffer from this problem. 
Suppose that on the basis of watching the behaviour of the boy and the flashing light I utter 
(31). 
(31) When the boy lifts this the light flashes. 
We would intuitively count this as true, and it's counterpart (31 *) as false. 
25 Bezuidenhout specifies that the machine is hooked up to John, but since this might reinstate the causal 
connection it seems better to view the machine as scanning John without the audience being aware of it. 
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(31 *) When the boy lifts that the light flashes. 
Furthermore, it seems that we could use (31) to say something true even if everyone other 
than John were enlightened-if, for example, we were observing John through a one-way 
mirror as part of an experiment. It does not seem reasonable to insist that (31) and (31 *) 
implicitly place the demonstrative within the scope of an attitude verb, especially since they 
report simultaneity rather than causation. It seems therefore that names aren't the only singular 
terms for which there is apparent SF in simple sentences. 
3. Defending the simple sentence counterexamples 
One common response to the Saul style examples is to claim that they can all be 
adequately explained. For example, it has been put to me by various philosophers in 
conversation that the right thing to say about: 
(13) I've never been to Leningrad but I visited St. Petersburg last week. 
is that it is just a witty way of saying (on one reading): 
(32) I never visited St. Petersburg while it was called Leningrad, but I did visit it last 
week. 
The difference between the propositional attitude cases and the simple sentences is, it has 
been suggested, that people get worked up when you claim, for standard example, that they 
believe that Hesperus is Phosphorus in virtue of believing that Hesperus is Hesperus. Nobody, 
they claim, gets worked up about the former case. 
The problem here of course is that the two cases are not, as put, equivalent. The case 
of (32) is a case where the identity in question can be known to both speaker and hearer. And 
of course it is true that in such a circumstances, the hearer who said "you mean you never 
visited st. Petersburg while it was called Leningrad" would not meet with denial, though she 
might well meet with irritation ("that's what I said"). But in the parallel case, where a speaker 
in the know about the identity uttered (33) to a hearer also in the know, the claim that he 
meant (34) would not meet with denial either. 
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(33) Bob believes that Hesperus is not Phosphorus. 
(34) Bob doesn't know that 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' name the same planet. 
If the claim that (13) really means (32) is all that needs to be said to explain the apparent 
difference between (13) and (13*), then surely the claim that (33) really means (34) is all that 
needs to be said to explain the apparent difference between (33) and (33*). 
(13 *) I've never been to St. Petersburg but I visited St. Petersburg last week. 
(33*) Bob believes that Phosphorus is not Phosphorus. 
Indeed, the position that this is all that needs to be said is that advocated by Howard Wettstein 
(1991). However, the question at hand is how is it that (33) means (34), and (13) means (32), 
while their counterparts (33*) and (13*) do not. The response of the naIve theorist is to claim 
that the sense in which (33) and (13) mean (34) and (32) respectively is the same sense in 
which one may be said to have meant the conversational implicatures of your utterance. The 
use of the word 'mean' in connection with the pragmatically determined conversational 
implications of an utterance was pointed out by Grice in his original papers on the topic, and 
the naIve view takes the consistent approach of treating all of our intuitions about differences 
between pairs such as (13) and (13*) and (33) and (33*) as a matter of these pragmatic 
implicatures. An advocate of the naIve view must, however, give an explanation of exactly 
what these pragmatic implicatures are, and this, as we have seen, is harder than it may appear. 
Those who wish to defend the view that some explanation of the behaviour of names 
In propositional attitude contexts should be given face a different difficulty however. 
Advocates of neo-Fregean view on which de re senses are truth-conditionally irrelevant are 
committed to treating (13) and (13*) as having the same truth-value. Advocates of the hidden-
indexical views have more resources for extending their account to these cases. However 
these treatments require a level of metaphysical commitment that many would feel 
uncomfortable with. More importantly, Moore and Forbes' use of the distinction between 
unenlightened contexts and enlightened ones commits them to providing a semantic account 
of the anti-substitution intuitions in the enlightened cases and a pragmatic account in the 
unenlightened ones. Thus advocates of these sorts of views must either defend a distinction 
between the simple sentences and the attitude contexts or one between enlightened and 
unenlightened contexts. 
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3.1 Weak intuitions 
As mentioned above, it has been argued that the difference between attitude 
ascriptions and the simple sentences can be made out in terms of our willingness to accept the 
consequences of allowing the substitution in the two cases. On this view, we must explain the 
propositional attitude cases because our intuitions that pairs such as (33) and (33*) diverge in 
meaning is too strong. In the case of (13) and (13*) however, they suggest that our intuitions 
are weaker and that we more readily accept pragmatic explanations in terms of conversational 
implicatures. The question whether so much weight should be placed on the strength of our 
intuitions in this respect is one that I take up later. Leaving that question aside, however, I 
want to challenge the claim that the intuitions associated with the Saul examples are as weak 
as this strategy suggests. 
As noted above, a speaker may well readily accept that what her utterance of (13) 
meant was that (32) was the case. However, we should not be mislead by this. The utterer of 
(13) seems very unlikely to accept that what she said in uttering (13) was the same as what 
she would have said by uttering (13*). Instead she would no doubt maintain that (32) was not 
only what she meant, but also what she said. The situation is much different from one in 
which a speaker utters (34) while meaning (35), or (36) while meaning (37). 
(34) I visited Darleen and Cherek. 
(35) I visited Charleen and Derek. 
(36) The essay is presented neatly. 
(37) The content of the essay is poor. 
In the case of (34) and (35) a speaker would happily acquiesce to the claim that (35) was not 
what they said, due to a slip of the tongue. And in the case of (36) and (37), the utterer of (36), 
when accused of saying (37) could reasonably (if somewhat legalistically) claim that (37) was 
not what they said, or for that matter protect themselves by saying "you said it, not me". My 
point here is not that our intuitions settle the matter, but that the intuitions associated with the 
Saul examples are not as weak as some might make out. 
What about the apparent strength of our intuition that, to take Kripke's case, Pierre 
would vehemently deny that he believed that London was pretty, while all the while insisting 
that he did believe that Londres est jollie? Isn't this intuition much stronger than the intuition 
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that the author of a travelogue might deny that he every stood on the streets of Leningrad 
imagining the goose-stepping soldiers of Leningrad while insisting that he did indeed stand on 
the streets of St. Petersburg imagining the goose-stepping soldiers of Leningrad? It is not 
immediately transparent to me that the author in question would not deny that the former 
claim was false, if he had reason to believe that the hearer had genuinely misunderstood him 
to have visited Leningrad during the period of Soviet rule. The difference is that Pierre's 
ignorance of the identity of London and Londres means that he always has good reason to 
believe that someone who claims he thinks London is pretty has misunderstood. On the other 
hand, our travelogue author is aware of (and indeed exploiting) the co-referentiality of the 
names in question. We understand his utterance because we know that st. Petersburg is 
Leningrad. Further, the appropriateness of the utterance depends on the identity - it would 
be peculiar to pick up a travelogue in which the author stood in the streets of New York 
imagining the goose-stepping soldiers of Leningrad. However, the fact that we know about 
the identity means that it is possible for us to use the name 'Leningrad' without giving the 
author reason to think he has been misunderstood. 
There are simple sentence counterexamples in which the identity is not required to be 
known and exploited but can be unknown-for example, Bezuidenhout's example in which a 
barbell which appears to be two barbells. Recall that in this case we are inclined to say that 
(31) is true but (31 *) false. 
(31) When the boy lifts this the light flashes. 
(31 *) When the boy lifts that the light flashes. 
In these cases, a speaker ignorant of the identity would always have reason to think that you 
had misunderstood her if you claimed that she had said (31 *), and so would protest 
vehemently, just like Pierre. Similarly, in the example of the police interview, it seems that 
Lois would be perfectly correct to refuse to sign a statement which contained (25*) rather than 
(25). 
(25) Clark entered the phone booth, and then the building exploded, and then later 
Superman came out of the phone booth. 
(25*) Clark entered the phone booth, and then the building exploded, and then later 
Clark came out of the phone booth. 
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To take a slightly different example, consider the case where I bet you $50 that there 
will be a picture of Norma Jean Baker in a book titled Monroe. You are unlikely to be 
inclined to hand over the money when I point out the picture of Marilyn singing to President 
Kennedy. Nor will I convince you to pay by pointing out that Marilyn just is Norma Jean, 
even if you are a philosopher of language. You will no doubt reply that what I bet was that 
there would be a picture of NormaiMarilyn before she dyed her hair etc?6 Of course, how we 
are able to say this is just the question at hand. Nevertheless, the conviction that I have not 
won the bet is just as strong as the conviction that someone who believes that Hesperus is 
Hesperus should not ipso facto be taken to have the belief that Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
3.2 Parallel explanations 
Saul has herself suggested that the problematic simple sentences offer a parallel set of 
anti-substitution intuitions,and thus provides additional support for the naIve view. She 
writes: 
[t]he main argument against Salmon and Soames's theory has been that it requires the 
violation of our intuitions about substitution. But the current approach to substitution 
in simple sentences requires what is apparently a perfectly parallel violation of 
intuitions, accompanied by a perfectly parallel appeal to pragmatics. The advocate of 
this approach owes us a reason for supposing that one set of intuitions deserves to be 
taken so much more seriously than the other. Without such a reason, her objection to 
Salmon and Soames's approach loses much of its force (Saul 1997a, 107). 
Stefano Predelli (1999) argues that it is a mistake to view a pragmatic treatment of SF in 
simple sentences as lending support to the naIve view of belief ascriptions. Predelli argues 
that a pragmatic treatment of SF in the simple sentences would not be parallel to the 
pragmatic treatment of attitudes offered by Salmon and Soames, since the defense in Frege's 
Puzzle depends crucially on the positing of the ternary relation BEL. Predelli claims that since 
26 It might seem on first glance that in this case the name 'Norma Jean Baker' does always pick out a certain time 
slice of Norma/Marilyn. However, reflection on the (original) lyrics of the Elton John song Candle in the Wind 
should convince you that we do sometimes use the name 'Norma Jean Baker' to pick out the individual 
Norma/Marilyn. In the song the name 'Norma Jean' seems to pick out the individual, and 'Marilyn Monroe' 
seems to pick out her public personae or aspect. 
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it implausible to think that a pragmatic explanation of SF in simple sentences will take the 
form of positing a ternary relation that is existentially generalized over, we should not view a 
pragmatic treatment of these cases as 'perfectly parallel, and not conclude that it gives support 
to the naIve view (Predelli 1999, 114). 
Predelli is correct that the pragmatic explanation of SF in simple sentences is not 
perfectly parallel in that strong sense, since the simple sentences do not involve any relation 
(ternary or binary) in a systematic way. However I think that he is mistaken when he claims 
that what is controversial about the naIve view is not its disregard for speaker's intuitions but 
the claim that we systematically and mistakenly interpret belief attributions as making claims 
about the third relatum of BEL (Predelli 1999, 115). It is true that given Salmon and Soames' 
endorsement of the ternary view of belief their claim that belief ascriptions do not specify the 
third relatum has seemed particularly puzzling to some (see Oppy 1992). However, much of 
the resistance to the naIve view has rested on the claim that the speaker intuitions in question 
should not be overridden unless it is absolutely necessary. For example, in defending the 
hidden-indexical view Mark Richard writes: 
Other than using bribery, threats, hypnosis, or the like, there is simply nothing you can 
do to get most people to say that Jones believes that Tully was an orator, once they 
know that Jones sincerely denies 'Tully was an orator', understands it, and acts on his 
denial in ways appropriate thereto. In particular, pointing out that Jones can express 
something he believes with 'Cicero was an orator' seems simply irrelevant to most 
people (Richard 1990, 125). 
In as far as part of the motivation for opposing the naIve view is that it disregards a substantial 
set of speaker intuitions, a pragmatic treatment of the problematic simple sentences does 
weaken the case. The simple sentences involve a set of intuitions that are parallel in that they 
both involve the substitution of co-referential names. Advocates of HIT, the neo-Fregean 
views, and the indexical view of names all take the first set of intuitions seriously. If they do 
not give the second set equal weight Saul is right to demand an explanation of the difference. 
4. Scorekeeping 
It seems then that all the contemporary views discussed in chapter three face a number 
of difficulties. None of them can accommodate all our intuitions about attitude ascription, 
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since in they all face the same difficulties in giving an account of Lydia's utterance of(1) that 
gives the correct truth-conditions. 
(1) No ancient astronomers believed that Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
Furthermore, the same anti-substitution intuitions that appear in the propositional attitude 
cases arise in a number of simple sentences for both proper names and demonstratives. 
Accounts which acco,mmodate the anti-substitution intuitions in the propositional attitude 
cases must either maintain that the two cases are relevantly different or attempt to 
accommodate them. Those who take the first option owe us an explanation of the difference, 
but it is hard to see what such an explanation could amount to. However, those who have 
attempted to take the second route find themselves defending a distinction which seems at 
least equally ad hoc-that between enlightened and unenlightened context. 
Despite the difficulties it faces with sentences like (1), the naIve view seems to have 
an advantage in that it treats all our anti-substitution intuitions as the result of the same 
confusion about the difference between pragmatic and semantic aspects of what is 
communicated by an utterance. In chapter seven I will argue that this advantage is 
illusionary-in fact the distinction between what is said and what is implied cannot be drawn 
in the way the naIve theory requires. First, however, I want to consider the suggestion that all 
these difficulties arise because Frege's treatment of quantification and reference underlies our 
approach to the semantics of natural language. Can alternate approaches to quantification 
solve the problems? 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Game-theoretic semantics and the new theory of reference 
The common ground of both the naIve theory and hidden indexical accounts of proper 
names is endorsement of the new theory of reference (NTR), a theory which includes among 
its tenets: 
such notions as direct reference, rigid designation, identity across possible worlds, the 
necessity of identity, a posteriori identities, singular propositions, essentialism about 
natural kinds, the argument from the failure of substitutivity in modal contexts that 
proper names are not equivalent to contingent definite descriptions, and related ideas 
and arguments (Smith 1995, 179). 
Commitment to the idea that proper names are directly referential and thus are used to express 
singular propositions is part of what makes explanatiQn of both propositional attitude contexts 
and the opaque simple sentences difficult. It is perhaps un surprising therefore that the new 
theory of reference has itself come under attack as the source of the problem, particularly 
from Iaakko Hintikka and Gabriel Sandu (1995), who offer independence friendly logics and 
game-theoretic semantics as an alternative approach. In this chapter I wish to address two 
questions-are the arguments for the new theory of reference fallacious, as Hintikka and 
Sandu charge, and does game-theoretic semantics offer a viable alternative. 
In what follows I discuss Hintikka and Sandu's arguments against the new-theory of 
reference and their alternate account of the semantics of natural language in terms of 
independence friendly logic and game-theoretic semantics. I argue that despite its independent 
interest the game-theoretic approach does not provide an adequate account of the behaviour of 
proper names. Furthermore, I argue that Hintikka and Sandu's criticism of the new theory of 
reference misunderstands some of the central arguments in favour of treating names as 
directly referential. 
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1. Is the new theory a/reference based on afallacy? 
Hintikka and Sandu argue that Kripke's modal argument shows only that the bound 
variables of quantifiers must be 'rigid designators' or 'directly referential'. Apparent rigid 
designation by singular terms can, they suggest, be explained either in terms of scope or in 
terms of independence friendly logic. In Hintikka and Sandu's view the belief that modal 
considerations provide support for the thesis that the semantic content of a proper name is 
exhausted by its referent is based on two mistaken assumptions-first, the belief that natural 
language quantifiers should be given a substitutional account, and second, the metaphysical 
assumption that individuals are given to us prefabricated. The view of reference that stems 
from these assumptions is then further reinforced, they argue, by an inappropriate 
commitment to retaining the laws of first-order logic, the assimilation of different modes of 
cross-world identification, the doctrine that ostensive definition is the paradigm way of 
teaching the references of singular terms, and (except among the central figures involved in 
developing the theory), a certain degree of logical ignorance. 
1.1 Modality and reference 
Hintikka and Sandu identify issues connected with modality as the central 
considerations in favour of direct reference. It is a familiar fact that sentences containing 
modal operators seem to admit of two readings, commonly described as de dicta and de reo To 
take Hintikka and Sandu's example, suppose that one utters the sentence: 
(1) Stefan knows that Marie Antoinette's lover is French. 
If we give the operator 'know' a possible worlds analysis on which 'a knows that S has the 
import that in every possible world compatible with what a knows, S is true, (1) can be read in 
two distinct ways. We may take it to be saying that in every possible world compatible with 
what Stefan knows the person who is Marie Antoinette's lover in that world is French. On this 
de dicta reading, the phrase 'Marie Antoinette's lover' may pick out different individuals in 
different worlds in the set of worlds compatible with what Stefan knows. 
Alternatively, we may give (1) a de re reading on which we take it to be saying that in 
every possible world compatible with what Stefan knows, the person who is Marie 
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Antoinette's lover in the actual world is French. On this reading, the phrase 'Marie 
Antoinette's lover' picks out the same individual in each world compatible with what Stefan 
knows (even if that individual is not her lover in that world). It is this reading which depends 
one us being able to use a term (say b) to pick out a single individual in all the relevant 
possible worlds, and this seems, as Hintikka and Sandu put it, to be "scarcely possible unless 
b refers to the same individual in all possible scenarios" (Hintikka and Sandu 1995, 248). That 
is, such reference depends us being able to use some term or other to pick out the individual 
who is in fact Marie Antoinette's lover in each of the worlds compatible with what Stefan 
knows. 
The expression of de re knowledge or necessity may thus, note Hintikka and Sandu, 
seem to require the possession of rigid designators, and, furthermore: 
this rigid reference cannot be mediated by any contingent definite description. For 
such a description can always in principle refer to different individuals in different 
possible scenarios (Hintikka and Sandu 1995,248). 
However, as Hintikka and Sandu are quick to point out, this line of reasoning does not, by 
itself, provide reasons to posit the existence of a class of directly referential terms in natural 
language. Indeed, that it does not is made patently obvious by the fact that the example they 
chose can be explicated entirely in terms of possible worlds and the behaviour of the definite 
description 'Marie Antoinette's lover', which all parties will agree is neither a rigid designator 
nor directly referential-indeed, according to advocates of a Russellian account it is not even 
a proper singular term. The 'rigid designation' exhibited by 'Marie Antoinette's lover' in de re 
uses of (l) can be explicated entirely in terms of quantification and scope, under which 
analysis the de re reading of (1) has the logical form of (2). 
(2) ::3x (x = Marie Antoinette's lover & Stefan knows that x is French) 
Quantification, as long as we have an independent account of it, provides all that is needed for 
the expression of rigidity. Rigid singular terms are on Hintikka and Sandu's view dispensable, 
and thus they conclude that the slogan of modal logicians should be "we do it with 
quantifiers" (Hintikka and Sandu 1995,253). 
If this is all the support that reflection on modal issues could provide for the NTR then 
Hintikka and Sandu would be right to reject this line of argument. However, I think this 
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analysis betrays a misunderstanding of the force of the modal argument, which provides a 
much more direct reason to regard proper names as directly referential than consideration of 
ascriptions of de re knowledge or de re necessity can provide. The modal argument, as I 
described it earlier, asks us to compare the modal profiles of sentences containing proper 
names in alternate possible worlds and contrast them with the modal profiles of sentences 
containing descriptions. The moral of that consideration was that for any description ~, the 
modal profile of (3) and (4) will differ. 
(3) Arthur Prior ~ed. 
(4) The ~ ~ed. 
Quantification and scope can provide no explanation of this phenomena, as there is no modal 
operator for the name to be outside the scope of. 
Hintikka and Sandu's claim that quantification provides all the rigidity we need raises 
two questions-does quantification into modal contexts require a class of directly referential 
terms in natural language, and can the difference between (3) and (4) be explained without 
treating proper names as directly referential. 
1.2 Quantification into modal contexts 
The explanation of de re reference given by Hintikka and Sandu relies, as we have 
seen, on quantification into modal contexts. It is, on their view, no accident that the 
developers of the new theory of reference were themselves modal logicians concerned with 
the legitimacy of such quantification, as the possible worlds treatment of quantification into 
modal contexts immediately raises the question of cross-world identification. Consider (5). 
(5) 3x 0 Px 
The standard clauses implicated in giving the truth conditions of (5) are as follows: 
3x~ is true in a world w with respect to an assignment v iff there is an individual d in 
the domain of w such that ~ is true in w with respect to an assignment v * which differs 
from v only in that d is assigned as the value of x. 
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D<\> is true in a world w with respect to an assignment v iff for every world w* such 
that wR w*, <\> is true in w*. 
As can be seen, applying these clauses of the definition of truth successively to (5) will 
require re-identifying d in world w*. As Hintikka and Sandu put it, quantification into modal 
contexts presupposes the existence of criteria of cross-identification. These criteria cannot 
themselves be explained in terms of quantification, on pain of (vicious) circularity, and so 
they certainly cannot be explained in terms of descriptions, as these themselves involve 
quantification (Hintikka and Sandu 1995, 249). Indeed, it seems as if the variables bound by 
quantifiers must exhibit a kind of direct referentiality, bilt here Hintikka and Sandu advise 
caution: "bound variables do not, in any literal sense, refer to anything at all. The rigidity and 
directness they exhibit is not a matter of reference, but of criteria of cross-identity" (Hintikka 
and Sandu 1995,253). 
More will be said about criteria of cross-world identification in what follows. Hintikka 
and Sandu's main conclusion, however, is that advocates of the NTR must have had some 
additional reason to think that quantifiers could not provide all the rigidity needed, and the 
obvious explanation is that they endorse a substitutional account of quantification. If the 
quantifiers of natural language are substitutional, then there must be a class of terms to serve 
as the substitution values of the variables, and these terms must themselves be rigid 
designators. Furthermore, since descriptions involve quantification, it would seem that the 
terms which serve as the substitution class cannot exploit descriptive content, but must be the 
Millian mere tag of the NTR. 
The question of whether natural language quantification is substitutional, or can be 
interpreted as substitutional, is a complicated one. In what follows I will assume that Hintikka 
and Sandu are correct in rejecting a substitutional interpretation, and consider whether given 
this assumption their charge that the NTR is unfounded is correct. 
1.3 Cross-world identification 
Hintikka and Sandu commend the new theorists for their insight in seemg that 
quantification into modal contexts requires a kind of 'rigid designation' on the part of the 
bound variables and suggest that the mistake of extending this requirement to proper names is 
encouraged by an implicit endorsement of the substitutional account of quantification. 
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Nevertheless, they recognize that whatever the New Theorists' views on the correct account of 
quantifiers, the claim that proper names are directly referential is intended to be independent 
of a particular account of quantification. The issue then is what reasons other than the modal 
considerations could provide support for this view. Hintikka and Sandu identify two further 
ideas which they claim reinforce the 'myth' of directly referential singular terms. First, new 
theorists conflate two different modes of identifying objects; and second, NTR involves a 
unjustified metaphysical assumption about the nature of individuals (Hintikka and Sandu 
1995, 263).1 
1.3.1 Modes of identification 
Hintikka and Sandu claim that the NTR conflates two modes of identification, and that 
this conflation also contributes to the 'myth' of directly referential terms. On their view we do 
not have well-defined individuals independently of specifying criteria of identification, and 
two different sets of principles for identifying individuals across possible worlds will result in 
two different sets of individuals. Hintikka and Sandu maintain that there are two distinct 
modes of identification which play an important role in our semantical practices. The NTR, 
they charge, runs roughshod over the important distinction between perspectival or subject-
centered identification and public or object-centered identification. Hintikka and Sandu have 
very little to say about the public mode of identification, except to note that it is implicated in 
the truth conditions of sentences like (6). 
(6) 3xKa x= b 
However the contrast to perspectival identification suggests that what is at issue is the 
(re)identification of physical objects on the basis of physical continuity. The perspectival 
mode of identification instead "relies on the subject's direct cognitive relations to persons, 
objects, places, times, events, etc" (Hintikka and Sandu 1995, 274). These direct cognitive 
relations serve to create what Hintikka and Sandu call a frame of reference for the second 
mode of identification. For exainple, in the case of seeing the frame of reference is my visual 
space, and an object can be cross-identified on the basis of its place in that space, even if I 
I Hintikka and Sandu also posit a third factor-the doctrine that the paradigm case for teaching the references of 
singular terms is ostensive definition (Hintikka and Sandu 1995,263). 
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have no further knowledge about who or what (in the public sense) that object is. Hintikka has 
proposed that we associate a second set of quantifiers (E and A) with this mode of 
identification while reserving traditional quantifiers for the public mode of identification 
(Hintikka 197 5b). With these quantifiers in hand we can represent the claim that a sees d with 
(7). 
(7) ExKa x =d 
What (7) is meant to capture is the idea that d is clearly present in a's visual space. It is true 
just in case one visual object is in all the scenarios compatible with a's visual knowledge. 
Hintikka and Sandu maintain that this distinction occupies an important role in the use of all 
the epistemic modalities and is well recognized by cognitive scientists distinctions between 
episodic and semantic memory and the where-system and the what-system (Hintikka and 
Sandu 1995, 275). 
One characteristic feature of the perspectival mode of identification is its reliance on 
ostension, at least in the visual case. Hintikka and Sandu maintain that the New Theorists use 
of ostension as a model for the direct reference attributed to proper names is a result of their 
conflation of the two kinds of identification. 
The New Theorists have realized, however dimly, that there exists a mode of 
identification different from the garden-variety public mode of identification and 
irreducible to it, viz. The perspectival one. Unfortunately they have been preoccupied 
with reference rather than cross-identification. This has led them to postulate a special 
mode of reference which is independent of the usual public linguistic reference (276). 
One of the mistakes brought about by this conflation of the modes of identification is the 
thought that the kind of reference associated with ostension is what is operative in the de re or 
rigid uses of singular terms.· This is a mistake, Hintikka and Sandu suggest, because once we 
have the notion of modes of cross-world identification and the associated quantifiers in hand 
we can see that the de re/de dicta distinction cuts across the perspectival/public one. The 
quantificational explanation of the de re/de dicta distinction applies equally well to the 
perspectival quantifiers E and A. Since ostensive or perspectival reference is not inherently de 
re, it cannot serve as a model for direct reference. 
Chapter 4: Game-theoretic semantics 112 
1.3.2 Metaphysics and individuals 
The notion of a perspectivally identified object is important because it illustrates one 
of the basic areas of disgreement between Hintikka and Sandu and the new theorists. In 
Hintikka and Sandu's view a visual object has just as good a claim to the status of 
metaphysically significant individual as does a public identified physical object, even when 
that object is identified with different publicly identified objects in different possible worlds. 
In their view individuals are constructed relative to our interests (postfabricated) rather than 
given to us (prefabricated). 
The unfounded metaphysical assumption that Hintikka and Sandu charge the NTR 
with is the postulation of a prefabricated fixed store of individuals and a store of proper names 
by which we can refer to them. It is this postulation that they take to be the central point of 
Kripke's claim in Naming and Necessity that cross-world identification is not problematic-
that rather than 'discovering' alternate possibilities and then determining who is who, we 
stipulate the alternate possibilities, and thus stipulate the identities involved: 
A possible world is given by the descriptive conditions we associate with it. . .. Why 
can't it be part of the description of a possible world that it contains Nixon and that in 
that world Nixon didn't win the election? It might be a question, of course, whether 
such a world is possible. (Here it would seem, prima jacie, to be clearly possible.) 
But, once we see that such a situation is possible, then we are given that the man who 
might have lost the election or who did lose the election in this possible world is 
Nixon, because that's part of the description of the world. 'Possible worlds' are 
stipulated, not discovered by powerful telescopes. There is no reason why we cannot 
stipulate that, in talking about what would have happened to Nixon in a certain 
counterfactual situation, we are talking about what would have happened to him 
(Kripke 1980,44) .. 
That is, on Kripke's view, the question of cross-world identity is not a genuine one. I do not 
describe an alternate possible world and then determine whether a given man in that world is 
Nixon or not. Whether he is Nixon or not is part of the description of the world. 
One difficulty for Hintikka and Sandu's account is that it is unclear how the notion that 
possible worlds are stipulated rather than discovered commits one to denying that there can be 
postfabricated individuals. As an interpretation of Kripke's discussion of stipulation this 
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seems implausible. Kripke emphasizes that possible worlds are as we describe them, and this 
seems to legitimate descriptions in terms of different modes of identification, rather than rule 
them out. It seems that Kripke's possible worlds may be inhabited by whatever individuals we 
can consistently describe. The question of whether perspectivally identified and publicly 
identified objects have equal claim to the status of individuals does not seem to rest on the 
correct answer to the question of whether we stipulate or discover cross-world identifications. 
1.3.3 Branching and lines of identification 
A more important area of disagreement between the NTR and Hintikka and Sandu is 
the question of whether it makes sense to speak of the lines of identification branching or not. 
The commitment of the NTR to the necessity of identity is what is at issue here, and the 
notion that possible worlds are stipulated is not, by itself, sufficient for the necessity of 
identity. Even if we assume that a and b are rigid designators which are co-referential in the 
actual world, this only implies that the identity statement 'a = b' is necessary when it is 
combined with the claim that the lines of identification do not branch (Hintikka and Sandu 
1995,268-269). In order to be a rigid designator a term must refer to the same thing in every 
possible world-that is, its reference must follow the lines of identification between worlds. If 
those lines of identification branch, then rigid designators which are co-referential in this 
world may not be co-referential in every world. 
Hintikka and Sandu suggest that the advocates of the NTR fail to consider this 
possibility because of the alleged commitment to the existence of a fixed store of individuals 
out of which possible worlds are constructed. However, if the store of individuals is not the 
individuals ofthe actual world, but is the set of individuals such that we can describe, specify, 
or imagine them, then it is not clear that this prevents branching. The assumption that there is 
no branching is really an assumption about the principles of identification that is independent 
of the question of whether there is a fixed pool of individuals. 
One important application of the distinction between the two modes of identification is 
in sentences which identify perspectivally identified objects with public identified ones, as in 
(8), (9), and (10). 
(8) It is now six o'clock. 
(9) That man is Saul Kripke. 
(10) I am Quentin Smith. 
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Because of the difference between the two modes of identification, these identities are on 
Hintikka and Sandu's view contingent. 
More important for our purposes however is that the idea of a rigid designator must, if 
Hintikka and Sandu are correct, be interpreted relative to a particular mode of cross-world 
identification. In (10), both 'I' and 'Quentin Smith' may be operating as rigid designators 
without the identity in (10) being necessary as long as they are rigid designators relative to 
different modes of identification. The doctrine that all identities between rigidly designating 
terms are necessary depends one of two states of affairs obtaining. One way in which it could 
be true is if there is just one mode of identification and thus just one set of postfabricated 
individuals. Alternatively, identities between rigidly designating terms will be necessary if all 
the rigidly designating terms are associated with a single mode of identification. 
1.3.4 Descriptivism 
Whether the principles of cross-world identification branch or not, the NTR has as one 
of its central doctrines a view about how cross-world identification does not occur. According 
to the NTR descriptive considerations or conceptual content definitely do not have a role to 
play. Hintikka and Sandu's maintain that there is no support for the view that alleged rigid 
designators cannot have their reference fixed descriptively. They make two points about the 
arguments against the description theory of proper names (Hintikka and Sandu 1995, 267). 
First, they note that we would be unable to find a description tX Bx that specifies the 
individual b in every possible world if the lines of cross-world identification are drawn even 
partly by other means (they nominate continuity considerations as the other component 
(Hintikka and Sandu 1995,268)). 
Secondly, even if the lines of cross-world identification are drawn entirely in terms of 
descriptive criteria (i.e., if there is some definable set of attributes B such that whatever 
possesses them is b), since descriptions rely on quantifiers and the quantifiers themselves rely 
on cross-world identification, we will not be able to express these descriptive criteria in terms 
of a description tX Bx. In Hintikka and Sandu's view the standard clause for the truth-
conditions of such a sentence rely on us already having specified the principles of 
individuation. 
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tX Bx ~ is true in a world w with respect to an assignment v iff 
(a) there is exactly one individual d in the domain of w such that Bx is true in w with 
respect to an assignment v * which differs from v only in that d is assigned as the value 
of x, and; 
(b) ~ is true in w with respect to v* .. 
Hintikka and Sandu conclude that there cannot be an object language account of the principles 
of cross-world identification, but deny that this means that there is non-descriptive reference 
by proper names or any other terms (Hintikka and Sandu 1995,268). This of course allows us 
to extrapolate their response to the problem raised by the difference in modal profile between 
(3) and (4). 
(3) Arthur Prior ~ed. 
(4) The ~ ~ed .. 
The name Arthur Prior will on their view pick out an individual who is cross-identified by 
means of either (a) descriptive criteria plus some other considerations or (b) purely 
descriptive criteria, but in neither case will an description of the form 'the ~' serve to express 
those criteria, as its meaning depends on the prior existence of the principles of identification. 
1.4 Why refer directly? 
As Hintikka and Sandu see it, once we let go of the implicit reliance on substitutional 
quantification the notion of direct reference by proper names (or other singular terms) does no 
theoretical work. It is not needed to explain de re reference, as that is adequately accounted 
for by quantifiers. Rigid designation (i.e., de re reference) is not a kind of reference at all, but 
the consequence of treating a singular term as having wide scope. Quantifiers and their 
associated variables rely on cross-world identification rather than reference, and directly 
referential singular terms fail as an explanation of this identification because they themselves 
rely on the same principles of identification. Direct reference to an individual depends on 
having a well-defined referent, and individuals are themselves defined in terms of principles 
of cross-world identification. Finally, the notion that ostensive reference provides a model or 
an explanation of direct reference by singular terms is mistaken. Once we understand that 
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ostension gains its apparently special nature from its role in perspectival identification, and 
realize that the de re/de dicto distinction cuts across the perspectival/public distinction, the 
temptation to equate ostension with a particular kind of reference is overcome. 
There is however one further consideration in favour of treating names as directly 
referential that Hintikka and Sandu do take seriously. Accounting for de re reference in terms 
of quantification and scope may seem to leave them open to the charge that while they have 
explained one means by which de re reference may occur, they have not explained how it is 
that names achieve such de re reference. After all, the objector may point out, (12) does not 
resemble (11), even if it somehow captures its logical force (when (11) is given a de re 
reading). 
(11) John knows that Mary enjoyed studying philosophy. 
(12) ::lx (x = Mary & Klohn (x enjoyed studying philosophy). 
Indeed, the differences in modal profile between (3) and (4) serve to reinforce this line of 
argument. 
(3) Arthur Prior ~ed. 
(4) The ~ ~ed. 
The idea that definite descriptions presuppose the principles of identification (via 
quantification) and so cannot elucidate those principles may well be correct, but one is still 
entitled to wonder why it is that names behave so differently, given that they too are supposed 
to presuppose principles of identification. Hintikka and Sandu may be right that we do not 
need to have a class of directly referential terms in natural language in order to make de re 
reference and quantification possible, but, says the defender of the NTR, as a matter of fact 
we do have such a class. In natural languages proper names accomplish de re reference in 
virtue of being directly referential, though a language in which they didn't is logically 
possible. 
Hintikka and Sandu maintain that the claim that (11) and (12) do not seem alike, even 
if the latter captures the force of the former, relies overly much on the surface form of both 
natural and formal languages, and they do not consider examples of the form of (3) and (4). 
We can, they suggest, simply regard (12) as the logical form of the de re reading of (11). As it 
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turns out, however, on Hintikka and Sandu's preferred approach to the semantics of natural 
language we do not have to accept that the logical form of (11) is (12). While the quantifier 
and scope explanation of de re reference is adequate, a more general account may be had in 
terms of game-theoretic semantics and informational independence. 
2. Independence friendly logics 
Hintikka and Sandu's argument that the primitive data of the NTR-de re reference-
can be adequately accounted for without positing a class of directly referential terms has not 
to this point depended on any rejection of the dominant approach to natural language 
semantics or the underlying logic of natural languages. It is rather a form of Ockham's razor. 
The positing of the special semantical class is, they suggest, an ontological excess which 
provides no additional explanatory power. In this light, the reply that emphasizes the apparent 
differences between (11) and (12) can be seen as making two points. First of all, by drawing 
our attention to the claim that (12) captures the force of (11) without explaining how or why 
(11) has that force, the defender of the NTR is maintaining that the positing of a class of 
directly referential terms does have additional explanatory power, though this power is not to 
be found in the giving of correct truth conditions or correct meaning but in the explication of 
how the meaning of a sentence is a function of the meaning of its parts.2 Secondly, by 
emphasizing the distance between the form of (11) and (12), they are drawing our attention to 
a theoretical virtue of the NTR. If proper names are directly referential then we have to hand a 
simple explanation of the semantical force of (11). Thus, even if one is not moved by the first 
point, the new theorist may be able to claim a theoretical standoff in which we must choose 
between ontological parsimony and explanatory elegance. 
This is not the end of the story, however, as Hintikka and Sandu do have at their 
disposal an alternative theory which endeavors to provide a simple explanation of how names 
can manifest so-called de re reference. This alternative theory rests on two ideas-
independence friendly logic and game-theoretic semantics. 
2 This move may have unanticipated consequences, as it commits the new theorist to endorsing as superior 
theories which give a better explanation of either the relationship between the linguistic meaning of the parts of a 
sentence and the linguistic meaning of the sentence as a whole or that between the linguistic meaning of the 
sentence and the meaning of any given utterance of that sentence. In particular, I think that advocates of the 
naIve theory may want to reject this strand of argument and focus on the second. 
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2.1 Scope and binding 
In ordinary first-order logic the idea of quantificational scope serves two purposes. 
First of all, it serves to indicate which variables are bound by which quantifiers. Secondly, it 
serves to indicate which quantifiers are dependent on which quantifiers. It is a difference in 
quantifier dependence which separates the no doubt true (13) from the exceedingly unlikely 
(14), for example. 
(13) Vx 3y (x has seen y) 
(14) 3y Vx (x has seen y) 
What is said in (13) is that for every individual (call them x) there is some object (call it y) 
such that x has seen y. In contrast, (14) asserts that there is an object (call it y) such that every 
individual has seen it. In the case of (14), we want to say that the choice of the value of y 
which makes it true depends upon what value has been chosen for x. Both Hintikka himself 
(1996) and Warren Goldfarb (1979) have argued that these dependence relations lie at the 
heart of first-order logic. Standard practice is to indicate dependence via the same notation as 
we indicate the binding-scope of the quantifier-by means of brackets. Each quantifier QI 
comes with a set of brackets indicating its scope, and any other quantifier Q2 falling within 
the brackets is dependent on QI. 
This linear notation is not without its limits, however, and quantifiers with relations of 
dependence inexpressible in first-order logic have been studied under the name 'branching 
quantifiers' since Henkin (1961). Some formulas of the resulting logic of partially ordered 
quantifiers follow. 
(15) 3x 
>S[X,Yl 
Vy 
(16) VZ3X~ 
/S[X,y,Z] 
Vy 
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(17) Vx 3u )S[X, y, u, w] 
Vy3w 
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In the case of (15), the choice of the value for x is independent of that for y. Thus (15) can 
easily be seen to be equivalent to (18) in standard first-order logic. 
(18) 3x Vy S[x, y] 
Similarly, (16) is equivalent to (19). 
(19) Vz 3x Vy S[x, y, z] 
In case of (17), however, there is no equivalent in ordinary first-order logic. The requirement 
that 3u be independent of Vy but dependent on Vx cannot be met simultaneously with the 
requirement that 3w be independent of Vx but dependent on Vy. 
2.2 Independence friendly logic 
Both Hintikka and Sandu have argued that branching quantifiers should be seen as an 
instance of a more general phenomena, that of informational independence. The essence of 
(17) is, they argue, the idea that the choice of the value of u should be made in ignorance of 
the value chosen for y (so that the choice for u could easily be made first) but in full 
knowledge of the value chosen for x (and ceteris paribus for w). 
Hintikka has introduced an alternative slash notation for independence. With this 
notation we allow the usual ordering and bracketing of first order logic to indicate 
dependence, but supplement it with punctuation indicating that a quantifier which would 
normally be dependent on a preceding quantifier is in fact independent of it. This is done by 
following the quantifier by a slash and then the quantifier which it is independent of. Using 
this notation (15) can be represented by (20), (16) by (21), and (17) by (22). 
(20) Vy (3x/Vy) S[x, y] 
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(21) Vy Vz (3x/Vy) S[x, y, z] 
(22) Vx Vy (3u!Vy) (3w/Vx) S[x, y, u, w] 
The idea of information independence need not be restricted to quantifiers. Any connective 
can be understood as informationally independent of any other. Thus, an independence 
friendly logic will also allow expressions like (23)-(25). 
(23) Vx (Ax (v/Vx) Bx) 
(24) (AI (v/&) A2) & (BI (v/&) B2) 
(25) Vx Vy ((AI [x, y] (v/Vx) A2[x, yD (v/Vy) (BI[X, y] (v/Vx) B2[x, yD) 
(For discussion of what these amount to see section 3.2.2 and Sandu 1998) This perfectly 
general notion of independence can be invoked to provide a reading for (11) that preserves its 
surface form but is logically equivalent to (12). 
(26) KJohn ((Mary/ KJohn) enjoyed studying philosophy). 
This formulation of course implies that there is some choice to be made with respect to the 
term 'Mary' in order for us to make sense of the idea that it is independent of the knowledge 
operator. Hintikka and Sandu's view is that in natural languages this is precisely the case. 
Understanding what this choice amounts to, however, requires understanding the general 
semantic framework which Hintikka and Sandu wish to apply to natural language-game-
theoretic semantics. 
3. Game-theoretic semantics 
Game-theoretic semantics (GTS) is an approach to natural languages that finds its 
inspiration (if not endorsement) in the Wittgensteinian notion of a language game. The basic 
idea is that the meaning of a sentence is to be explained by an abstract semantical game, and 
that the meaning of any given linguistic unit is to be explained in terms of the game rules 
connected with it. The technical apparatus of game-theory is combined with that of model-
theoretic semantics to produce a formal treatment of the intuitive idea of a language game. In 
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order to further explicate this idea, I will give the rules for the familiar case of classical first-
order logic. 
3.1 GTS for first-order logic 
In GTS for a first-order language L the truth definitions are (as expected) given 
relative to a model M. The atomic sentences are given their usual truth definition relative to 
the assignment of members of the domain of M to the constants of L and subsets of the 
domain of M to the predicate letters of L. This assignment is then extended to give a valuation 
V to all the sentences of L as follows. Associated with each sentence S is a zero-sum3 two 
person game G(S) between players we will designate as t and f.4 Each play of G(S) consists of 
a sequence of applications of the game rules to input sentences. Each application of a rule 
results in an output sentence. S is the input sentence for the first application of a rule in the 
game G(S); for following rules, the output of the immediately previous application of a rule 
serves as input. The rules are constructed so that after a finite number of applications of rules 
in a play of G(S) an atomic sentence A is reached. The game rules are given in terms of two 
roles: T (also: Myself, the Verifier) and F (also: Nature, the Falsifier). At the beginning of 
each play t has the role T and f the role F, though they may switch in the course of the play. 
The win conditions are as follows: 
Player t wins iff either: 
(a) t has the role T and v(A) = 1; or 
(b) f has the role T and v(A) = 0 
Player f wins otherwise. 
The rules for the connectives of first order logic are: 
3 A zero-sum game is one in which if you add the values representing the outcomes for all the players the total is 
zero. Intuitively the idea is that, in the two person case, the game has a winner and a loser. 
4 Writers on GTS often identify the players merely in terms of the roles they play. Michael Hand introduced the 
separation of the players from their roles as part of a neutral terminology for GTS (1989). I have adopted that 
neutral terminology here. Hand's interest is in separating GTS as a technical device for semantics from the 
Wittgensteinian idea that the meanings of sentences are constituted by speakers playing the language-games of 
GTS. 
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(R.v) If play reaches a sentence of the form (SI v S2), T selects Sj (where i E {1,2}) and play 
continues with respect to Sj. 
(R.&) If play reaches a sentence of the form (SI & S2), F selects Sj (where i E {1,2}) and play 
continues with respect to Sj. 
(R.::!) If play reaches a sentence of the form ::!x S[x], T selects a member of the domain d, 
and play continues with respect to the sentence S[a] and the model M(d,a) (where the 
constant a does not occur in 3x S[X]).5 
(R. V) If play reaches a sentence of the form \/x S[ x], F selects a member of the domain d, 
and play continues with respect to the sentence S[a] and the model M(d,a) (where the 
constant a does not occur in \/x S[x]). 
(R.-.) If play reaches a sentence of the form -'S then t and f switch roles, and play continues 
with respect to S. 
A strategy for a player in a semantical game gives (roughly) a set of instructions telling the 
player how to move in response to moves by the other player. Call a strategy for tat-strategy 
and one for fan f-strategy. Truth-in-a-model is defined not relative to any particular play of a 
game, but in terms of the strategies available: 
V(S) = 1 iff there is a winning t-strategy for G(S). 
V(S) = 0 iff there is a winning f-strategy for G(S). 
5 Hintikka and other writers on GTS frequently omit the model shifting aspect of (R.3) and (R. V) in favour of 
formulations such as: 
(R.3*) If play reaches a sentence of the form 3x S[x], T selects a member of the domain d. Ifthe name of this 
individual is b the game continues with respect to S[ b]. 
(See for example Hintikka 1996, 25.) Hintikka later suggests that b need not be a name of L, and his 
formulations of the rules for natural language sometimes instruct T to name the individual chosen should they 
not be named. Assuming that the quantification of GTS is to be objectual these devices must be taken to amount 
to the alternate model device used above, but are considerably less clear. Moreover, (R.3*) combined with the 
name-need-not-be-in-L provision leaves unspecified the appropriate course of action should d fail to have a 
name in any language. All in all, the formulation I have used seems preferable. 
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For standard first-order logic the GTS truth-conditions are equivalent to their Tarski-type 
counterparts [ref]. Their real versatility is in dealing with extensions to first order logic, such 
as the independence-friendly logic discussed above. 
3.2 GTS and information 
One basic component of game theory is the distinction between games of full 
information and partial information. Chess, in which one has knowledge of all of the 
opponent's prior moves, is an example of the former, and poker, in which one is ignorant of 
the cards held by other players, one of the later. Accordingly, a game theorist might well ask 
whether semantical games are games of full information or not. Classical first-order logic 
assumes full information. Consider, for example, the game for Vx 3y S[x, y], represented in 
standard tree form. For convenience we will consider a finite covered domain of three 
individuals. 6 
G(Vx 3y S[x, yD 
\:Ix::3y S[x, y] 
::3y S[a, y] ::3y S[b, y] ::3y S[c, y] 
(a) (/3) (y) 
//\ / \ / \ 
S[a, a] S[a, b] S[a,c] S[b, a] S[b, b] S[b, c] S[c, a] S[c, b] S[c, c] 
Since 3y is within the scope of Vx, t knows which one of a, p, or y they are at when they 
make the choice of an individual with which to instantiate 3y. They have full information 
about the move made by f. Accordingly, a winning strategy for t will tell them which 
individual to choose given the individual chosen by f. In other words, the winning strategy 
6 i.e., the domain is composed of three individuals all of whom are assigned a name by the model. 
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corresponds to a two-place function defined for each individual in the domain. There is a 
winning strategy for t just in case (27) is true. 
(27) ::JfVy S[f(y), y] 
However, it is an simple matter to vary the situation so that the player does not have this 
information. Tliis gives us the game for (20): 
G(Vx (3y/Vx) S[x, y]) 
:Jy S[a, y] 
(a) 
//\ 
S[a, a] S[a,b] S[a, c] 
\Ix (3yNx) S[x, y] 
:Jy S[b, y] 
(13) 
S[b, a] S[b,b] S[b, c] 
:JyS[c,y] 
(y) 
S[c, a] S[c, b] S[c, c] 
The box represents the fact that t does not know which of a, ~, or y they are at. Accordingly, 
a winning strategy for t must tell them which individual to choose regardless of which 
individual was chosen by f. This gives us the previously noted equivalence of (20) and (18). 
(18) ::Jx Vy S[x, y] 
One thing to notice is that GTS has been extended to cover the independence-friendly first-
order logic without any modification in the rules or the truth-definition. In contrast, Tarski-
type truth-definitions cannot be given for independence-friendly first-order languages (Sandu 
1998; Hintikka 1996). Furthermore, since each rule for an operator corresponds to a choice by 
one or another player, the notion of informational independence extends naturally to the other 
operators. With GTS in hand it is easy to see that (23) is equivalent to (28). 
(23) Vx (Ax (v/Vx) Bx) 
(28) (Vx Ax) v (Vx Bx) 
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A winning strategy for (23) must tell twhich disjunct to choose regardless of which 
individual has been chosen by f. There can only be such a strategy if (28) is true. 
3.2.1 When independence matters 
Cases such as that of (22), which has no ordinary first-order equivalent, are also 
handled smoothly by GTS, and indeed are thus given a clear truth condition. We can see this 
by working through the tree for (22) in a domain of three individuals. 
G('v'x 'v'y (3u1'v'y) (3w/'v'x) S[x, y, u, wD 
Vx Vy (3u1Vy) (3wNx) S[x, y, u, w] 
~ 
v (ul )( / ) [ Y 3 Vy 3w Vx S a, y, u, w] ( Vy 3uNy) (3w Vx) S [b ,y,u,w (ul ) Vy.3 Vy (3w Vx) S[c, y, u, w] 
~(3u1Vy) (3wNx) S[a, a, u, w] r- (3uNy) (3wNx) S[b, a, u, w] k3u1Vy) (3wNx) S[c, a, u, w] 
(al) (a2) (a3) 
r-(3u1Vy) (3wNx) S[a, b, u, w] I- (3uNy) (3wNx) S[b, b, u, w] -(3uNy) (3wNx) S[c, b, u, w] 
(131) (132) (133) 
"--(3u1Vy) (3wNx) S[a, c, u, w] - (3u1Vy) (3wNx) S[b, c, u, w] -(3uNy) (3wNx) S[c, c, U, w] 
(Yl) (Y2) (Y3) 
We begin with the two choices made by f. The first choice for t is to instantiate the existential 
quantifier 3u. The independence of this quantifier from 'v'y but not from 'v'x is captured by the 
fact that t makes this choice knowing which column he is in (i.e., knowing whether he is in 
the set of positions marked by subscript 1, 2, or 3), but without knowing which row he is in 
(i.e., without knowing whether he is at a, p, or y). 
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G(Vx Vy (3uJVy) (3w/Vx) S[x, y, u, wD continued . 
... 
r- (3wNx) S[a, a, a, w] r- (3wNx) S[b, a, a, w] r- (3wNx) S[c, a, a, w] 
(al) (a2) (a3) 
r- (3wNx) S[a, a, b, w] r- (3wNx) S[b, a, b, w] r- (3wNx) S[c, a, b, w] 
(a4) (a5) (a6) 
L- (3wNx) S[a, a, c, w] L- (3wNx) S[b, a, c, w] L- (3wNx) S[c, a, c, w] 
(a7) (as) (a9) 
f-- (3wNx) S[a, b, a, w] f-- (3wNx) S[b, b, a, w] r- (3wNx) S[c, b, a, w] 
(131) (132) (133) 
r- (3wNx) S[a, b, b, w] r- (3wNx) S[b, b, b, w] r- (3wNx) S[c, b, b, w] 
(134) (135) (136) 
- (3wNx) S[a, b, c, w] L..- (3wNx) S[b, b, c, w] - (3wNx) S[c, b, c, w] 
(137) (l3s) (139) 
r-- (3wNx) S[a, c, a, w] - (3wNx) S[b, c, a, w] r-- (3wNx) S[c, c, a, w] 
(YI) (Y2) (Y3) 
I-- (3wNx) S[a, c, b, w] r-- (3wNx) S[b, c, b, w] I-- (3wNx) S[c, c, b, w] 
(Y4) (Y5) (Y6) 
----:-- (3wNx) S[a, c, c, w] '--- (3wNx) S[b, c, c, w] '--- (3wNx) S[c, c, c, w] 
(Y7) (Ys) (Y9) 
At this point, t knows which group of rows he is at (i.e., a, 13, or y), but not what column or 
exactly what row he is in. This represents his knowledge of the move made for Vy and his 
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ignorance of the move made for \Ix (and thus of course of his move for 3u).7 Without 
finishing the tree we· can now see that in order for t to have a winning strategy for (22), (29) 
must be true. 
(29) 3f3g \Ix \ly S[x, y, f(x), g(y)] 
That is, the strategy must tell t which value to choose for u based on the value of x, and which 
value to choose for w based on the value of y. 
3.2.2 When independence doesn't matter 
Sometimes two formulas identical except for the dependence relations between the 
operators tum out not to be different at all. Such is the case with (24), which turns out to be 
logically equivalent to (24*). 
(24) (AI (v/&) A2) & (BI (v/&) B2) 
(24*) (AI v A2) & (BI v B2) 
To see this, consider the game tree for (24). 
(AI (v/&) A2) & (BI (v/&) B2) 
----- ------
a 
/ " 
7 Of course, for this to be a humanly playable game we must imagine that either the 'player' t is actually 
composed of two human beings, each responsible for a different move and privy to different information, or that 
the game is played by declaring the strategies ahead of time and then playing mechanically in accord with them. 
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Since t doesn't know which of a or ~ he is at, he must make a choice for each one. Thus he 
must have a strategy that tells him which pair to pick from among (AI, BI), (AI, B2), (A2, BI) 
and (A2, B2)' However, this is the same strategy that he must have for the sentence (AI & BI) 
V (AI & B2) V (A2 & BI) V (A2 & B2)' And this is equivalent to the formula (AI v A2) & (BI 
v B2)-in other words, to (24*), the same formula as (24) except that the disjunctions are not 
treated as independent of the conjunction. In this case, informational independence makes no 
difference. 
4. Natural languages, GTS, and names 
Branching quantifiers, and indeed the notion of information independence in general, 
form an important part of Hintikka's advocacy of GTS as an approach to the semantics of 
natural language. For our purposes however, the focus will be on the role of informational 
independence in the treatment of proper names. Hintikka's view is that in natural languages 
the game rules must include a rule for proper names. As a consequence, it is possible to ask 
whether the application of the rule to a proper name is made independently of other rules or 
not. Names will exhibit de re reference, argue Hintikka and Sandu (1995,260-262), when the 
application of the name rule is informationally independent of the modal operator. 
Accordingly, (11) should be represented as having the logical form of (13). 
(11) John knows that Mary enjoyed studying philosophy. 
(12) 3x (x = Mary & KJohn (x enjoyed studying philosophy). 
(26) KJohn ((Mary/ KJohn) enjoyed studying philosophy). 
Unlike (12), the form of (26) is very similar to that of (11). Nevertheless, claim Hintikka and 
Sandu, (12) and (26) are logically equivalent to each other. We can explain how (11) can have 
the force of (26) by means of the informational independence of 'Mary' from 'John knows'. 
Thus, they argue, we have an explanation of how (11) can come to have the force of (12). 
4.1 Rules for natural language 
The application of GTS to natural languages raises some issues that don't arise in the 
formal case-most importantly, the issue of rule ordering alluded to above. The rules for the 
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connectives of first-order logic are unambiguous about which rule is to be applied at any 
given point of the game, as the appropriate rule is determined by the unambiguous logical 
form of the sentence under consideration. Natural language, with its less than transparent and 
frequently ambiguous logical form, introduces further complications. To see how this works, 
let us consider some game rules for English. 
(Ror) 
(R.and) 
(Rnot) 
(Rsome)8 
(R.every) 
(Rany) 
If play reaches a sentence of the form 
SI or S2 
T selects Sj (i = 1,2) and play continues with respect to Sj. 
If play reaches a sentence of the form 
SI and S2 
F selects Sj (i = 1,2) and play continues with respect to Sj. 
If play reaches a sentence of the form 
negS 
then t and f switch roles, and play continues with respect to S. 
If play reaches a sentence of the form 
X - [NP Some Y ([s' whoj [s Z - ej - Z']])] - W 
T selects an individual, say b, and play continues with respect to 
X- b-W, ifbis a Y (andZ-b-Z') 
If play reaches a sentence of the form 
X - [NP Every Y ([s' whoj [s Z - ej - Z']])] - W 
F selects an individual, say b, and play continues with respect to 
X-b-W, ifb is a Y (andZ-b-Z') 
If play reaches a sentence of the form 
X - [NP Any Y ([s' whoj [s Z - ej - Z']])] - W 
8 Throughout the quantifier rules will be stated in terms of 'who". The versions for "that", "which", "where", 
"when" etc are analogous. The use of different phrases goes with different constraints on the realm of choice, but 
that issue can be safely ignored in what follows. 
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F selects an individual, say b, and play continues with respect to 
X-b-W, ifbis a Y (andZ-b-Z') 
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The reader will have noted that the rule for 'any' is identical to the rule for 'every'. In ordinary 
English, however, the force of these two words is often different. Consider, for example, the 
difference between (30) and (31). 
(30) Richard does not date every girl. 
(31) Richard does not date any girl. 
GTS operates with a number of ordering principles which guide the application of the game 
rules. The important one for (30) and (31) is (O.L.R). 
(O.L.R) In one and the same clause, game rules are applied from left to right. 
This insures that in (30) (Rnot) is applied before (Revery). General ordering principles like 
(O.L.R) are supplemented by special ordering principles for particular lexical items. In the 
case of (31) the relevant principle is (0. any ). 
(0. any) (Rany) has priority over (Rnot), (Ror) and (Rcond).9 
This principle ensures that (31) has the expected meaning. The first move in G(Richard does 
not date any girl.) will yield a sentence like (32). 
(32) Richard does not date Susan, if Susan is a girl. 
Accordingly, t will only possess a winning strategy for (31) if for every individual either they 
are not a girl or Richard does not date them. In contrast, since the first move of G(Richard 
does not date every girl.) is the reversal of roles called for by (Rnot), a winning t-strategy 
9 The rule for conditionals, (R.cond), and the associated notion of a subgame, plays an important role in GTS's 
treatment of anaphora and the notorious donkey sentences. However, as my aim is not to evaluate GTS as a 
whole but merely to examine whether it can provide the claimed solution to the problem of proper names, I have 
not introduced this complication here. 
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will exist just in case there is one girl whom Richard does not date. In short, the difference 
between 'any' and 'every' in English is not a difference in the rule associated with them, but a 
difference in the ordering principles.10 
4.2 Names and GTS 
Unlike GTS for first-order logic, which treats the reference of constants as fixed by 
the model, GTS for natural languages treats the interpretation of proper names as a matter of 
game playas well. What this interpretation amounts to, however, is merely the assigning of a 
reference to the name (Hintikka and Kulas 1985, 25). Indeed, it seems that the main purpose 
of this rule is to deal with the fact that there is generally more than one bearer of any proper 
name, if the quotation Hintikka and Kulas use to illustrate the phenomena in ordinary 
discourse is anything to go by. 
"Thompson is talking about getting on to Duckett, but I wouldn't have that, not at any 
price. 'I'll ring Sir John,' I said. Least I could do." 
"I presume," said Sir John, with commendable restraint, "that by Thompson you mean 
Dr. Thompson, and that the Doctor has advised you to get in touch with Sergeant 
Duckett at the police station in Cregwell Village. Am I right?" 
"Of course you're right. It's perfectly simple, isn't it ... " 
(Patricia Moyes Murder Fantastical, quoted in Hintikka and Kulas 1985, 25). 
While Hintikka and Kulas never explicitly state the rule for names, the discussion here and 
elsewhere in their book suggests that the rule must be something like the following (Hintikka 
and Kulas 1985,25,89, 159): 
(R.name) If play reaches a sentence in which a proper name a occurs, T assigns a referent to 
the name. 
10 Ordering principles are not unique to GTS, but may also be found in games such as chess (where the 
difference between white and black is merely that white goes first), or tabletop war games. 
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Hintikka and Kulas do not give a full account of the ordering principles for (Rname), but 
suggest that it has priority over some specific rules applying to the same clause, while 
remaining subject to the general structural principles like (O.L.R). 
4.3 Modal operators 
Before we can fully assess Hintikka's claim that GTS supplies a solution to the 
problems connected with proper names we must add to our account rules for modal operators. 
In order to account for these, GTS is generally wedded to possible world semantics, so that at 
each stage of the game we have both a sentence and a world. This leads to the following rule 
for 'knows'. 
(R.knows that) If play reaches a sentence of the form 
b knows that S 
and the current world is WI, F selects a world W2 which is a member of b's 
epistemic alternatives to WI and play continues with respect to Sand W2. 
A rule for necessity has not been offered, but we can extrapolate from (Rknows that) to give 
the following rule: 
(R.necessary that) If play reaches a sentence of the form 
It is necessary that S 
and the current world is WI, F selects a world W2 such that W2 is 
accessible from WI and play continues with respect to Sand W2. 
With these rules in place we can begin to see what form the GTS treatment of the phenomena 
of de re reference and connected problems will be. For 
(11 ) John knows that Mary enj oyed studying philosophy 
there are two rules-(R.knows that) and (Rname)-that could be applied. As the left-to-right 
ordering principle (O.L.R) applies to both these rules, (Rknows that) will normally be applied 
first. However, if the choice for 'Mary' is informationally independent of that made for 'knows 
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that', then the situation will be tantamount to that in which (R.name) is applied first. Thus on 
its de re reading (11) is treated as having the logical form of (26). 
(26) K John «Mary/ KJohn) enjoyed studying philosophy). 
Three questions are raised by this-how is the referent of the name identified, does this give 
us the correct result, and how does this treatment deal with the modal argument. 
4.4 Names and criteria of identification 
Hintikka and Sandu's position regarding names, as noted above, is that they are either 
associated with descriptive criteria (which can't be captured by a definite description) or they 
are associated with conceptual content composed of both descriptive criteria and continuity-
based criteria. In either case, fixing the reference of a proper name in accord with (R.name) 
will require the player in the role of T to apply these criteria to identify the referent. 
Presumably then, the idea behind the treatment of (11) discussed above is that applying the 
criteria before (or in ignorance of) the choice of an epistemic alternative to the world in which 
evaluation of (11) begins will give different results than applying them after. 
(11) John knows that Mary enjoyed studying philosophy 
However, it is hard to see how this is compatible with the inexpressibility of the descriptive 
criteria. Remember, Hintikka and Sandu's view is that quantification in modal contexts 
presupposes criteria of cross-world identification, and that these criteria are not trivial-that 
we are not given a prefabricated set of individuals, and that we cannot assume that the there is 
no branching occurring. Definite descriptions, as a kind of quantifier, also depend on the 
criteria of cross-world identification. Names, though associated with some sort of criteria for 
application, are not equivalent to any definite description. 
4.4.1 Identification and the rule for names 
With this in mind, consider the two different games GTS could associate with (11). In 
a play of the game associated with what (for lack of a better term) we shall call the de dicto 
reading, a world W2 is first chosen, and then the referent of 'Mary' is identified in that world 
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by locating the individual matching the associated criteria (whatever they are). In a play of the 
game associated with the de re reading, first (effectively) the referent of 'Mary' is identified. 
Then a world W2 is chosen. However, for the identification made first to be of any use, it must 
be an identification of Mary in every one of John's epistemic alternatives to WI. If the 
identification made only identifies Mary in WI then it will have to be made all over again after 
W2 is chosen. Therefore if the identification is to be suitably prior to the application of 
(R.knows that), the referent of Mary must be chosen for each world. 1 1 The question is, on 
what principles is this choice made. If they are made on the basis of the criteria associated 
with the name 'Mary", then the choice of the referent in W2 will be exactly the same as the 
choice made in the de dicta version of the game. In order for there to be a difference, criteria 
for cross-identification which differ from the criteria which fix the reference of the name must 
be used in the second case. 
In this, the case is perfectly parallel with that of cases with definite descriptions. 
Consider (1) again. 
(1) Stefan knows that Marie Antoinette's lover is French. 
In order for there to be a difference between the two readings of (1) we must have a 
alternative means of re-identifying the person who is Marie Antionette's lover in this world. 
Presumably, in each case the alternative means of re-identifying the individual concerned are 
the public principles of cross-identification introduced earlier. I2 If the public principles are an 
alternative to the criteria for identifying the referent of the name, then of. course whatever 
those criteria are they are not principles of cross-identification. 
II One can see that this is so by considering the game of partial information in which the choice corresponding to 
(R.name) is made temporally after but in ignorance of the choice corresponding to (R.knows that). Since the 
player in role T will have to choose without knowing what world is at issue, she must make a choice for each 
world. 
12 Hintikka and Sandu say explicitly that two sets of principles of cross-identification are present in our semantic 
practice-the public and the perspectival. Since there is no reason to think that perspectival principles are at 
work, we are left with the public principles. 
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4.4.2 Names and descriptions 
This admission, however, is very important. Recall, Hintikka and Sandu's explanation 
ofthe difference in modal profile between (3) and (4) is that the descriptive content associated 
with the name 'Arthur Prior' cannot be captured by any definite description because definite 
descriptions are quantifiers and thus presuppose the criteria of cross-world identification. 
(3) Arthur Prior ~ed. 
(4) The ~ ~ed. 
But this explanation only makes sense if what names pick out is the criteria of cross-world 
identification themselves. If the set of attributes B such that whatever possesses them is bare, 
like those mentioned explicitly in a description, separate from criteria of cross-world 
identification, then the application of the name in alternate possible worlds will itself depend 
upon the criteria of cross-world identification. If this is the case, then there is no reason to 
think that there will be no definite description which captures the set B. 
Of course, Hintikka and Sandu do have an alternative explanation-the difference 
between (3) and (4) for any ~ is that the name 'Arthur Prior', unlike the description, does not 
have any continuity considerations associated with them. The problem with this second 
approach however is that continuity criteria just seem to be an addition to the set of attributes 
B. Of course it may be impossible in practice to capture the continuity criteria we use in a 
description, but is it impossible in principle? The presence of continuity conditions in Bare 
only a barrier to capture by a natural language definite description on a very narrow view of 
those descriptions. The modal argument, however, is targeted against any description at all, 
including ones like: 
The person who most resembles John. 
The ship most continuous with Theseus's. 
The thing in world W2 which has all the attributes in B and meets the usual continuity 
requirements. 
Of course applying the descriptions in this list will be difficult-but presumably no more 
difficult than applying the usual continuity requirements themselves. 
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In as far as the combination Hintikka and Sandu's account of names, the GTS 
treatment of names, and considerations of cross-world identification provide an account of de 
re reference that distinguishes it from de dicta reference, it does so in just the same way as 
any other descriptive account of names. Of course the GTS treatment of independence does 
give an account of the logical.form of the sentences under consideration, but as Hintikka and 
Sandu themselves note (1995, 261), this is an issue of minor importance. In as far as Hintikka 
and Sandu are offering a sophisticated version of the description theory they also face the 
difficulties presented by the modal argument. Of course, the notion of scope allows any 
description theory to explain the possibility of a difference between (33) and (34). 
(33) Necessarily, the number of planets is nine. 
(34) Necessarily, the number of planets is the number of planets. 
In addition, however, a description theory must explain why it is that there is apparently no 
reading of proper names on which they are not treated as independent of (or outside the scope 
of) alethic modal operators. The obvious option for a GTS theorist is to suppose that there is 
an ordering principle connected with the proper names requiring that (R.name) be applied 
before (R.necessary that). This is tantamount to adopting wide-scope descriptivism. 
4.5 GTS and Soames' revised modal argument 
As discussed in chapter two, Scott Soames has recently argued that wide-scope 
descriptivism does not provide an adequate response to the modal argument. In discussing his 
argument I noted that it rests on the assumption that a descriptivist must endorse the following 
thesis (where n is a name, S(n) a sentence containing an occurrence of n, d is a description, 
and S(d) the result of substituting an occurrence of d for each occurrence of n): 
the proposition expressed by Sen) is the proposition expressed by S( d), on an 
interpretation in which each occurrence of d (that replaces an original occurrence of n 
in Sen)) is given wide scope over every modal operator, modal predicate, and modal 
quantifier in Sex), except those for which doing this would involve removing d from 
the scope of some propositional attitude verb (Soames 1998, 5) 
This principle is what gives support to (PI) in Soames' revised modal argument: 
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(P 1) The proposition that if n is F, then something is both F and G = the proposition that if 
the G is F, then something is both F and G. 
(P2) The proposition that if the G is F, then something is both F and G is a necessary truth. 
D (the x: Gx) [Fx ~ 3y (Fy & Gy)] 
(C) The proposition that if n is F, then something is both F and G is a necessary truth. 
D [Fn ~ 3y (Fy & Gy)] 
However the game-theoretical variant of wide-scope descriptivism is not committed to 
identifying S(n) and S(d), and thus not committed to (P1). To see why, we must consider the 
rule for 'the'. 
The canonical game-theoretic treatment of definite descriptions treats the anaphoric 
description as the primary one and the referential, Russellian and generic uses as special cases 
of the general rule (Hintikka and Kulas 1985,33-76). 
(R.the) If play reaches a sentence of the form 
X - [NP the Y ([s' whoj [s Z - ej - Z']])] - W 
T selects an individual, say b, from the set I, F selects a different individual, 
say d, from the set I, and play continues with respect to 
X-b-W, bis a Y (andZ-b-Z'), and 
(either) d is not a Y (or its not the case that Z - d - Z') 
In the anaphoric case, the set I is the set of all individuals introduced earlier in the game (by 
either player). Where no individuals have been previously introduced, contextually relevant 
individuals are considered. Where the members of that domain are perceptually rather than 
publicly identified individuals Donnellan-type referential uses will arise. More interestingly, 
if no individuals have been introduced earlier in the game, and no contextually relevant 
individuals either fit or appear to fit the description, I is set as equal to the whole domain of 
discourse. This gives the Russellian reading for definite descriptions as a special case. Finally, 
generic uses such as (35) arise when I is set to the whole domain of discourse but it is obvious 
that the speaker does not believe that there is just one thing fitting the description. 
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(35) The kiwi lives in New Zealand. 
In this case, Hintikka and Kulas suggest, the principle of charity guides the hearer into 
assuming that the utterer intends her utterance to be true of a representative (in this case, 
species-typical) member of the class. 13 
This rule is distinctly different from (R.name). Accordingly, even if the means of 
identifying the referent of a name used in an application of that rule are to locate the 
individual who possesses a set of attributes that could be captured by a definite description, 
the game associated with a sentence containing that definite description will be different from 
one associated with the sentence which results from substituting the name for the description. 
In GTS the game associated with an utterance is the best candidate for the semantic content 
that utterance. Thus, an advocate of the GTS variety of wide-scope descriptivism is free to 
reject (PI) of Soames' argument, and need not deny that the argument is valid. 14 
4.6 Modal profile revisited 
In section 2.4 I raised doubts about whether Hintikka and Sandu's claim that proper 
names may well have descriptive content without that content being expressible by any 
definite description was compatible with the GTS treatment of proper names. If that objection 
is right, then it remains for Hintikka and Sandu to deal with the modal profile version of the 
modal argument. Why is it that for any non-trivial description ~, (3) and (4) seem prima facie 
to come apart in truth value in different possible worlds. 
13 Interestingly, Hintikka and Kulas suggest that this analysis can also be extended to explain the unusual 
Scottish use of phrases like "the McDougal" to refer to the head of the clan. In this case, they suggest, the lack of 
uniformity among members of the clan means that the individual chosen can not be representative in the way the 
generic use requires. However, there is a distinguished individual-an obvious choice for the individual intended 
by the utterer-namely the head of the clan. 
14 Soames no doubt assumes that any advocate of wide-scope descriptivism as a thesis about what the reference 
of a proper name is must, given the desire to explain modal and propositional attitude contexts, take the 
description to also capture the semantic content of the name. In GTS however there is no clear candidate for the 
role of proposition as Soames describes it, and the semantic content of any linguistic unit shorter than a sentence 
is exhausted by the rules and ordering principles associated with it. 
Chapter 4: Game-theoretic semantics 
(3) Arthur Prior ~ed. 
(4) The ~ ~ed. 
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Since the modal profile objection is made in terms of truth-value, not semantic content, it is 
not enough to point to the fact that G(Arthur Prior ~ed) differs from G(The ~ ~ed). If the 
description ~ does indeed capture the set of attributes according to which the referent of 
Arthur Prior is identified in alternate possible worlds, then the description and the name 
should be co-referential in each world, and the truth value of the sentences identical. 
One response for the advocate of GTS descriptivism is simply to deny that for any 
non-trivial ~ there will be some world in which (3) is false. The claim that there is no 
description for which (3) is necessarily true looks very plausible when what is under 
consideration are descriptions used in ordinary conversation, such as 'the inventor of tense 
logic', or 'the foundation professor of philosophy at the University of Canterbury'. However, 
once we let go of the requirement that the description involved capture the semantic content 
of the name in addition to pick out its reference in any possible world there are many other 
descriptions available to us. Indeed, Frank Jackson has recently given a defense of 
descriptivism as a theory ofthe reference of proper names based on the observation that most 
objections "overlook obvious candidates to be the descriptions or properties that secure 
reference according to the theory" (Jackson 1998b, 1). 
Of course, for a given name it may well be the case that there is no description ~ 
associated with a particular name-with Arthur Prior, for example-but this will be a 
contingent matter which occurs when we do not have words (other words) for the property or 
properties associated with the name in question (Jackson 1998b, 6). Nor is this the target of 
the modal profile argument. The modal profile argument is meant to show that where there 
are other words for the putative properties associated with a name, the description 'the ~' 
which captures those properties will always miss the target-there will always be some world 
in which the name picks out someone other than the ~. But of course there are candidate 
descriptions (clusters of properties) which plausibly do pick out the same thing in each world 
w as a given name h. One plausible candidate might well be the property of being the thing 
with a set of properties ~ which best meets the continuity requirements connecting it to the 
actual ~. 
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4.7 What GTS can't do 
It looks like, as claimed, GTS can give us a plausible account of why it is that a 
sentence such as (11) can have the force of (12). 
(11) John knows that Mary enjoyed studying philosophy. 
(12) ::Ix (x = Mary & K John (x enjoyed studying philosophy). 
It does this by treating the de re reading of (11) as having the logical form of (26). 
(26) KJohn ((Mary/ KJohn) enjoyed studying philosophy). 
When the rule (R.name) is applied independently of the rule (R.knows that), the result is 
equivalent to one in which the rule for the name is applied first and thus to (12). By 
introducing an ordering principle which gives the rule (R.name) priority over the rules for the 
alethic modal operator (so that names are always independent of such operators) GTS can 
account for the behaviour of names in modal contexts, and similar treatments are available for 
counterfactuals. 
However, despite this success there remain outstanding problems for the game-
theoretic treatment. One problem of course is its reliance on the possible worlds treatment of 
belief and knowledge, which notoriously has difficulty explaining how it is that one can 
believe one logical truth while failing to believe another. Of course GTS doesn't treat the 
proposition expressed by a sentence as a set of possible worlds-indeed, it is not clear that on 
GTS it makes any sense at all to talk of the proposition associated with a sentence at all, at 
least if that term is to retain any vestige of its former use. Nor does it treat the set of possible 
worlds in which a sentence is true as the object of a belief expressed using that sentence. 
However, since the truth conditions of a belief or knowledge ascription are given in terms of 
what is true in the doxastic or epistemically accessible worlds (respectively), anything true in 
all possible worlds will be true in all those alternatives. Put that way, it looks like GTS has a 
worse problem than traditional possible-worlds treatments. For traditional treatments 
believing anyone necessary truth puts the set of all worlds among my beliefs, and thus if I 
believe anyone such truth I believe them all. For GTS the situation is worse-· as long as I 
believe anything at all I believe all the necessary truths, as they will not be false at any world 
in my set of doxastic alternatives. Hintikka has indicated that he thinks the right solution for 
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this problem is to acknowledge that the set of doxastic or epistemic alternatives may include 
worlds which are not logically possible, and Ranatala (1982) has offered a technical treatment 
in terms of urn models. 
Another serious problem for those interested in the semantics of proper names is 
(R.name). This rule faces two pressing difficulties as an account of names-first, it treats all 
names as identical from the point of view of their semantics, and secondly, it allows T to use 
any name to refer to any object. The first of these might arguably be looked upon as a positive 
feature of GTS. It has been suggested that proper names are simply not part of language at all, 
as linguistic competency in no way requires one to master all the proper names, or even a 
particularly large subset-one might even be considered competent in a language while 
knowing no proper names whatsoever. However, it does seem that a competent speaker of a 
natural language would have to know how to use proper names as a class, even if she didn't 
know any particular proper names. (R.name) it might be argued, captures this peculiar feature 
of names by treating them as semantically on a par-if you know how to use one then from 
the point of view of the semantics you know how to use them all. 
However, this feature of (R.name) looks a lot less desirable in light of the fact that as 
stated it allows the player in role T to choose any referent at all for a given name. Of course, 
given a sentence like (36) there are lots of candidates for the referent of 'Nicole'. 
(36) Nicole is related to John Ralston Saul. 
However, not just anybody is a candidate-in order for someone to be the referent of the 
name there must be a convention, however localized, of using that name to refer to them. We 
would not take kindly to someone who, upon challenged over the truth of (36), defended his 
claim by saying that 'Nicole' refers to Adrienne Clarkson. 15 As written however, (R.name) 
will provide a winning strategy for (36) to t as long as Adrienne Clarkson is chosen as the 
referent of 'Nicole'. In fact, for any simple sentence involving a name and a simple predicate 
(R.name) provides a winning strategy just in case the predicate is satisfied-t must merely 
chose whatever satisfies the predicate as the reference of the name. 
15 Of course we can enter into extremely localized agreements to use a name. You and I may agree to use the 
name 'Nicole' to pick out Adrienne Clarkson throughout the course of an evening so as the discuss Canada's 
Governor General without anyone else realizing it. Given such a convention your utterance of (36) will be true. 
However, the convention must precede the use (though of course it need not be explicitly stated). 
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Of course the version of (R.name) presented here is my reconstruction based upon 
some rather sketchy remarks by Hintikka and Kulas (1985). Advocates of GTS may well be 
able to offer a rule which does put appropriate constraints on which object can be chosen as 
the referent of the name. However, it does seem to me that we can make some predictions 
about any proposed rule. First, any such rule will almost certainly be the result of encoding 
some other theory of names in game-theoretic form. One can easily imagine causal game-
theoretic accounts, metalinguistic game-theoretic accounts, etc. The most likely candidate, 
given Hintikka and Sandu's expressed views about the descriptive content of names, is a 
descriptive game-theoretic account. Secondly, there seems to be no in principle reason to 
think that any such account will not run into the same problems as its non-game-theoretic 
analogue. In the case of the descriptive version of (R.name) the considerations of scope and 
cross-world identification discussed in section 1 only work for it if they work for any other 
descriptive theory. GTS may provide an explanation of how a proper name can be 
independent of a logical operator, but this will not be of any help if Kripke is right about 
cross-world identification. Sometimes independence doesn't matter. 16 
In short, if advocates of GTS can find the right theory of proper names it will likely be 
a theory everyone can use, and if someone else gets the right theory it almost certainly can be 
incorporated into GTS. 
5. So, is the NTR based on afallacy? 
Neither game-theoretic semantics nor the general considerations of cross-world 
identification seem to provide a viable positive account of names. The key negative claim 
made by Hintikka and Sandu is that the new theory of reference, and with it the naIve view of 
proper names, rests on a serious of errors and fallacious arguments. In general, however, I 
think it is Hintikka and Sandu who have missed the point of the advocate of direct reference. I 
shall take each of their main charges in tum. 
16 See section 3.2.2 
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5.1 De re reference 
• Arguments based on ascriptions of de re modality (whether alethic or epistemic), do not 
provide evidence of the existence of directly referential terms. Ascriptions of de re 
modality are adequately explicated by quantifiers and scope. 
The modal argument against the description theory of names is primarily meant to 
show that a descriptive sense does not fix the reference of proper names in alternative 
possible worlds-that is, that the reference of the name in a world a is not whatever 
individual in a matches a non-rigid description associated with the name. The problem is not 
the existence of de re reference in epistemic or other contexts, but the fact that for alethic 
modal operators the de dicta use does not seem to be possible. Kripke's modal argument is 
intended to show that names are rigid designators, not that they are directly referential. The 
treatment of names as having descriptive content but taking wide scope is one way to deal 
with this, direct reference another. This form of the modal argument is targeted against simple 
descriptivism, but not against wide-scope or rigid descriptivism. 
5.2 Criteria for cross-identification 
• An account of quantification in modal contexts reqUIres independent criteria for 
comparing the denizens of different possible worlds-i.e. criteria for cross-identification. 
On pain of circularity these criteria cannot make use of quantifiers, and thus cannot 
exploit definite descriptions. However, the mistake made is to assume that these criteria of 
cross-identification in any way implicate the existence of a class of rigidly designating 
free singular terms in natural language. That is, it is sufficient for making sense of 
quantification that we have such criteria. The variables associated with quantifiers will be 
directly referential. It is only on a substitutional interpretation of the quantifiers that direct 
reference by variable depends on a class of directly referential singular terms. 
Hintikka and Sandu may be right about the connection between the invention of the 
new theory of reference and the early advocates interest in quantified modal logic. However, 
the primary reasons in favour of treating names as directly referential rigid designators do not 
depend on quantification into modal contexts. Most advocates of direct reference do not deny 
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that there could be descriptive names in natural languages, and many allow that there are 
probably a small number of such names, e.g., Jack the Ripper. Rather, the claim is that the use 
of the majority of proper names is best accounted for by the supposition that proper names are 
in general directly referential. Advocates of the NTR are in no way committed to the view 
that there must be a class of directly referential terms in natural languages. 
5.3 Rigid reference versus rigid designators 
• The fact that we can refer to an individual in all the possible worlds-i.e. rigidly-does 
not by itself give us any reason to think that there is in natural language a class of singular 
terms which refer rigidly in virtue of the semantic properties of the class, or even any 
terms which, as a matter of their linguistic meaning, refer rigidly. 
Hintikka and Sandu are certainly right in this respect. The mere fact of rigid reference 
does not by itself support the existence of such a class of terms. After all, the indexical 'actual' 
gives a mechanism by which we can from rigid designators out of otherwise flaccid 
descriptions, and Kaplan's dthat provides a technical device with a similar effect. However, as 
noted above, the NTR is not committed to any essentialist claims about the existence of such 
terms. The claim is rather that, as a contingent linguistic fact, we use proper names as rigid 
designators, and that the best explanation of this is that they are directly referential. 
5.4 The metaphysics of individuals 
• The metaphysical assumption that individuals are prefabricated is unfounded. The no-
branching view of lines of cross-world identification rests on an unacceptable and 
implausible metaphysics of individuals. 
Suppose that Hintikka is right and that individuals (at least the kind that can exist in 
multiple possible worlds) are post-fabricated relative to our interests, and also that the 
individuals in question can branch in alternate possible worlds. The question will then be 
what the relationship between names and these individuals. Consider a simplified example in 
which we, determine that the planet named Hesperus should be identified as planet X in world 
a, while Phosphorus should be identified as planet Y, despite the fact that in the actual world 
Hesperus and Phosphorus are co-instantiated. 
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One might ask why we should continue to say that the tenus 'Hesperus' and 
'Phosphorus' are co-referential. Whatever the method by which the referent of a proper name 
is fixed, it seems that in this case the method has produced different answers. However, 
Hintikka and Sandu are entitled to point out that they are co-referential in the same sense that 
'the number of planets' and 'nine' are co-referential. That is, identity claims between them are 
true, and they support substitution salva veritate to the same degree. 
Putting aside the question about pre and post-fabrication of individuals and the 
stipulation of possible worlds, Kripke's claim is that, where the proper names a and b both 
pick out an individual i in the actual world, whenever we have reason to identify a given 
individual d in a world a as the referent of a, we have equally good reason to identify d as the 
referent of b. The mere fact that in an alternate possible world there are two entities with good 
claims to be i is not sufficient to show that the names differ in referent in that possible world. 
If the referent of a name is in general fixed by non-rigid descriptive criteria, then the names 
may diverge in reference in a. If however the reference is fixed by rigid criteria-whether 
descriptive, causal, or something else-then both names will refer to the same thing in a, or if 
there is no suitable candidate, neither will refer. 
In short, the question comes down to one about our actual use, rather than one about 
the status of individuals across possible worlds. The data here is our intuitions about alethic 
modal claims and the modal profile of various sentences, and as noted above, this suggests 
that names are rigid designators. 
5.5 Direct reference and the necessity of identity 
• Direct reference does not imply the necessity of identities between directly referential 
tenus unless supplemented by the assumption that the world lines do not split or merge. 
Branching need not violate the continuity considerations that seem so important to cross-
identification and re-identification. 
Hintikka and Sandu's claim that even if names are directly referential (and thus rigid 
designators) branching allows for contingent identities between them is very pUZzling. 
Directly referential tenus have no meaning other than their referent. So in a case like that 
discussed above, where the tenus 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' pick out different planets in an 
alternate possible world, the assumption that they are directly referential seems to commit us 
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to the claim that they have different referents in the actual world-i.e., that 'Hesperus' refers 
directly to one individual, and 'Phosphorus' to another, but that these "individuals" are co-
instantiated in the actual world. If we don't assume this, then there seems to be no reason to 
think that they pick out different planets. 
The situation is different in the case of descriptions. It is easy to see how the 
description 'the planet seen first in the evening' and the 'planet seen first in the morning' could 
have the same reference in one world and a different one in an alternate world. Their referent 
in each world is determined by the linguistic meaning of the description. But the linguistic 
meaning of directly referential terms is exhausted by their referents. There seem to be two 
possibilities. Suppose the content of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' is the object in the actual 
world. If this is the case, then in an alternate possible world they will pick out whatever has 
the best claim to being the object in that possible world. If there are two or more objects with 
good claims, then whatever object has the best claim (perhaps, if Hintikka and Sandu are 
right, the best claim relative to our interests) will be the referent of both names. Alternatively, 
the content of 'Hesperus' is one cross-world line of identification and the content of 
'Phosphorus' is a different cross-world line of identification. In this case, there seems to be no 
reason to say they have the same referent. Unlike the descriptions, or descriptive names, we 
cannot say they have different linguistic meaning but the same referent, as their linguistic 
meaning just is the referent. So in this case it seems like the names really aren't co-referential 
after all, and thus the identity claim between them is not literally true. This solution, like those 
which identify the referent of names with different time-slices of a normal individual, is of no 
help at all. First of all, this view must deny that it is possible for two names to pick out the 
same cross-world line of identification, or the problems with names will arise all over again. 
Secondly, it is well known that the problematic opaque cases can arise even when there is just 
one name (see some earlier chapter), and this phenomena can not be accounted for by the 
different referents view. 
Hintikka and Sandu put a lot of emphasis on the fact that the lines of cross-world 
identification are relative to our interests. This might suggest that we can constantly re-draw 
the lines, so that the situation we described for first possibility, where the content of the co-
referential names is the object in the actual world and not the cross-world lines of 
identification is not accurate. One might propose that while the names pick out the object and 
are directly referential, our interests cause us to draw the line one way with respect to the use 
of 'Hesperus' and another with respect to the use of 'Phosphorus'. Now as a matter of fact this 
does not seem to be Hintikka and Sandu's view-they suggest that there are two criteria of 
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cross-world identification in use, a set of public criteria defining public objects, and a set of 
perspectival criteria associated with the space of our perceptual fields that defines visual, 
auditory, and other perspectival objects. This second set of criteria is closely associated with 
indexicals like'!' and 'that'. There is no reason to associate the use of 'Hesperus' or 
'Phosphorus' with perspectival criteria, and so the public criteria must be at work for both of 
them. 
As will be come clear in what follows, I have some sympathy with the view that our 
interests affect our use of proper names. However, I do not think the view that the effect of 
our interests is to cause us to draw the lines of cross-world identification differently with 
respect to two different names can make sense of the claim of contingent identities between 
directly referential terms. The suggestion that the mere use of the term 'Hesperus' rather than 
'Phosphorus' can change our interests with respect to drawing the lines of cross-world 
identification does not sit well with the claim that the meaning of the terms is exhausted by 
their reference. If the mere difference of terms is enough, then there must be some difference 
in the linguistic meaning of the terms. And notice if this claim is to support the view that 
identity statements like (37) are contingent, it must be merely the difference of terms that does 
the job, since there is no other context (such as a propositional attitude) to trigger this change. 
(37) Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
5.6 Puzzling Pierre 
• The solution to the problems connected to the propositional attitude contexts is to 
acknowledge that in someone's doxastic alternatives names which are actually co-
referential may well diverge in reference. In Kripke's case of puzzling Pierre this means 
that London and Londres may diverge. This solution does not depend on attributing 
descriptive content to the names-they may refer to two objects in worlds in which there 
are two identical counterparts to the object which is the actual world referent. 
Alternatively, we might say that the believer-say Pierre--does not know what city 
London (and/or Londres) is, since in some of his doxastic alternatives 'London' picks out a 
different city. 
Hintikka and Sandu's first non-descriptivist solution to the problematic propositional 
attitude cases stands or falls with the notion that two proper names can be genuinely co-
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referential and refer directly and yet have their reference diverge in alternate worlds, a notion 
which I take the above discussion to have shown to be incoherent. The second solution seems 
to suffer from a different difficulty. Pierre lives in London and based on his experiences 
denies that 'London is pretty' is true, but, ignorant of the fact that London is Londres, believes 
that Londres est jolie on the basis of tourist information he read before leaving Paris (Kripke 
1979). The proposal is that we explain this by saying that it is compatible with what Pierre 
knows that 'London' picks out a number of different cities. But if this is the case, then it is 
unclear why we would say that Pierre has any beliefs about London at alL 17 Instead, they 
seem to be suggesting that his mental attitude is best captured by the claim that he believes 
that the sentence 'London is not pretty' expresses a truth. This is just the metalinguistic view 
of belief, which faces many known problems. Alternatively, they might be suggesting that his 
belief has the content 'the city called London is not pretty', i.e., advocating a metalinguistic 
descriptive view of names. Either way, the proposed solutions are neither straightforward or 
easily implemented. 
6. Conclusion 
In discussing Hintikka and Sandu's criticisms of the new theory of reference I have 
restricted my attention to the claims made about the arguments in favour of treating names as 
directly referentiaL It may well be the case that they are right to emphasize the interest 
relative nature of cross-world identification and that Kripke is mistaken in his claim that it is 
not a genuine problem. Never-the-Iess, the possibility of branching lines of identification and 
multiple criteria for cross-world identification does not show that proper names are not 
directly referentiaL Hintikka and Sandu seem to have mistaken the claim that proper names 
are as a matter of fact directly referential for some sort of essentialist claim that there must be 
a class of directly referential terms. The argument that names are directly referential is based 
on our actual use of those names, and our intuitions about the truth values and meaning of the 
sentences in which they occur. Finally, Hintikka and Sandu have not offered a viable 
alternative view. Game-theoretic semantics has the potential to provide an explanation of de 
re reference in terms of the independence of names from modal operators. However, it cannot 
provide a full explanation of the behaviour of names or insure that the independence of names 
in . particular contexts results in the correct result without providing an adequate rule for 
17 lowe this observation to Jack Copeland. 
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names. In order for the rule for names to do the job it will have to capture an account of 
proper names which would do the job for game-theoretic semanticists and others alike. 
Hintikka and Sandu's positive account seems to come down to the view that proper 
names express some kind of descriptive content which is always given wide-scope over 
modal operators, but which can take either narrow or wide scope with respect to propositional 
attitude verbs. Descriptivism in general faces two problems-the objections raised by 
Soames' modal argument and the fact that it (like its neo-Fregean relative) cannot account for 
either Lydia cases or the opaque simple sentences discussed by Saul and Bezuidenhout. While 
game-theoretic semantics provides an answer for the former problem, it is still faced with the 
latter. 18 
18 GTS definitely cannot afford to ignore the Saul examples, since as a program in linguistics it is committed to 
treating ordinary language use in its full diversity. For an example of GTS's commitment to treating even 
marginal phenomena of ordinary use see the discussion of the highland use of phrases like 'the McDougal' in 
footnote 13. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Neo-medieval semantics 
Hintikka and Sandu are not the only philosophers to have defended the idea that the 
puzzles connected with singular terms stem arise because of inadequacies in our underlying 
logic. Gyula Klima finds the root of the difficulty in the Fregean approach to quantification 
itself. What ever the virtues of a Fregean treatment for mathematics, Klima suggests, the 
right account of natural language quantification is to be found in a formal system designed 
expressly for it, namely, medieval logic. In his view the problems connected with opaque 
contexts are just one symptom of the general failure of the contemporary approach to 
quantification in natural languages. 
Klima divides the anomalies of the Fregean quantificational paradigm into four broad 
categories (Klima 1990). First are the unrepresentable sentences. Natural language contains a 
broad variety of quantifiers, including 'most' and relatives like 'more than half of that simply 
cannot be captured by first-order quantification theory.! Those who think that branching 
quantifiers are part of natural language quantification will also include these sentences in this 
class. Second are the anomalies associated with cross-reference and anaphoric pronouns. It is 
well known that standard quantification theory has difficulty capturing the notorious donkey 
sentences like (1). 
(1) If Bill owns a donkey, he beats it. 
Third we have the various opaque contexts, including the problematic propositional attitude 
contexts? Klima's fourth category is the mismatch between the syntax of first-order logic and 
I No formula of first-order logic can give their truth conditions. See Barwise and Cooper 1981. 
2 Klima considers only the possible worlds based treatments which deal well with modal contexts but do not 
offer sufficiently fine-grained intensions to handle the attitudes. However, while the return to the Russellian 
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natural language, but this mismatch would be (as he notes) of little concern (except as a 
research program in linguistics) if it were not for the other inadequacies. 
The result of these difficulties has been what Klima describes as a splitting up of the 
paradigm. Just as the difficulties caused by names have resulted in a proliferation of 
competing theories, none of which has a decisive advantage over the others, the other 
problems raised by natural language have resulted in a variety of competing approaches, 
including Montague semantics, discourse semantics, adaptations of possible worlds semantics 
including that of Cresswell and the situation semantics of Barwise and Perry, and game-
theoretical semantics. And, just as in the case of names, no one theory is dominant. Klima's 
proposal is that a unifying perspective, and indeed a new paradigm for quantification theory, 
is to be found in late medieval logic-in particular in Jean Buridan's versions of the medieval 
theories of signification (roughly analogous to linguistic meaning) and supposition (roughly 
analogous to reference). The larger question-whether a medieval inspired approach to 
quantification can ameliorate the difficulties posed by quantification in natural language-is 
not one I will directly discuss here. However, I will argue that the problems connected with 
proper names are not solved by late medieval semantic theory. If I am right about this then the 
answer to the more general question can at best be that a medieval style semantics helps with 
some of the problems, rather than providing the new paradigm that Klima hopes it can. 
1. Signification and supposition 
Of course it is a misnomer to speak of the medieval theories of signification 
and supposition-instead we have a number of competing theories held together by a 
common terminology and a common goal. Klima's main interest is in the fourteenth century 
approach to semantics exemplified by the views of Jean Buridan and William Ockham, and it 
is on their views that I will concentrate. 
1.1 Signification 
The first ingredient in medieval semantics is the theory of signification. Signification 
is the relation which holds between the smallest significant elements of a language and the 
notion of the structured proposition offers a considerable improvement, we have seen that names continue to 
offer a difficulty. 
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elements of the world they are signs for. However, the theory differs from contemporary· 
accounts of linguistic meaning in that signification is a causal property of terms (Spade 1982, 
188). A word signifies whatever it brings to mind or makes understood.3 Most medievals took 
written and spoken terms to have their signification in virtue of their relationship to mental 
terms, and mental terms were seen as the primary bearers of signification. Written terms were 
often claimed to signify their ultimate significates in virtue of immediately signifying vocal 
terms, which in term immediately signify mental terms. It is only the mental terms, or 
concepts, corresponding to 'man', 'animal' and 'whiteness' which immediately signify men, 
animals, and white things. However, it is the ultimate significates of terms which medieval 
semantics is primarily concerned with. 
Medievals distinguished between the syncategorematic terms and the categorematic 
terms-a distinction which roughly corresponds with the modem division between the logical 
operators and the non-logical parts of language. The syncategorematic terms are often 
characterized as not signifying anything, though of course they are not meaningless in the 
broader sense. Thus Ockham writes: 
Examples of syncategorematic terms are 'every', 'no', 'some', 'all', 'except', 'so much', 
and 'insofar as'. None of these expressions has a definite and determinate signification, 
nor does any of them signify anything distinct from what is signified by categorematic 
terms. The number system provides a parallel here. 'Zero' taken by itself does not 
signify anything, but when combined with some other numeral it makes that numeral 
signify something new. Likewise, a syncategorematic term does not, properly 
speaking, signify anything; however, when it is combined with a categorematic 
expression it makes that categorematic expression signify or supposit for something in 
a determinate manner, or it performs some other function with respect to the relevant 
categorematic term (Ockham Summa logicae I, c.4).4 
3 See, for example, Ockham, Summa Logicae I c.l 
4 Henceforth SL. Translations of Part one of the Summa logicae are Micheal Loux's, from Ockham 1974a. Loux 
uses the quotation mark device to create names for 'every', 'no', etc. In light of the topic under discussion it is 
worth pointing out that this device is not used (or needed) by the medievals. As we shall see, their view is that 
one ofthe ways in which a term can supposit is for itself, the class of tokens equiform to it, or one of a variety of 
other objects other what it signifies. 
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We may thus contrast 'man', 'animal' and 'whiteness', which bring to mind (respectively) all 
men (and nothing else), all animals, and all whitenesses, with 'every', which does not bring 
anything to mind at all. However there were a number of competing theories of 
syncategoremati1 terms-Abelard thought that they generated an understanding without 
generating an understanding of something (Abelard 1970, 119 3-16), and Buridan that they 
signified ways of conceiving things (Buridan 1977, 4: 1966, 116).5 This latter position of 
Buridan's plays a key role in his account of the sophism 'I owe you a horse', discussed below 
in section 3.5. 
1.2 Supposition 
The aspect of medieval semantics that we will be most concerned with is supposition 
theory. Supposition is a relation between terms and things just as signification is. However, 
while the role of signification is to make the basic assignments that create a language, 
supposition, as Peter King suggests, is what explains our use of language to actually talk 
about things: 
It is one matter to assign certain terms to certain things, so that a language may be set 
up in the first place; this is the contribution of signification. It is quite another matter 
to actually use that language to talk about things; this is explained by supposition, 
which accounts for the referential use of (significative) terms. Hence there are two 
major differences between supposition and signification: first, terms have signification 
wherever they are found, inside or outside a sentence, but it is only in a sentence that 
we use terms referentially, that is, actually talk about things and say something about 
them (King 1985, 35). 
Supposition theory provides the answers to two questions-what kinds of supposition can a 
term have, and in what contexts does it have each kind. 
The word 'supposition' would be accurately translated as 'reference', but the medieval 
approach to the reference of terms is different from ours in two important ways. First of all, 
terms only have supposition in a sentential context. Words do not have any supposition until 
used in an utterance. Secondly, all supposition is context sensitive-what a term supposits for 
5 See Spade 1982, 190-191 for a list of various accounts of the syncategorematic words. 
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always depends on the utterance in which it appears and the context of that utterance. 
Occurrences of a term were classified according to the kind of supposition the term had. The 
basic division is that between proper and improper supposition. A term has proper supposition 
when it is being used literally, improper supposition when it is being used rhetorically or 
figuratively. Proper supposition is then divided into material, simple, or personal. 
1.2.1 Material and simple supposition 
A term has material supposition when it stands for itself, another token equiform to it, 
or a token(s) of one of the other levels oflanguage. In (1)-(3), for example, the term 'man' has 
material supposition. 
(2) Man is a noun. (homo est nomen) 
(3) Man is a spoken monosyllable. (homo est vox disyllabus) 
(4) Man is a written expression. (homo est dictio scripta) 
(2) and (3) are about spoken expressions and (2) and (4) about written expressions. None of 
them are about particular human beings, or human nature. 
Obviously material supposition is in part concerned with the use/mention distinction 
familiar to contemporary philosophers. However it is not quite correct to assimilate it this 
distinction. First of all, the quotation device transforms a word into a name of itself, whereas 
for the medievals a term is the same whether in material, personal, or simple supposition. 
Secondly, the quotation device can be iterated, whereas material supposition cannot. Finally, 
and most importantly, a term can materially supposit for terms that are only similar to it. A 
term in one case or gender can materially supposit for one in another, and a clause in indirect 
discourse supposits for one in direct discourse (King 1985,40; McCord Adams 1987, I 330). 
Thus, material supposition covers more cases than the use/mention distinction. 
Simple supposition is exemplified by the use of 'man' in (5). 
(5) Man is a species. (homo est species) 
Here however there is less agreement among medieval authors about what the term 'man' 
supposits for. Those realists who took species to be mind-independent universals said that a 
common term in simple supposition stands for the universal associated with it. In contrast 
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Ockham, who takes universals to be nothing but concepts, claims that a term with simple 
. supposition stands for the concept associated with it (Ockham Summa logicae I, c.64). This 
nominalist program in semantics culminates with Buridan, who takes the logical step of 
equating simple supposition with material supposition. Since a concept is nothing other than a 
mental term, he sees it as just as much a sign as an utterance or inscription. Supposition for a 
concept is thus just another class of material supposition (Buridan Tractatus de 
suppositionibus, 3.2.6)6. 
1.2.2 Personal supposition 
Finally, a term has personal supposition when it supposits for the thing(s) it 
(ultimately) signifies. Thus 'man' in (6) was judged to have personal supposition. 
(6) Man is white. (homo est albus) 
Individual men are what are being attributed a colour, and thus what 'man' stands for. Personal 
supposition is further divided into discrete and common supposition. Singular terms, whether 
proper names or demonstrative pronouns like 'this man', have discrete supposition. Common 
terms in personal supposition, such as 'man' in 'A man runs' or 'Every man is an animal' have 
common supposition. Buridan, who offers a particularly complete categorization, further 
divides the common supposition into relative and absolute, where relative supposition is that 
possessed by anaphoric terms (Buridan TS 3.3.1). 
The relationships between the various kinds of supposition can be represented by the 
following figure: 
6 Henceforth TS. See Buridan 1985. 
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/ \ 
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Material Simple Personal 
/ \ 
Discrete Common 
ReI.tit ~olute 
While these kinds of supposition are the most common, they do not exhaust the kinds 
discussed. Buridan, for example, gives considerable attention to the scientific use of a terms to 
stand for everything it signifies in the past, present, or future (natural supposition) and some 
earlier philosophers extensively considered the divisions of improper supposition. 
1.3 The modes of common personal supposition 
The further division of absolute common personal supposition into the notorious 
modes of supposition has caused considerable disagreement among modem commentators. 
The account of the different modes has often been seen as an account of quantification. 
Marilyn McCord Adams describes the whole of supposition theory as best corresponding to a 
theory of satisfaction (McCord Adams 1987, I 327), and suggests that it is closely tied to 
fallacy recognition, claiming that on this account "the two parts of Supposition Theory are not 
disjointed the way a use/mention distinction and a theory of quantification are, but are united 
under the rubric 'aspects of the way words stand in propositions for things, useful in fallacy 
detection'" (McCord Adams 1987, I 382). In contrast Peter King thinks that it is without 
question a theory of reference (King 1985, 35) and Paul Vincent Spade thinks that it is a 
theory of reference but that by the fourteenth century the divisions of common personal 
supposition are vestigial (Spade 1988). However the most convincing account is that of 
Terence Parsons, who like Spade sees the early versions of the theory as an unsuccessful 
attempt to connect the theory of reference with the theory of quantification, but maintains that 
by the fourteenth century the modes of common personal supposition had become part of a 
theory of global quantificational effect (Parsons 1997a). 
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1.3.1 The modes 
Common personal supposition divided into determinate and confused supposition, and 
confused supposition into merely confused supposition and distributive confused supposition. 
Determinate supposition is exemplified by both subject and predicate terms of existentially 
quantified statements such as 'A man runs' or 'Some man is white'. Ockham describes 
determinate supposition as when: 
the assertion is that a proposition of the relevant sort is true in the case of some 
determinate particular. That particular by itself is sufficient to make the proposition 
true. Nothing else is required. Thus, for the truth of ' A man runs', it is required that one 
of the relevant singular propositions be true. Anyone will do, and it makes no 
difference whether the remaining singular propositions are all false (Ockham SL I, 
c.70). 
The singulars in question are sentences in which the term with common supposition is 
replaced by a term which supposits discretely for one of the things the term supposits for. 
Thus, both 'Socrates runs' and 'This man runs' are relevant singulars for 'A man runs'. 
The remaining cases of common supposition are all classed as confused. The subject 
terms of universally quantified sentences such as 'Every man runs' exemplify distributive 
confused supposition. A term has distributive confused supposition when the truth of the 
proposition requires that all of the relevant singulars are true (Buridan TS 3.6.1; 3.6.3: 
Ockham SL c.70). Finally, a term has merely confused supposition when none of the singulars 
are required to be true for the proposition to be true. For example, 'Every man is an animal' 
can be true without it being the case that "Every man is this animal" is true. 
1.3.2 Global quantificational effect 
One of the familiar parts of contemporary quantification theory is the notion of prenex 
normal form. Provided there are no biconditionals in a formula of first order logic it is 
possible convert that formula into an equivalent one in which all the quantifiers are at the 
front and each of them has scope over everything to the right of it. This is accomplished by 
moving the quantifier in stages towards the front of the formula. The movement is subject to 
two restrictions-(a) whenever you move the quantifier past a negation or a conditional it 
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must be switched from existential to universal or vice versa, and (b) you cannot move an 
existential past a universal or vice versa. Thus we can transform (7a) into (7e) via the 
following steps. 
(7a) -, (Vy Gy ~ Vx Px) 
(7b) -, 3y (Gy ~ Vx Px) 
(7c) Vy -, (Gy ~ Vx Px) 
(7d) Vy -, Vx (Gy ~ Px) 
(7e) Vy 3x -, (Gy ~ Px) 
Thus the second universal quantifier in (7a) (i.e., Vx) is in effect an existential quantifier 
which takes narrow scope with respect to Vy. It is on this basis that Parsons defines what he 
calls the global quantijicational effect of a quantifier. Each quantifier when moved up front 
will be either a universal or an existential quantifier and in addition may be able to move to 
the front of all the other quantifiers in the formula (Parsons 1997b, 10). Thus the global 
quantificational effect of a quantifier is composed of the kind of quantifier it becomes in the 
sentences prenex normal forms and the scope that it has in those forms. 
On this basis Parsons is able to give the following alternate definitions of the modes of 
common personal supposition. 
A term is determinate in a formula if it becomes a wide scope existentially quantified 
term in (one of) the prenex normal forme s) of that formula. 
A term is distributive in a formula if it becomes a universally quantified term in (one 
of) the prenex normal forme s) of that formula. 
A term is merely confused in a formula if it becomes an existentially quantified term in 
(one of) the prenex normal forme s) of that formula, but can't get wide scope in any 
such form (Parsons 1997b, 10). 
The equation of the modes of common personal supposition with global 
quantificational effect is complicated by medieval use of restricted quantification. When the 
quantifiers are restricted it is no longer the case that every quantifier can be moved into 
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prenex position. One advantage of treating the doctrine of the modes of supposition as an 
account of global·quantificational effect is that for restricted quantifiers the gaps match up---
that is, the very quantifiers that have no prenex position are those that medieval authors could 
assign no mode of supposition to (Parsons 1997b). 
2. Ampliation and Appellation 
Medieval philosophers gave truth conditions for sentences terms of the form of a 
sentence and the supposition of its terms. The general requirement for the truth of a 
categorical proposition-namely one which doesn't contain any sentential operators or 
connectives-is that the terms of the sentence supposit for the same thing. Complications 
arise when the sentence contains syncategorematic terms. Ockham gives a fairly exhaustive 
set of truth conditions, noting, for example, that an existential sentence is true just in case 
there are some things that both terms supposit for, and that a universal is true just in case the 
predicate supposits for all the things that the subject supposits for. (Ockham SL II, c2-1 0).7 
Complications arise for more complicated sentences, especially tensed sentences and those 
containing modal operators. It is these complications that give rise to the doctrines of 
ampliation and appellation. 
2.1 Ampliation 
The default supposition of a term is for all of its significates that exist in the present 
time. For example in (8) the term 'man' supposits for all those men which currently exist. 
(8) A man is running. . 
However when the sentence in which a term occurs is tensed, or includes a modal operator or 
any related term, the term is ampliated to stand for significates that don't currently exist. 
Accordingly, in (9) the term 'man' stands for past men as well as present ones. 
(9) A man was running. 
7 See Ockham 1980. 
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In general a term occurring before a tensed verb is ampliated to supposit for those of its 
significates that exist both presently and at the time of the verb (Buridan TS 6.2.1). One 
occurring after a tensed verb is ampliated to supposit for those of its significates which exist 
at the time of the verb (Buridan TC 1.6.2). Similarly, a term occurring in a sentence with a 
modal operator will be ampliated to stand for merely possible things (Buridan TS 6.2.1). 
2.2 Appellation 
Before turning to Buridan's treatment of intentional contexts we need one more 
element of medieval semantic theory-the theory of connotation or as Buridan calls it 
appellation. Consider this example from the Sophismata (Buridan 1977; 1966). 
Third sophism: White will be black. 
I posit the case that this wood is now white, and tomorrow it will be black. 
Then it is argued as follows: this wood will be black and this wood is white; therefore 
white will be black. 
The opposite IS argued. A proposition of the future is not true if the 
corresponding proposition of the present will never be true. For example, if this true: 
"Antichrist will preach," it follows that at some time this will be true: "Antichrist is 
preaching." Similarly, the proposition "Aristotle argued" is not true unless at some 
time it was true to say that Aristotle is arguing. And so of others. But it has never been 
true to say that white is black, nor will it ever be true to say this. Therefore it is the 
case that neither white is black nor that white was black (Buridan 1966, 111; 1977, 
60).8 
2.2.1 Primary and secondary signification 
In order to understand utterances like (10) we must, in Buridan's view, pay careful 
attention to the relationship between the primary significates of an appellative term and its 
secondary significates. 
8 Translations of the Sophismata are all adapted from those ofT. K. Scott, which appear in Buridan 1966. 
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(10) White will be black.9 
Both 'white' and 'black' are appellative rather than absolute terms. Appellative terms are ones 
which supposit for one thing or group of things but connote a second thing or group of things 
in an indirect way. In contrast, an absolute term has no connotation or connotes only those 
things for which it supposits. Appellative terms have both a primary and a secondary 
significates .Buridan, like Ockham, has a peculiarly nominalist theory of appellation. 
Consider, for example, sentence (11). 
(11) Socrates is white. 
According to both nominalist and realist, both subject and predicate terms supposit for the 
same thing-namely Socrates. On the realist account Socrates, qua white thing, is one of the 
secondary significates of the term 'white' (album), which primarily signifies the universal) 
That is, the primary significates of connotative terms are universals, whereas the secondary 
significates are the things which fall under them. For Ockham, and later Buridan, the situation 
is partially reversed, and of course the mind independent universal done away with. The 
primary significates of 'white', for Buridan, are the white things, that is, those particulars for 
which it can have personal supposition. The secondary significate is not however, the 
universal, as one might expect. For a nominalist like Buridan the universal is nothing other 
than the concept of whiteness, and a strict reversal of the previous doctrine would make this 
concept the secondary significate of the term white. However Buridan does not take this 
position but instead maintains that the secondary significates of 'white' are the particular 
whitenesses that inhere in the white things-that is, the reasons for which these things are 
truly called white. The whitenesses in question are not universals but particulars. In (8) the 
term 'white' supposits for Socrates (along with all the other white things) because there is a 
particular whiteness inhering in him. A term connotes or appellates its secondary significate 
because it is the secondary significate which determines the primary significates of the terms. 
Buridan refines this view by noting that while some appellative words supposit for 
those things in which the secondary significates actually exist relative to the time of the 
9 An indefinite sentence in which the subject term has personal supposition is equivalent to an existentially 
quantified sentence-i.e., (10) is equivalent to 'Some white [thing] will be black', not 'Every white [thing] will be 
black'. 
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proposition, others are what he calls privative terms, in that they supposit for those things in 
which lack the secondary significates at the time of the proposition. For example while both 
'caecum' (blind) and 'videns' (sighted) appellate vision, 'caecum' appellates vision as non-
adjacent, so that it can only supposit for those things which do not have vision. 
2.2.2 Secondary significates and appellation 
The difficulty with (l0) arises because of the role of the secondary significates in 
fixing the primary significates (and thus the supposition) of the appellative terms. Since 
blackness and whiteness cannot simultaneously inhere in the same substance, it can never be 
the case that 'black' and 'white' can simultaneously supposit for the same thing. Thus (10') can 
never be true. 
(10') White is black. 
Accordingly (10) cannot be read as (lOa) and consistently treated as true (where ( is the 
present time). 
(10a) There is a time (' > ( such that at (' it is true that white is black. 
Buridan's solution is to note that combining an appellative term with a tensed verb affects the 
appellation and thus the supposition of that term. He writes: 
appellative terms appellate differently in respect of a verb of inherence and of the 
present tense and in respect of a verb of the past or future tense, and in respect of this 
verb 'can' or 'possible'. For in respect of a verb of the present tense (if there is not an 
ampliative term), a appellative term, whether it is the subject or predicate, appellates 
its thing as something related in the present to that for which the term is of a nature to 
supposit, and as related to it in some determinate way, according to which it appellates 
it. And then to whatever things such a appellated thing belongs, that term supposits for 
those things and no others. And such a term, suppositing for some things, not only 
would cease to have supposition because of the destruction or annihilation of those 
things, but because of the removal of the appellated things or of the manner in which 
they are related to those things. For example, if the term 'shod' supposits for you, it 
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would cease to supposit for you if your shoes were removed from you. But in respect 
of other verbs the subject and predicate appellate differently. For the predicate 
appellates things only for the time covered by the verb-for whatever time the verb 
has been restricted to. And if for this time, the mode of relation of the thing appellated 
does correspond to that for which the time is of a nature supposit, then it does not 
supposit for that thing, regardless of how well the mode of the relation corresponds for· 
the [whole] time of the verb. For example, if I say 'Socrates was white yesterday,' the 
term 'white' does not supposit for Socrates unless whiteness was related to him 
yesterday, whether or not it is still so related or was previously so related to him .... 
But the subject appellates its thing indifferently and in a disjunctive manner for the 
present time and for the time of the verb, as is also the case with supposition (Buridan 
1966, 113-114; 1977,62-63). 
Buridan's point is that the tense in sentences like (10) is not a sentential operator but instead 
modifies the supposition of the terms. 
(10) White will be black. 
Since it is in the subject position the term 'white' in (10) supposits for anything which is now 
white or anything that will be white in the future. In contrast, the term 'black' supposits only 
for those things which will be white in the future. Thus (10) is correctly parsed as (1 Ob) 
(where t is the present time). 
(1 Ob) [Something] which is white at tn :2: t is black at time tm > t. 
Since in the posited case there is something-namely the piece of wood-which is one of the 
things which is white either now or in the future and also one of the things which is black in 
the future, the terms in (10) have overlapping supposition and thus (10) is true. 
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2.3 Signification formalized 
Buridan's point can be made a little clearer by means of a formal notation for 
signification and supposition introduced by Klima.lO We begin by representing signification 
as a one-place function. 
SGT(P)=v 
This can be read as: the significate of P is v. However in the case of appellative terms, the 
value of v will not be defined directly but by means of another one-place function. The values 
that this second function ranges over are the secondary significates of the term. On Buridan's 
account the secondary significates of the term 'white' are the whitenesses of the white things. 
According to Buridan and other nominalists the secondary significates of a term like 
white are the particular whitenesses inhering in individuals. On this account 'white' signifies 
all those individuals who are the values of the following one-place function. 
SGTA('white')(u) = w. 
This should be read s: the signification of 'white' with respect to u is w. The permitted values 
for u are the secondary significates of 'white'-namely the individual whitenesses. Thus the 
signification of 'white' with respect to Socrates' whiteness is Socrates. 
SGTA(,white')(Socrates' whiteness) = Socrates 
We can then define the signification of 'white' in terms of SGTA('white')(u). 
V E SGT('white') iffthere is some u such that SGTA(,white')(u) = v. 
In general, for each appellative term Q the SGT(Q) IS defined in terms of the function 
SGTA(Q)(U). 
10 I have adapted Klima's notation somewhat. 
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2.4 Supposition formalized 
Signification is a constant property of a term-at any moment the term 'white' 
signifies all those things that ever have been, are, or will be white. 11 However the supposition 
of a term is context relative, and the suppositum of an appellative term in common personal 
supposition is a function of its secondary significates. Consider (11) again. 
(11) Socrates is white. 
Since (11) involves a present tense verb and contains no ampliative terms, the relevant 
secondary significates are those that actually exist. Thus 'white' in (11) supposits for those 
individuals in whom whiteness currently inheres. If we represent the existents at a time t by 
Db we can capture this with the following formula (where t is the present). 
SUP('white') = SGT('white')(u) for all u E Dt 
Thus Socrates will be one of the things 'white' supposits for just in case Socrates' whiteness is 
among the things that currently exist. 
In contrast, since (10) involves a tensed verb, the domain of relevant secondary 
significates is enlarged for all the terms in the sentence. 
(10) White will be black. 
F or terms that appear before the verb the relevant domain includes all those secondary 
significates that exist now or at the time indicated by the verb, while for those that follow it 
the relevant domain of secondary significates includes only those which exist at the time of 
the verb. Thus in (10) (where t is the present time): 
SUP('white') = SGT('white')(u) for all u E D t U Dt+l U Dt+2 ... 12 
II Some discussion of the merely possibly white should go here. 
12 It should be noted that Buridan is a temporal divisibilist-he believes that time is infinitely divisible into 
intervals and that there are no temporal instants (Buridan Sophismata Chapter IV 1966; 1977). Thus the time 
indexes here should be read as referring to intervals rather than instants of time. 
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SUP('black') = SGT('black')(u) for all u E D t+1 U Dt+2 ... 
3. Buridan on intentional contexts 
The puzzles of intentionality were familiar to Buridan, and in the Sophismata he 
discusses a number of sophisms that exploit our anti-substitution intuitions (Buridan 1977; 
1966). I begin with a familiar case of involving a propositional attitude and substitution. 
3 .1 You know the coins in my purse to be even in number. 
Tenth sophism: You know the coins in my purse to be even in number. 
It is proved, because you know every pair to be even in number, so you know 
every two to be even. But the coins in my purse are two; hence, you know them to be 
even. 
The opposite is argued. I posit that you believe that in my purse there is only 
one coin, and so you believe there not be an even number of coins in my purse. Then it 
is argued thus: You do not know that whose opposite you believe, since opinions or 
beliefs about opposites-i.e, contradictories or contraries-cannot be in the same 
intellect simultaneously, because they are contrary, as is said in the fourth of the 
Metaphysics. But these are opposites; 'The coins in my purse are not even in number' 
and 'They are even in number' and you believe that they are not even. Therefore you 
do not believe them to be even. (Buridan 1966, 124-125; 1977, 72). 
Buridan's tenth sophism of the chapter poses a familiar quandary. Given the posited 
case it seems that substitutivity of identicals provides a good argument for the claim that, 
intuitions to the contrary, (12) is true. 
(12) You know the coins in my purse to be even in number. 
3.2 Appellation and rationes 
Buridan's explanation of the failure of substitution in this context is that propositional 
attitude verbs, semantic verbs like 'to signify', and also verbs like 'to owe', 'to promise' and 'to 
obligate', cause the terms that occur with them to appellate the mental concepts-or 
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rationes-that they derive their ultimate signification from (Buridan 1966, 126; 1977, 73). 
The terms which describe the object of the attitude or debt continue to supposit as usual but in 
addition appellate the concept by means of which the suppositum are understood. The 
relations in question are thus seen as a three-way ones between the subject, the object, and the 
way in which that object is understood. 
Buridan distinguishes between two cases-the one in which the term occurs before the 
verb and the one it which it occurs after. In the later case the term appellates the particular 
concept of the suppositum that it is associated with. In the former case the term merely 
indicates the existence of some concept of that suppositum. 
when it occurs after the verb, the term appellates the rationes proper to it 
determinately and precisely. But when the terms occur before the verbs, they appellate 
their rationes indifferently and in disjunction with the other ways the things signified 
can be signified or understood (Buridan 1966, 126; 1977, 74). 
Thus (12) has the logical form of (12*) whereas (13) has that of (13*) (Buridan Tractatus de 
consequentiis 3.7.1 O)Y 
(12*) You know the coins in my purse to be even in number according the ratio by 
which they are called the coins in my purse. 
(13) The coins in my purse are known by you to be even in number. 
(13*) The coins in my purse are known by you to be even in number under some ratio. 
In the case under discussion (13) is true but (12) is false (Buridan 1966, 134; 1977, 80-81). 
Buridan's solution is therefore closely allied with the neo-Fregean version of the hidden-
indexical theory advocated by Graeme Forbes and discussed in chapter two. Like all 
advocates of hidden-indexical theories, Buridan maintains that the terms continue to have 
their usual supposition in propositional attitude contexts, but in addition play a role in 
providing the third relatum of the attitude. Moreover his account of the form of attitude 
ascriptions is similar to that of Forbes in that it has the term doing double duty as both a 
referring term and part of the specification of that third relatum. 
13 Henceforth TC. See Buridan 1985. 
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3.3 The medieval hidden-indexical theory 
The notation introduced above also allows us to capture the force of Buridan's solution 
to the problematic propositional attitude contexts. Buridan's opinion is that (12) was false but 
(13) was true. 
(12) You know the coins in my purse to be even in number. 
(13) The coins in my purse are known by you to be even in number. 
This means that in (12) 'You' and 'know the coins in my purse to be even in number' must not 
have overlapping supposition, whereas in (13) 'you' and 'person by whom the coins in my 
purse are known to be even in number' must overlap in supposition. As discussed above, 
Buridan explains his solution by noting that the effect of the attitude verb is to cause the other 
terms in the sentence to appellate the concepts they are associated with. We represent the 
concept associated with a term by means of a one-place function: 
RAT(P)=v 
This should be read as: the concept determined by P is v. Thus in (12) the supposition of the 
whole predicate should be represented as follows: 
SUP('know the coins in my purse to be even in number') = 
SGT('know') [RAT('coins in my purse') RAT('is even in number')] 
[SUP('coins in my purse') E SUP('is even in number')] 
(I here suppress reference to the domain of presently existing things.) In other words, the 
predicate supposits for just those people who know that the suppositum of 'coins in my purse' 
is one of the supposita of 'even in number' by means of the concepts 'coins in my purse' and 
'even in number'. Since in the posited case you are not one of those people, the two terms do 
not overlap in supposition. 
In contrast, (13) is true just in case the supposition of 'the coins in my purse' is one of 
the things that is known by me to be even in number. Thus the supposition of the predicate of 
(13) should be represented as: 
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SUP ('known by you to be even in number') includes SUP('Y') iff 
SUP ('you') E SUP ('know X to be even in number') for some X such that 
SUP('Y') E SUP('X') 14 
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In other words, the supposition of 'the coins in my purse' is one of the things that is known by 
me to be even in number just in case I am one of the things supposited for by the phrase 'know 
X to be even in number', for some concept X which supposits for the coins in my purse 
(possibly along with other things). The role of the concept remains in 'know X to be even in 
number', since this is properly represented by: 
SUP('know X to be even in number') = 
SGT('know') [RAT('X') RAT('is even in number')] 
[SUP('X') E SUP ('is even in number')] 
However, since the only requirement is that the supposition of 'the coins iIi my purse' be 
included in that of 'X', the particular concept determined by 'X' no longer plays an essential 
role. 
3.4 I owe you a horse 
As mentioned above, Buridan includes the verbs 'to owe' and 'to promise' and related 
words among those that cause the terms appearing with them to appellate their rationes. In the 
Sophismata he closes his discussion of appellation with a discussion of a sophism involving 
the verb 'to owe'. 
3.4.1 The sophism 
Fifteenth sophism: I owe you a horse. (Or similarly: I owe you a denarius.) 
I posit the case that for a good service which you performed for me, I promised 
you a good horse. And I have obligated myself before a competent judge to make 
14 Notice that the relationship between the two suppositions is not required to be one of identity-Buridan claims 
that (13) is true because the addressee knows that all pairs are even in number and he has a pair of coins in his 
pocket. The coins in his pocket are but one of the pairs supposited for by 'pair'. 
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suitable payment to you of a good horse. Thus the sophism appears manifest, for it is 
commonly said that every promise is included in ones debt .... And similarly, I posit 
that I bought some mustard from you for one denarius and I have not paid you. It 
follows that lowe you a denarius. 
But the opposite is argued in a difficult way, conceding the aforementioned 
case. For lowe you nothing, so lowe you neither a horse nor a denarius .... I asset the 
antecedent, because I do not owe you this horse, namely Morellus, nor this one; hence 
lowe you no horse. And consequently lowe you nothing, as I promised you nothing 
other than a horse .... 
I no more owe you Morellus that Favellus, since I no more promised you one 
than the other, and I could fulfil my obligation equally with one horse as with another. 
Therefore it follows that if I do not owe you Morellus, neither do lowe you Favellus, 
for the same reason. And the same is true of other horses. Therefore lowe you no 
horse ... 
But then I prove the antecedent, for just as was said at first, lowe you no more 
Morellus than Favellus. Hence lowe you either both or neither. If neither then the 
proposition is proved, namely, that I do not owe you Morellus. But it cannot be said 
that lowe you both, since I promised only one. Hence lowe you only one. And it does 
not follow that it lowe you one, then lowe you two (Buridan 1966, 137-138; 1977, 
83-84). 
3.4.2 The role of appellation 
Buridan begins his commentary with the observation that, as he said before, the verb 
'to owe' causes the terms following it to appellate the concepts with which they are associated, 
so that any substitution of the name of a particular horse-say Morellus-into (14) will result 
in a change in the appellation, and the resulting sentence will be false, since according to the 
case Buridan did not promise any particular horse. 
(14) lowe you a horse. 
The result of this is that the term horse does not have any of the possible modes of 
supposition-that is, it has no global quantificational effect. It is not possible to descend from 
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(14) to its singulars-if we assume, with Buridan, that there are only three horses that ever 
exist, (14) does not imply (15). 
(15) lowe you Morellus, or lowe you Favellus, or lowe you Brunellus. 
However (16) does follow from (14), and Buridan takes the situation with respect to (16) to be 
very different. 
(16) A horse is owed by me to you. 
'To owe', like the other intentional verbs, does not cause a term preceding it to appellate the 
particular concept associated with that term. Thus (16) does imply (17) (Buridan 1966, 138-
139; 1977, 84-85). 
(17) Morellus is owed by me to you, or Favellus is owed by me to you or Brunellus is 
owed by me to you. 
3.4.3 How many horses? 
The next difficulty is that (17) implies that one of its disjuncts is true. This raises a 
problem since there is in the posited case no more reason to say that Buridan owes you 
Morellus than that he owes you any of the other horses. Buridan's solution is to say that all of 
the disjuncts are true, and thus that (18) is also. 
(18) Every horse is owed by me to you. 
Buridan argues that his conclusion is not as counterintuitive as it might seem. First of all he 
notes that for each horse it is the case that his giving it to you would count as fulfilling his 
obligation. Since one cannot fulfill a debt except by paying what one owes, we might 
independently conclude that every horse is owed by him to you. Secondly, given that in the 
case the disjuncts seem to be either all true or all false, the alternative is to claim that no horse 
is owed, and this is obviously wrong. 
Most importantly, Buridan distinguishes between (18) and (19). 
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(19) lowe you every horse. 
The latter does not follow from the former because in (18) 'every horse' does not appellate the 
concept corresponding to it but only the existence of some concept under which its 
suppositum-namely all the horses-have been promised. But the concept under which they 
have been promised is not the one corresponding to 'every horse' but the one corresponding to 
'horse'. Concerning the related question of whether it is true that he owes you the king's horse, 
Buridan writes: 
I say that the king's horse is owed by me and to pay the king's horse I have obligated 
myself. Thus if! should buy that horse or if it should be given to me and I should pay, 
I would be freed. But neither do lowe the king's horse, nor am I obligated to pay the 
king's horse, nor can you demand the king's horse, except in conjunction with the 
others; for I have not promised that to you according to the reason for which it is 
called the king's horse, but according to the indeterminate and confused concept of this 
term 'horse' (Buridan 1966, 142; 1977,88). 
3.5 Taming the horse with notation 
Buridan's justification for endorsing (16), (17), and (18) as consequences of (14) 
seems a little peculiar, but it makes more sense when we consider it in light of the formal 
notation introduced above. Consider (14) and (16) again. 
(14) lowe you a horse. 
(16) A horse is owed by me to you. 
On Buridan's account the predicates of(14) has the following supposition in the posited case: 
SUP('owe you a horse') = 
SGT('owe') RAT('a horse') 
[SUP('a horse') SUP ('to you')] 
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Part of what is claimed by (14) is that the debt was incurred by means of the concept 
corresponding to 'a horse'. In contrast (16) is true just in case the supposition of horse overlaps 
with the supposition of 'is owed by me to you'. 
SUP('is owed by me to you') includes SUP('Y') iff 
SUP ('you') E SUP('owe X to you') for some X such that 
SUP('Y') E SUP('X') 15 
Since (16) is an existential sentence it is true just in case there is at least one thing supposited 
for by both 'a horse' and 'is owed by me to you'. That is, by the rules of suppositional descents, 
(16) implies (17) (where Morellus, Brunellus, and Favellus are all the horses that will ever 
exist). 
(17) Morellus is owed by me to you, or Favellus is owed by me to you or Brunellus is 
owed by me to you. 
As a disjunctive hypothetical proposition, (17) is true just in case one of the instances is. And 
while it is a little odd, we can see that each disjunct of (17) is true. Take the first disjunct. On 
Buridan's account it is true just in case the supposition of , Morell us' is also supposited for by 
'is owed by me to you'. But as we just saw this is so just in case: 
SUP ('you') E SUP('owe X to you') for some X such that 
SUP('Morellus') E SUP('X') 
And of course, the supposition of , Morell us' is one of the things supposited for by 'a horse'. 
3.5.1 All the horses 
So far this may seem unproblematic. However one counter-intuitive consequence of 
the truth of all of the disjuncts of (17) is that (18) is also true. 
15 Notice that the relationship between the two suppositions is not required to be one of identity-Buridan claims 
that (13) is true because the addressee knows that all pairs are even in number and he has a pair of coins in his 
pocket. The coins in his pocket are but one of the pairs supposited for by 'pair'. 
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(18) Every horse is owed by me to you. 
But this too follows directly from our formal account of the supposition of 'is owed by me to 
you'. As a universal (18) is true just in case everything supposited for by 'horse' is also 
supposited for by 'is owed by me to you'. And as we have seen, this is the case for each of our 
horses. 
Buridan is willing to accept this consequence for two reasons. First of all, the truth of 
(18) does accord with our intuition that every horse is something which could be used to pay 
off the debt. Secondly, his theory leaves him free to deny that (19) is true. 
(19) lowe you every horse. 
The formal account also rules that (19) is false, since it would only be true if Buridan was one 
of the things supposited for by 'owe you every horse'. 
SUP('owe you every horse') = 
SGTCowe') RA TC every horse') 
[SUPC every horse') SUP('to you')] 
As the formalization shows, this would only be true if the debt was incurred under the 
complex concept formed out of the concept corresponding to 'horse' and that corresponding to 
the syncategorematic term 'every'. However in the case under discussion no debt was incurred 
under that concept. 
3.5.2 Klima on owing a horse. 
My account of Buridan's position on the semantics of (14), (16), and (18) departs from 
that of Klima in a number of ways. Klima treats 'equum tibi debens'-i.e, something like 'a 
horse is owed by x to you'-as the predicate of (16) (equum tibi debeo). He then gives the 
supposition of this predicate in terms of quantification over terms: 
SUPCequum tibi debens') = SGT('debens')SUP('te')RA T('X')SUP('equus') 
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One consequence ofthis is the need to give a complicated account of the truth of (18) in terms 
of the result of substituting each individual supposited for by 'equus' in place of SUP('equus'). 
But regarding Buridan's claim concerning "Omnem equum tibi debeo", this amounts 
to saying that if this sentence is true, then for any choice of an individual suppositum 
of the term 'equus', the term 'debens' signifies me with respect to that horse considered 
under any concept whatsoever (Klima 1993, 345) 
This interpretation conflicts with what Buridan himself says about the king's horse. When 
discussing (20) what Buridan emphasizes is precisely that I do not owe the king's horse with 
respect to any concept whatsoever. 
(20) The king's horse is owed by me (equum regis debeo) 
In particular, the king's horse is not owed by me "according to the reason for which it is called 
the king's horse, but according to the indeterminate and confused concept of this term 'horse'" 
(Buridan 1966, 142; 1977, 88). Furthermore this claim of Klima's does not seem to fit with 
what he himself says elsewhere, and perhaps the mistake is cause by the awkwardness of his 
formal treatment. Accordingly, my account is to be preferred, since it preserves the medieval 
account of truth conditions in terms of sentence form and supposition, and provides a 
perspicuous account of why Buridan endorses the truth of (17) and (18). 
3.6 The trouble with singular terms 
What should now be abundantly clear is that Buridan's account, as interesting as it is, 
does not provide a general solution to the problem of singular terms in intentional contexts 
and certainly cannot be extended to cover the problematic simple sentences. Buridan will 
have all of the same difficulties with the puzzle of Lydia and the astronomers as do advocates 
of contemporary hidden-indexical accounts. Recall that Lydia is a beginning philosophy of 
language student who returns from her first class to report to her friend Martina what she has 
learned by uttering (21). 
(21) No ancient astronomers believed that Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
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The puzzle is to give an account of the truth-conditions of (21) that will count the ancient 
Babylonians, the linguistically impoverished astronomers, and the seasonal cycle astronomer 
as counterexamples, but will not count those astronomers who merely believe in the identity 
of Venus with itself. 
Buridan must treat (21) as true just in case the supposition of 'ancient astronomers' 
does not overlap with the supposition of 'believed that Hesperus is Phosphorus' We represent 
his account the supposition of the predicate as follows: 
SUP (,believed that Hesperus is Phosphorus') = 
SGT('believe') [RA T('Hesperus') RA T('Phosphorus')] 
[SUP('Hesperus') = SUP('Phosphorus')] 
There is of course no difficulty with claiming that the concept associated with 'Hesperus' is 
different from that associated with 'Phosphorus'. The difficulty arises, as for the other 
accounts, with specifying the concept associated with each term in such a way as to count all 
our counterexample astronomers as believing that Hesperus is Phosphorus. The problem is 
that the counterexamples do not share any concepts of Hesperus or Phosphorus. Buridan 
cannot accommodate this as his theory can only accommodate disjunctive specifications of 
concepts when the term is placed outside the scope of the verb, and in this case the belief that 
Venus is Venus would count as one of those specifications. 
4. Reference and Quantification 
Both Klima and Hintikka and Sandu suggested that the problems with singular terms 
arose as a result of Fregean approach to quantification. However it turns out that neither 
game-theoretic semantics or the neo-medieval treatment advocated by Klima can provide a 
satisfactory solution for the puzzle cases. The question which thus arises is why the idea that 
an alternative quantificational framework will solve the problems has seemed so tempting and 
resulted in so little success. 
One reason for thinking that an alternative approach to quantification would solve the 
problems is that there is a close tie between quantifiers and referential terms. The common 
ground between the quantifiers of first-order logic, independence friendly quantifiers, and the 
restricted quantifiers of neo-medievallogicians is the reliance on the referential properties of 
variables. Furthermore it seems to many philosophers that there is an essential tie between 
Chapter 5: Neo-medieval semantics 177 
reference and quantification-it seems the very mark of a referential term that given the truth 
of (22), (23) follows. 
(22)-a-
(23) ::Ix --x--
Part of the appeal of Russell's treatment of definite descriptions and descriptive theories of 
names is that they shift, as Quine puts it, "the burden of objective reference which had been 
put on the descriptive phrase .. . [on to] ... bound variables, variables of quantification, 
namely words like 'something', 'nothing', 'everything' (Quine 1948,6). As the slogan says, "to 
be is to be the value of a bound variable", and nothing else is available to be referred to. 
The puzzles connected with the propositional attitudes and the simple sentences of 
chapter three arise because the names in them seem to refer neither to the things themselves-
the planet Venus, the individual Clark/Superman-nor to our concepts of those things. The 
truth-conditions of these sorts of sentences have proven remarkably difficult to specify in 
terms ofthe sorts of entities that could be the values of a bound variable. And yet, as Kripke's 
arguments show, proper names do seem to be genuine referring terms-we cannot dispose of 
them in favour of descriptions. 
Given such a dilemma it is no surprise that the fault might be thought to be located in 
the treatment of variables and quantification itself, and the remedy sought in a new 
quantificational theory. It is also no surprise that neither Klima's neo-medievalism nor game-
theoretic semantics provide a solution. The late medievals like Buridan had at base the same 
approach to reference as the Fregean one, and the admitted a realm of entities that, while not 
co-extensive with ours, was at least as restricted. Similarly, despite Hintikka and Sandu's 
claims about the context sensitivity of cross-world identity, the variables of independence-
friendly logic exhibit the same kind of bare reference and take the same values as the 
variables of traditional first-order logic. If the solution is to be found in an alternate view of 
variables and quantification that alternative would have to be a far more radical departure 
from current approaches than either neo-medievalism or game-theoretic semantics. I for one 
have no idea what such an alternative would be like. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Semantics, pragmatics and intuitions 
Having rejected the idea that the problems associated with proper names and other 
singular terms are an artifact of the Fregean quantificational paradigm, I now return to the 
question of how we are to deal with the puzzle cases. The theory with the strongest position at 
the end of chapter three was the naIve theory, which maintains that all of the intuitions that 
co-referential terms differ in semantic content are to be explained in terms of pragmatic 
implicature. It is part and parcel of that account that we have difficulty recognizing the 
difference between semantically imparted information and pragmatically imparted 
information, and that this difficulty explains both our pre-theoretical convictions and our 
unwillingness to accept the naIve theory, 
In this chapter I argue that the distinction between semantically imparted information 
and pragmatically imparted information does not match the distinction between what is said 
and what is merely implied, and conclude that any inability to recognize the difference 
between the former phenomena does not carry with it any implications about our ability to 
recognize the latter. I then discuss what criteria may be used to distinguish semantic content 
from implicature and argue that the correct one is the availability principle championed by 
Francois Recanati. However, since according to this principle language users do have the 
ability to distinguish semantic content from mere implicature, this means that the naIve 
theory'S account of the origins of our anti-substitution intuitions cannot be correct. 
1. The nai've theory 
At the end of the discussion of the counter-examples I concluded that the naIve view, 
despite facing some difficulties, was in the strongest position. The tenability of the naIve 
view, however, depends on the plausibility of the claim that we misidentify the origins of the 
anti-substitution intuitions. On the naIve view our intuitions about the truth conditions of 
various sentences containing proper names and other singular terms are to be explained not in 
terms of the semantic properties of those sentences but in terms of their pragmatic properties. 
The naIve theorists view, to summarize, is that the semantic content of singular terms is 
exhausted by their referents. On this view, the truth of (1) guarantees the truth of (2), (3) that 
of (4), and vice versa in each case. 
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(1) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman came out. 
(2) Superman went into the phone booth and Superman came out. 
(3) Lois believes that Superman can fly. 
(4) Lois believes that Clark Kent can fly. 
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Since they differ only in that they contain different co-referential names, then the proposition 
expressed by (1) is the same as that expressed by (2). The case of(3) and (4) is parallel. 
Salmon and Soames' standard account of our inclination to reject the result that (3) and 
(4) have the same truth conditions is that (3) and (4), in addition to saying what Lois believes, 
carry with them certain pragmatic implicatures about how she believes it. Thus the claim of 
the naIve view is that what is said by (1 )-its semantic content-is identical to the semantic 
content of (2), but that what is pragmatically implicated by (1) differs from what is implicated 
by (2) , and thus our intuitions about the assertability of the sentences differ .. Furthermore, 
language users are generally insensitive to the difference between pragmatically provided 
information and semantically provided information, and so identify both components as part 
of the content of(1). 
Now the approach of the naIve theorist is to argue that we can privilege some of or 
intuitions about the semantic content of names-namely those which are in their favour-and 
explain away the rest in terms of pragmatic features of language. I want to emphasize here 
that the question is whether we can ever be wrong, collectively and systematically, about our 
own language. For it is exactly that kind of mistake that is at issue in the writings of defenders 
of the naIve view. For example, Salmon writes: 
Even when the ordinary usage of a certain locution is systematic, it can be 
systematically incorrect-if, for example, the language is deficient in certain ways that 
compel speakers to violate its rules in order to convey what they intend, or if the 
principles or social conventions governing the appropriateness of certain utterances 
require certain systematic violations of the principles and rules governing correct and 
incorrect applications of the terms used (Salmon 1986, 84) 
and further: 
It is no embarrassment to the modified naIve theory that ordinary speakers typically 
deny literally true belief attributions (and other propositional attitude attributions) ... 
With widespread ignorance of the significance of the distinction between semantically 
encoded and pragmatically imparted information, such violation of the rules of the 
language is entirely to be expected (Salmon 1986, 85). 
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Salmon's view, to summarize, is that we systematically use a particular locution incorrectly-
namely to communicate something other than what the locution is linguistically appropriate 
for communicating-and that we do so in part because we are ignorant of a basic distinction 
built into our linguistic practice, and in part because our language is not actually up to the job 
that we put it too. 
Now Salmon's view, as stated, seems in part to be manifestly absurd. If we 
systematically use language to communicate something, then it surely cannot be correct to say 
that the language is inadequate to the job. It is less obviously mistaken to say that we could 
use a certain locution systematically but incorrectly, but this also seems to exhibit some 
internal tension. It seems at first glance that the mere fact that language is a conventional 
system ensures that we cannot be wrong in this way. After all while, poisson is the French 
word for fish, there seems no reason why it couldn't have been the word for dogs, and the fact 
that it isn't seems just to be a fact about how French speakers (collectively) use the word. Of 
course there are cases where a word (or sentence, or phrase) is ambiguous-but this too is a 
fact about our usage. What gives Salmon's view whatever plausibility it has is the idea that 
this mistake arises from ignorance about the distinction between what is said and what is 
implied. The problem with the view that we can be ignorant of this distinction is that it 
reflects a misunderstanding about how theories of conversational implicature work. 
1.1 The role of intuition 
One obvious objection to the naIve account is that the intuitions attached to (3) and (4) 
do not behave like the intuitions associated with standard examples of pragmatic implicature. 
Consider, for example, the intuitions concerning the temporal order of the events described by 
(5). 
(5) They fell in love and moved in together. 
It is remarkably easy to convince someone that (5) is true in the case where the subjects move 
in together prior to falling in love, and that intuitions to the contrary are the result of 
conversational implicature. The idea that (5) would in such circumstances be pragmatically 
misleading but strictly speaking true is appealing-in part because it fits in nicely with the 
view that in many other circumstances--e.g. (6)-there is no suggestion of temporal ordering. 
(6) He bought a new shirt and rented a tuxedo. 
In contrast, our intuitions about (3) and (4) are remarkably robust. As Mark Richard points 
out: 
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Other than using bribery, threats, hypnosis, or the like, there is simply nothing you can 
do to get most people to say that Jones believes that Tully was an orator, once they 
know that Jones sincerely denies 'Tully was an orator', understands it, and acts on his 
denial in ways appropriate thereto. In particular, pointing out that Jones can express 
something he believes with 'Cicero was an orator' seems simply irrelevant to most 
people (Richard 1990, 125). 
Even exposing people to the counterparts to (6)-namely cases where co-referential names 
are substitutable, as in the Ruth Barcan Marcus example of chapter two-does not increase 
the appeal of the pragmatic story. 
1.2 Are our intuitions irrelevant? 
Jennifer Saul has argued that this resistance does not necessarily tell us much about 
the correctness of the claim that the intuitions concern pragmatically provided conversational 
implicatures (Saul 1998, 364). Sentences like (5), she suggests, are paradigm cases used to 
illustrate the phenomena of conversational implicature. It is precisely because they are easily 
recognized and almost universally accepted that they are used to explicate the concept. It 
would be surprising if all cases of pragmatically provided implicatures were as clear and 
obvious as these cases, and it is unreasonable to expect this. The fact that our intuitions are 
hard to overcome should not be given to much weight. Nor, argues Saul, is the case that our 
intuitions are as immovable as is suggested, for while it is not easy to convince people that (4) 
is in fact true but merely implicates something false, it is not as difficult as convincing people 
that (7) is true and merely implicates something false. 
(7) Richard Nixon was President of the United States of America on August 16, 1999. 
Her claim is that nothing we could do other than proposing an elaborate political conspiracy 
theory could induce anyone to give up the view that (7) is literally false. In other words, the 
intuition that (4) is literally false is supposed to be stable, but not as stable as the intuition that 
(7) is literally false. Now, it is not obvious to me that it is easier to get people to give up their 
intuitions about (4) than it is to get them to give up their intuitions about (7). But even 
allowing that it is, this does not show that the intuitions are too unstable to be intuitions about 
the semantic content of the utterance. 
1.3 Paradigms and fuzzy distinctions 
Saul's view is that (5) and similar sentences are merely the paradigm cases of 
pragmatic implicature-they are the teaching cases for the distinction. Other cases may well 
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be less obvious. But it is unclear what this means. It might mean that the concept of pragmatic 
implicatures is a vague or fuzzy one, like bald. The man with no hair on his head is a clear 
case of baldness, and may be used to illustrate the concept. However, there are plenty of 
borderline cases where it is not obvious whether the person is correctly described as bald. 
Unfortunately, while this approach will have the consequence that it may not be obvious 
whether an aspect of what is communicated is part of the semantic content or part of the 
pragmatically provided implicatures, the fuzzy distinction will not do the work that the 
Soames-Salmon view requires. One feature of fuzzy concepts is that there may well be no 
answer to the question of whether the concept applies to a particular case or not. The best we 
may be able to say is that a particular man is slightly bald. But if the best we can say about an 
aspect of what is communicated by (3) and (4) is that it is partly a matter of pragmatic 
implicatures, then we are not in a position to say that the semantic content of these 
expressions is simply that ascribed by naive view. A man who is slightly bald also almost has 
a full head of hair, and if the distinction between what is said and what is merely implied is a 
fuzzy one, then an aspect of what is communicated that is partly a matter of pragmatic 
implicatures is also somewhat a mat~er of semantic content, and the semantics of (3) and (4) 
must reflect that. 
In short, the semantic/pragmatic distinction cannot be a fuzzy or vague one if it is to 
do the work required by Salmon and Soames. In particular, there must be ways (at least in 
principle) of determining whether a given piece of information is part of the semantic content 
or a merely pragmatic feature of the utterance. The fact that our initial intuition that (5) 
implies a particular temporal order is so easily overcome is not just an accidental feature of 
the paradigm cases that makes them good teaching cases, but in fact itself a way of testing 
whether the implication is merely a pragmatic one. The implications associated with (3) and 
(4)fail this particular test, and this is why the stability of our intuitions is seen as an objection 
to the Soames-Salmon view. 
Saul's conclusion is that the only alternative way to evaluate the Soames-Salmon view 
is to see whether or not we can describe how the pragmatic implications come about. But this 
is to ignore the fact that other tests for differentiating pragmatic implicatures from semantic 
content. What Saul should have said is that this is not the only test of whether an implication 
is a pragmatic one, and thus that failing it is not conclusive evidence against the naive 
account. The question this raises is threefold-what is the distinction between what is said 
and what is merely implicated; what is the relationship between this distinction and the 
distinction between semantics and pragmatics; and how can we tell content from implication? 
2. What is said versus what is implied 
The distinction between the content of an utterance (what is said) and its implicatures 
originates with H. P. Grice (1961, 1975, 1978, 1989). Grice offers both a characterization of 
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the distinction and a theoretical framework for explaining how the varIOUS kinds of 
implicatures arise. This framework emphasizes the role of the maxims guiding our 
conversational exchanges in generating the implicatures of our utterances. Subsequently the 
study of conversational maxims has split into two schools-those still following the Gricean 
framework, and those advocating the principles of relevance theory. 
2.1 The Gricean view 
On the account advocated by both Grice and his followers and relevance theorists, 
there is an important distinction to be made between what is said with an utterance, and what 
is implicated. What is said when someone utters (8) is a function of the linguistic meaning of 
the sentence (what Grice calls the conventional meaning) and the context. 
(8) I have just eaten. 
The role of the context is of course necessary because of the use of the indexical. In some 
cases, like that of "I", the linguistic meaning of the indexical is a simple function from the 
context to the referent, but in other cases, like that of "this", the referent may be determined 
partly through pragmatic means. Nevertheless, in either case I do not know what is said (i.e., 
what the semantic content of the utterance was) until I know enough about the context to fix 
the reference of the indexical. As Grice points out in his original paper (Grice 1975, 158), it is 
likely also features of context that disambiguate between the two meanings of "vice" in "He is 
in the grip of a vice". Whether the man in question is unfortunate enough to have part of his 
body stuck in a tool or is rather under the influence of a less than desirable aspect of his 
character is a matter of what is said, and this is so even if the ambiguity is resolved 
pragmatically. 
In contrast, what is implicated by an utterance is what is implied, suggested, meant, 
etc. When, to adapt Grice's example, I say that our mutual acquaintance Linda hasn't been 
arrested yet, I suggest that she is likely to be arrested. Nevertheless, that she is likely to be 
arrested is not in Grice's view part of what is said-it is merely implicated. Similarly, ifI utter 
(8) in response to the question "Would you like to have lunch?", I implicate, but not say, that 
I do not want to go. 
2.1.1 Conventional implicature 
Grice identifies three kinds of implicatures-conventional implicatures and 
generalized and particularized conversational implicatures. Conventional implicatures are, 
according to Grice, implicatures which stem from the conventional meaning of words but 
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which nonetheless do not enter into the truth conditions of what is strictly speaking said. One 
of Grice's own examples was 'therefore' in (9) (Grice 1975). 
(9) He is an Englishman and therefore brave. 
On his view, the suggestion that his bravery is a consequence of being English is an 
implicature and not part of what is said. What is said is merely that the subject possesses both 
properties-being English and being brave. However, the use of the word 'therefore' serves, 
through its conventional meaning, to implicate the consequential claim. Similarly, consider 
the difference between (10) and (11 ).1 
(10) She is poor and honest. 
(11) She is poor but honest. 
On Grice's view (10) and (11) have the same truth-conditional content, but because of the use 
of 'but' (11) carries with it a metalinguistic commentary to the effect that the second conjunct 
is surprising, or contrasts with the first conjunct in some way. 
We might well dissent here, thinking that in (9) we say, and not merely implicate, that 
the consequence holds, but (11) may be a less controversial example. It is interesting to note 
that in the case of (11) the implication-that the speaker thinks the second conjunct contrasts 
with the first--could hardly fail to be true if the speaker is speaking truthfully. In contrast the 
implication of (9)-that the relation between the two properties is that of consequence-is 
much more likely to be false. In any case, conventional implicatures, if they exist, are part of 
the linguistic meaning of the sentence uttered, but are not part of what is said-the semantic 
content. 
Nathan Salmon has suggested that in the case of belief ascriptions additional 
information is conveyed by means of either conventional implicature or generalized 
conversational implicature (Salmon 1989, 252-253; 275f11). It is fairly easy to see that it 
cannot be by conventional implicature. Conventional implicatures are called 'conventional' 
because they are part of the conventional (i.e., linguistic) meaning of the word or phrase that 
gives rise to them. As a result they arise independently of the circumstances of the 
conversation or contingent facts about the context of utterance. In contrast the problem with 
belief reports and the other puzzle cases is precisely that the acceptability of substitution is 
highly context sensitive. 
If the problem was restricted to propositional attitude attributions then it might be 
possible to defend the view that the conventional implicature involved in the puzzle cases 
itself involved a contextual element. The defender of the naIve view might claim that the use 
1 This example is from Grice 1961. 
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of an attitude term carries with it a conventional implicature to the effect that there is some 
contextually specified relation between the that-clause and the way in which the state of 
affairs in question is thought of. Unfortunately the simple sentence puzzles show that the 
intuition can arise in the absence of any propositional attitude verb. Since conventional 
implicatures are associated with the use of some word or phrase, this means that we must 
locate the origin of the conventional implicature with the use of the name itself. However, 
since the implicature doesn't arise with every use of the names in question-or even with 
most or a substantial number of uses of them-it must be a conversational implicature. 
2.1.2 Conversational implicature 
Both generalized and particularized conversational implicatures arise from the fact 
that our conversational exchanges are generally cooperative ventures-regardless of other 
conflicts, the participants have some common goal, if only the minimal one of successful 
communication. Accordingly, suggests Grice, we are generally guided by the cooperative 
principle-" make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it 
occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged" 
(Grice 1975, 158-9). The difference between the two types is that generalized conversational 
implicatures are relatively context insensitive-they do not depend upon any particular details 
of the conversational situation (Grice 1975, 165). 
Assuming that we are guided by the cooperative principle-or in any case something 
similar to it-Grice identifies four categories of conversational maxims: Quantity, Quality, 
Relation, and Manner. 
Grice's maxims: 
Quantity 
AI. Make your contribution as informative as is required by the purposes of the 
exchange. 
A2. Do not make your contribution more informative that is required. 
Quality 
B. Try to make your contribution one that is true. (supermaxim) 
B 1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 
B2. Do not say that for which you lack sufficient evidence. 
Relation 
C. Be relevant 
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Manner 
D. Be perspicuous (supermaxim) 
D 1. Avoid obscurity of expression. 
D2. Avoid ambiguity. 
D3. Be brief. (avoid unnecessary prolixity). 
D4. Be orderly. 
(Grice 1975, 159). 
186 
With these maxims come failures to fulfil them, but what is important to the Gricean account 
is that we can fail to fulfil them in importantly different ways (Grice 1975, 161). We may: 
F 1. Quietly and unostentatiously violate a maxim (as when one lies). 
F2. Opt out of the maxim (and the cooperative Principle). This will generally be 
indicated, as when one says "I cannot say more," or, "my lips are sealed." 
F3. Flout a maxim, i.e. blatantly fail to fulfil it.2 
In general it is the assumption that we are operating in accord with the cooperative principle 
that generates implicatures. Indeed, it is this that allows Grice to offer a characterization of 
these implicatures: 
A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) thatp has implicated q, may 
be said to have conversationally implicated that q, provided that (1) he is to be 
presumed to be obeying the conversational maxims, or at least the cooperative 
principle; (2) the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required in order 
to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those terms) consistent with 
this presumption; and (3) the speaker thinks (and would expect the bearer to think that 
the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the bearer to work out, or grasp 
intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required (Grice 1975, 161). 
In the example given above, where I utter (8) in response the question "Would you like to 
have lunch?", I am failing to obey the maxim be relevant unless there is some connection 
between my having eaten recently and the answer to the question. 
2 Grice proposes that being faced with a clash between maxims is a way of not fulfilling a maxim, but as others 
have noted (e.g. Martinich 1996, 119), a clash is a reason for not fulfilling a maxim, not a way of not fulfilling 
one. Martinich also suggests that FI-3 should be supplemented by suspending a maxim, which covers cases in 
which a maxim is permanently opted out of. His example is the U.S. Senate, in which filibustering is permitted. 
Theatrical performances might constitute another example. However, this seems a difference in degree rather 
than in kind. 
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(8) I have just eaten. 
Given the background infonnation that people usually prefer to space out their meals over 
time the obvious assumption is that I do not want to have lunch. In case of 
(5) They fell in love and moved in together, 
the implication appears given the background infonnation-people usually fall in love before 
moving in together-and the assumption that I am acting in accord with the maxims be 
orderly and make your contribution as informative as is required. The default context of (5) is 
one in which the infonnation that the order is not the expected one is required. 
Despite the inclusion of 'grasp intuitively' in the definition above, Grice explicitly says 
that conversational implicatures must be capable of being worked out-"if it can in fact be 
intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicature (if 
present at all) will not count as a conversational implicature; it will be a conventional 
implicature" (Grice 1975, 161 emphasis in original). 
The main point of all this is that possibility of neo-Gricean conversational implicature 
depends on the speaker being able to work out the implication on the basis of the assumption 
of the cooperative principle and knowledge of what the utterance actually says. It must, as 
Grice puts it, be calculable. Salmon's defense of the naIve view against our recalcitrant 
intuitions is that we are ignorant of the true meaning of the belief attributions-that we 
mistake their pragmatic content for their semantic content. But if this is the case, then neo-
Gricean pragmatics can supply no explanation for where those implications come from. 
Grice's pragmatic explanations rely on the very knowledge of the semantic content of the 
utterances that Salmon denies we possess.3 
2.2 Relevance Theory 
The primary competitor to a Gricean account of pragmatics is relevance theory, which 
was introduced by Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson in their 1986 book Relevance: 
Communication and cognition. Central to Sperber and Wilson's view is the idea that linguistic 
3 In his (1989) Salmon rejects Stephen Schiffer's claim in (l987b) that his view is not compatible with the 
Gricean account of implicature. However Schiffer's argument depends upon the audience having to know that 
what was said by an utterance is strictly false (Schiffer 1987b, 466-471), and Salmon correctly rejects this 
(Salmon 1989, 252-253), pointing out that implicatures can arise due to violations of maxims other than the 
maxim of quality. The point here is more general-regardless of what maxim is involved in the implicature, the 
generation of conversational implicatures depends upon the audience knowing what was strictly and literally 
said by the utterance. 
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communication (and indeed human cognition in general) is governed by a search for 
relevance. Grice, it seems, was on the right track with his undeveloped single maxim of 
relation-be relevant-and his comments to the effect that the second maxim of quantity 
might be unnecessary if the maxim of relation was properly understood (Grice 1975, 159). 
What he failed to do, if relevance theory is right, was notice that in fact every maxim-and 
indeed the cooperative principle itself--can be replaced by the single notion of relevance. 
Sperber and Wilson (S& W) define relevance in terms of an interaction between the 
cognitive effects of information and the processing effort required to acquire it. The 
interaction between new information and existing assumptions produces cognitive effects 
such as strengthening existing assumptions, . contradicting and thus eliminating existing 
assumptions, or combining with existing assumptions to allow inferences to further new 
information. In principle, the greater the cognitive effects the more relevant a piece of 
information will be. However, these cognitive effects do not, as S& W put it, come for free. 
All cognitive effects cost some mental effort to arrive at, and this effort can serve to lower the 
relevance-the greater the effort required, the less relevant the information. S& W's base 
assumption is that any utterance is a request for the hearers attention, and thus comes with the 
expectation that it will be relevant enough to be worthy of this attention. 
Relevant enough, on S&W's view, is captured by the notion of optimal relevance. 
Optimal relevance 
An utterance is optimally relevant iff: 
(a) it is relevant enough to be worth the addressee's effort to process it; and 
(b) it is the most relevant one compatible with the communicator's abilities and 
preferences (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995: 260-78). 
The presumption that any utterance carries with it is that it is optimally relevant, and it is this 
presumption (dubbed the communicative principle of relevance) which S& W use to explain 
various pragmatic effects, including disambiguation and conversational implicatures. Of 
course, not all utterances are actually optimally relevant, and hearers may still process the 
irrelevant ones. They do so by rejecting or accepting interpretations of an utterance according 
to whether they are consistent with the communicative principle: 
An utterance, on a given interpretation, is consistent with the principle of relevance if 
and only if the speaker might reasonably have expected it to be optimally relevant to 
the hearer on that interpretation (Wilson and Sperber 1998, 11) 
In other words, what matters for determining conversational implicatures and resolving 
ambiguities is not the actual optimal relevance of the utterance on a particular interpretation, 
but the reasonableness of the presumption of optimal relevance by the speaker. 
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According to relevance theory, hearers can be expected to go through a process of 
considering possible interpretations along a path of least resistance-that is, by evaluating the 
most accessible interpretation first, and so on-and to stop when the expected level of 
relevance is reached (this level varies along with the speaker's abilities and preferences). In 
the case of: 
(5) They fell in love and moved in together, 
an utterance which puts events in the order in which they occurred will be more relevant-
add more information while requiring little extra processing-than one which doesn't. 
Despite its departures from the Gricean viewpoint, relevance theory is still what 
Robyn Carston calls post-Gricean (Carston 1998, 227). While it rejects the cooperative 
principle which characterizes neo-Gricean accounts, it still shares the inference based 
approach. We might therefore expect it to also share a version of Grice's calculability 
principle for conversational implicatures, and indeed Carston describes Sperber and Wilson's 
work as a development of an account of "the inference processes involved in the derivation of 
implicatures" (Carston 1988, 157). What distinguishes relevance theory from Gricean theory 
is not a denial of the inference process, but rather a view of that process as involving the 
formation and testing of hypotheses rather than a deductive process. For relevance theory the 
explanation of pragmatic implicatures depends upon us being able to work out the implication 
on the basis of the assumption that it is compatible with the communicative principle of 
relevance and a knowledge of what is said. Again, Salmon's defense of the naIve view 
maintains that we confuse the pragmatic content of belief attributions with their semantic 
content. But, just as in the Gricean case, the relevance theorists explanations of pragmatic 
implications rely on the very knowledge of the semantic content of the utterances that Salmon 
denies we possess. 
The obvious response on behalf of the naIve view to this charge, however, is to argue 
that while we must, in some sense, know what the semantic content of an utterance is in order 
for a pragmatic explanation to work, there is no reason to think that we know that we know. 
In other words, while pragmatic theories of conversational implicature like those of Grice and 
Sperber and Wilson require the semantic content to be available for pragmatic processing, 
there is not reason to think that it must be consciously available to the speaker or the hearer. 
Calculable, on this view, does not mean consciously calculable. If this response is right, then 
we need to investigate whether there are any other ways of identifying conversational 
implicatures available to us. 
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3. Recognizing implicatures 
3.1 Detachability and cancelability 
In addition to calculability, Grice suggests that conversational implicatures would 
have the properties of being non-detachable and cancelable. A supposed implicature is non-
detachable insofar as we cannot find an alternative way of saying the same thing which does 
not have the implicature. The first point to note is that this test only applies to implicatures 
that are consequences of what is said, not how it is said. Secondly, since this test depends on 
us having a prior knowledge of what is said by an utterance, at best it can serve to distinguish 
conversational from conventional implicatures. In fact, as Grice himself notes, it not even a 
sufficient test for conversational implicature, as entailments and, if they are to be treated as a 
separate class, presuppositions (Have you stopped beating your wife?) will also exhibit non-
detachability (Grice 1978, 115). 
Grice also claims that all conversational implicatures are cancelable, either explicitly 
or contextually. A putative implicature that p is explicitly cancelable just in case it is not 
incoherent to follow up the utterance supposed to implicate p with the words "but not pIt or "I 
don't mean to imply pIt or some such. It is contextually cancelable just in case we can imagine 
some situation in which the utterance will not carry the implicature. However, while all 
conversational implicatures may well be cancelable,4 cancelability cannot serve as a test for 
the presence of a conversational implicature. In cases where an utterance is genuinely 
semantically ambiguous we may be able to apparently cancel the unintended reading. Jerrold 
Sadock gives the following example (Sadock 1978, 293): 'Everyone speaks one language. 
This is normally thought to be ambiguous between two readings, one which gives narrow 
scope to the existential quantifier, and one giving wide scope. However, the sentence 
'Everybody speaks one language, although no one language is spoken by everyone' is 
perfectly sensible, and shows that the wide scope reading is cancelable. This does not, 
however, tempt us to view the wide scope reading as a mere conversational implicature. What 
is being cancelled is one of two possible readings, not an implicature. Indeed, in many cases 
where there may be debate over whether something is a conversational implicature or a 
genuine ambiguity cancelability will not serve to distinguish between cases. 
3.2 The modified Ockham's razor 
Grice of course is well aware of this difficulty, and it is for this reason that he 
proposes the Modified Ockham's Razor (MOR): senses are not to be multiplied beyond 
necessity (Grice 1978, 118). The idea here is that one should not propose an ambiguity unless 
4 Sadock (1978, 293) claims otherwise. 
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the ambiguity does some work-Grice suggests that an ambiguity might do some work if 
explains the ease of a particular range of use, or the fact that a certain kind of use, which 
would otherwise seem legitimate, is in fact uncomfortable. He also says that we should not 
posit semantic ambiguity when the special use of the word is predictable given the other use. 
Recanati points put that the MOR will not do as a test for when something is a 
conversational implicature rather than part of what is literally said in that it fails to distinguish 
between different kinds of pragmatic processes (Recanati 1993, 237). The Gricean picture 
assumes that there are only two possible explanations for apparently different uses of a 
word-either it has two distinct linguistic meanings, or the difference is a result of 
conversational implicatures. We have, however, already noted that some contextual features 
are required to fix the reference of indexicals like the 'I' in (8). 
(8) I have just eaten. 
What may not be obvious from this particular example, however, is the degree to which 
pragmatic considerations are involved in determining what is said. In (8) the indexical seems 
to carry with it as part of its linguistic meaning a precise rule for identifying the referent-it is 
the speaker of the context.s However, in a case like (12) pragmatic features playa much 
greater role. 
(12) She bought John's book. 
First of all, fixing the reference of 'she' involves much more than following a simple linguistic 
rule of the sort associated with 'I'. She may be the woman previously under discussion, or the 
one who just walked by, and it is a pragmatic process that determines which. At most the 
linguistic meaning of 'she' requires that the referent be female. 6 Secondly, it is pragmatic 
processes that serve to specify the relation between John and the book. An utterance of (12) 
may say that Carolyn has bought the book written by John, or that she has bought the book 
John was trying to sell, or that she has bought the book John wanted to buy. Which relation is 
selected will depend largely on which is relevant to the conversation at hand.? 
Indeed, consideration of examples with unarticulated constituents like: 
S In chapter seven I argue that this precision is only apparent. 
6 At most, since in some circles it is usual practice to refer to transvestites as 'she', and, while the content of the 
rest of the sentence rules it out in this case, 'she' has traditionally been the correct pronoun for ships and various 
other inanimate objects. 
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(13) It is raining .. 
show that pragmatic processes can sometimes be essential for anything to be said at all: (13) 
does not express a proposition unless completed by a contextually supplied place and time. 
Recall that in the case of (13) the unarticulated constituents are usually the place and time of 
the utterance, so that (13) is correctly read as: 
(14) It is raining {here} {now}. 
However this is not always the case. We could well imagine the weather forecaster saying 
"And now to tomorrow's weather in Wellington. It's raining." In this case (13) is properly 
completed as: 
(15) It is raining {in Wellington} {tomorrow}. 
It is pragmatic processes operating in the context that disambiguate between (14) and (15) as 
readings of (13). 
Now it seems right to think that the place and time indexes are part of what is said, 
because (13) does not express a complete proposition without such indexes, and thus is not 
truth-evaluable. Grice's principle tells us to prefer a pragmatic explanation to one on which 
(13) is mysteriously semantically ambiguous between (14), (15), and countless other readings, 
and this is surely right. The consequence however is that we must accept that the linguistic 
meaning of sentences may underdetermine what is said, and that pragmatic processes 
sometimes contribute to what is said rather than to what is merely implicated. The MOR 
cannot help us to separate pragmatically determined aspects of what is said from what is 
pragmatically implicated by an utterance. 
3.3 Minimalism 
Despite the failure of the MOR many people have been sympathetic with its 
minimalist approach towards semantic content, and have offered alternative minimalist 
principles for distinguishing semantic content from implicature: the linguistic direction 
principle, the mixed minimalist principle, and the minimal truth-evaluability principle 
(Carston 1988, 163-4; Recanati 1993,240-242). 
7 Recanati describes this as free rather than controlled context dependence, "in the sense that the linguistic 
meaning of a context-sensitive expression constrains its possible semantic values but does not consist in a 'rule' 
or 'function' taking us from context to semantic value" (Recanati 1989,99) 
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3.3.1 Linguistic direction 
Linguistic direction: a pragmatically supplied aspect of what is communicated is part 
of what is said just in case it is triggered by the grammar of the utterance-that is, just 
in case the sentence sets up a slot which is to be filled. 
On this view, context sensitive expressions set up 'slots' which need to be filled before 
one knows what is said. For example, to know what is said by "He bought a loaf of bread", 
one must determine who the reference of he is-and that it was that particular person who 
purchased the loaf of bread is part of what is said. 
This linguistic direction principle will not do, however, if we do not wish to count 
conventional implicatures as part of what is said (Recanati 1993,240). Recall that in (11) the 
linguistic meaning of 'but' is to be treated as carrying a conventional implicature about the 
relationship between the conjuncts. 
(11) She is poor but honest. 
In a sentence of the form 'P but Q', the 'but' (on this account) serves to highlight a certain 
attitude of the speaker towards the relationship of Q to P. In other words, 'P but Q' can be 
parsed as containing a certain kind of metalinguistic commentary such that it should be read 
roughly as 'P and Q (and I think that Q is surprising given P).' However, the truth conditions 
of 'P but Q' are just those of 'P and Q.' 
The metalinguistic commentary is triggered by the use of 'but', and so by the linguistic 
direction principle, the commentary is part of what is said. Linguistic direction is not 
sufficient for being part of what is said. 
3.3.2 Mixed minimalism 
Mixed minimalism: a pragmatically supplied aspect of what is communicated is part 
of what is said just in case (i) it is triggered by the grammar of the utterance-that is, 
just in case the sentence sets up a slot which is to be filled-and (ii) the slot must be 
filled in order for the utterance to be truth-evaluable (i.e. in order for it to express a 
proposition). 
The failure of linguistic direction as a sufficient criteria for being part of the semantic 
content of an utterance leads is the motivating factor for mixed minimalism. This principle 
adds the further requirement that pragmatically provided information must be required for the 
utterance to express a complete proposition. However, as Perry observes, our old friend (13) 
shows that the linguistic direction requirement is not necessary (Perry 1986, 138). 
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(13) It is raining. 
If! utter (13) on the morning of August 31 1999 in Canberra, then what I have said is true just 
in case it is raining in Canberra on that morning. That it is raining in Wellington, or 
Vancouver, or Los Angeles is irrelevant-that rain doesn't matter to the truth of my utterance 
of (13). But the place of my utterance of (13) is certainly not supplied or triggered by any part 
of (13). Unarticulated constituents show that linguistic direction is not even necessary for a 
pragmatically provided piece of information to be part of what is said .. 
3.3.3 Minimal truth-evaluability 
Minimal truth-evaluability: a pragmatically supplied aspect of what is communicated 
is part of what is said just in case its contextually determined content is required for 
the utterance to be truth-evaluable (i.e. in order for it to express a proposition). 
The acknowledgment of unarticulated constituents leads to the third of our minimalist 
principles, which maintains that what is said includes only what is needed for an utterance to 
express a proposition. However both Carston and Sperber and Wilson have argued that even 
this principle is too strong (Carston 1988: Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995). Their case rests on 
examples like (16) and (17): 
(16) a. It will take some time to get there. 
b. The park is some distance from where I live. 
(17) I have had breakfast. 
Consider, to begin with, (16b). We can produce a truth-evaluable proposition simply by fixing 
the reference of 'I' and 'the park'. The proposition expressed by me with (16b) will be true just 
in case I do not live in the park-that is, as long as there is some distance, no matter how 
small, between where I live and where the park is. However, this will not normally be 
information of interest to my audience-in fact, it is not information that a speaker is likely to 
want to convey on any occasion, and on those occasions when a speaker does want to state 
that she doesn't live in the park she will likely do so simply by uttering (18): 
(18) I don't live in the park. 
Generally, (16b) will be used to convey that the park is further away than the audience thinks, 
or that it is too far for some proposed activity like walking there. Similar considerations apply 
to (16a), which will normally convey that it will take a significant amount oftime to get to the 
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destination, and (17), which generally conveys that one has had breakfast on the day of 
utterance, rather than that one has had breakfast at some time or other during ones life. 
Philosophers who subscribe to something like the principle of minimal truth-
evaluability will want to maintain that the proposition expressed by (16b) is simply the claim 
that there is some distance between the park and my house, and that everything else conveyed 
is mere implicature. Carston's view, in contrast, is that the restriction of the domain of the 
existential quantifier to a more specific group of distances is part of what is said (e.g., {x: x is 
greater than the audience's estimate of the distance}, or {x: x is to far to walk}). Her main 
objection to the view that the minimal proposition is what is said (in Carston's terminology, 
the explicature) by a use of (16b) is that on such a view the proposition expressed is 
cognitively inert: 
But what function then does the explicature have in the mental life of the hearer? It is 
entailed by the implicature: if the park is further away from my house than the hearer 
had been assuming, it follows that it is some distance or other from my house. When 
this entailment relation holds between putative implicature and explicature the 
probability of functional independence of the two propositional forms is very low. 
What the hearer is going to remember from this utterance is some estimate of the 
distance involved, not the fact that there is a distance, and any inferences he draws on 
the basis of the utterance will involve the proposition concerning this amount of 
distance, rather than the basic proposition concerning the existence of a distance, a 
truism which has long been an assumption he has subscribed to .... It's difficult to see 
any justification for a principle along the lines of 'use the maxims just in order to get a 
minimally truth-bearing vehicle'. This is to ignore the nature of communication and of 
cognition in general in the interests of a formal principle which has absolutely no 
bearing on human psychology (Carston 1988, 165). 
Advocates of the minimal truth-evaluability principle have two possible responses to this. The 
first is to simply maintain that facts about what the hearer remembers and what propositions 
play an inferential role in her mental life are simply irrelevant to the question of what is said. 
This objection is one I will take up in more detail subsequently. The second response, 
however, is to maintain that the simple existential claim that there is some distance or other 
between the park and the speakers house is not the minimal truth-evaluable proposition. 
How should this response be spelt out? Each of (16a), (16b), and (17) can be analyzed 
as quantifications-(16b), for example, quantifies over distances. One view of natural 
language quantification is that in general quantifiers require a domain of quantification to be 
contextually provided. The supposition that the domain is context-dependent is seen to 
explain why sentences like (19) are not normally taken to convey that everybody in the world 
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went to Auckland, but just that everybody in a certain contextually relevant group (e.g. the 
postgraduate students in the department) went to Auckland. 
(19) Everybody went to Auckland. 
Now, the minimal truth-evaluable proposition expressed by (16b) will only be the one which 
quantifies over all distances if we think that the natural language quantifiers come with a 
default domain-namely, the domain of everything-which is only constrained by the 
explicit content of the rest of the utterance (e.g. by the requirement that it be a distance). 
However, it is just as plausible an account of the quantifiers to maintain that their linguistic 
meaning specifies only that there be some domain or other, and that this domain must be 
supplied by context before any proposition can be expressed. On this view, (16b) only 
expresses a proposition once the domain is supplied, and this domain may well be the set of 
distances too far to walk, or some other contextually appropriate set-in general, the set of 
distances worth mentioning in a given context. 
This same approach to quantification can be applied to give the intuitively appropriate 
results for (16a), (16b), (17), and indeed (19) above. Unfortunately, it does not seem to be 
easily extensible to some other examples offered by Carston (1988, 165): 
(20) a. He ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped. 
b. I went to the exhibition and ran into John. 
c. She took the gun, walked into the garden and killed her mother. 
d. I had a holiday in Austria and did some cross-country skiing. 
In most contexts of utterance (20a) will convey that the subject jumped off the cliff, (20b), 
that John and I met at the exhibition, (20c) that she killed her mother with the gun in the 
garden, and (20d) that I skied while in Austria. However, in these cases it seems implausible 
that there is some slot which must be filled for each sentence to express a proposition. Rather 
the proposition conveyed seems to be the result of what Recanati calls free enrichment, a 
process whereby the minimally truth-evaluable content connected to an utterance (the one that 
results from saturation, i.e. filling the contextually sensitive slots) is enriched to become a 
more informative proposition. If this proposition is what is said, then not only will the 
principle of minimal truth-evaluability will be false, but minimalism towards what is said will 
also have to be abandoned. 
3.4 The independence principle 
As noted above, however, the attempt to accommodate the intuition that what is said 
by (16b) in a given context is that there is some contextually significant distance between the 
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speaker's house and the park, or for that matter the intuition that in uttering of (20a) one will 
generally say that the subject jumped off the cliff, is not the only response the advocate of 
minimalism can make. It is possible for an advocate of minimalism to simply maintain that 
what is said is the minimal truth-evaluable proposition and that facts about what the audience 
retains from the conversation, or what does inferential work for them, are neither here nor 
there. To evaluate this response we need to consider Carston's view in more detail. 
Carston begins her discussion with the observation that the undisputed cases of 
conversational implicature exhibit one important property in common-they do not overlap in 
propositional content with what is explicitly said by an utterance. Consider, for example, one 
of Grice's own examples: 
(21) A: Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days. 
B: He's been paying a lot of visits to N ew York. 
B's utterance uncontroversially implicates that Smith may have a girlfriend in New York, a 
claim which has truth conditions distinct from those of what B literally said. The same 
phenomena can be found in one of Carston's own examples: 
(22) A: Have you read Susan's book. 
B: I don't read biographies, 
which implicates both that Susan's book is a biography and that B hasn't read it. Both of these 
implications are independent of the explicit content of the utterance. The implicatures and the 
explicatures "occupy independent roles in the mental life of the hearer" and "function as 
autonomous premises in inferential interactions with other assumptions" (1988, 138). It is this 
feature of conversational implicatures, Carston suggests, which serves to distinguish them 
from pragmatically provided aspects of what is said. The independence principle, 
accordingly, says that 
(20): 
a putative implicature is actually part of what is said just in case its contextually 
determined content entails the minimally truth-evaluable content. 
Carston's main evidence for the independence principle is the sentences grouped under 
(20) a. He ran to the edge of the cliff and jumped. 
b. I went to the exhibition and ran into John. 
c. She took the gun, walked into the garden and killed her mother. 
d. I had a holiday in Austria and did some cross-country skiing. 
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In each case, it seems that the richer proposition-the one we intuitively identify as what is 
said--entails the weaker one which the minimalist takes to be what is said. Since the richer 
proposition entails the weaker one, the independence principle will rule that it is what is 
literally said by the utterance. The problem with this is twofold-first, the principle seems 
largely ad hoc. While it seemingly gives results in accord with our intuitions, there seems to 
be no independent reason why it should be true. Secondly, as Carston herself recognizes, it 
seems to allow too much to be built into what is said. Consider again B's utterance from (21): 
(21) B: He's been paying a lot of visits to New York. 
Now, we take the claim that Smith may have a girlfriend in New York to be one of the 
conversational implicatures of B's statement. But Carston's independence principle would 
seem to license treating (20) as what is explicitly said by B: 
(23) Smith's been paying a lot of visits to New York and he may have a girlfriend 
there. 
After all, since (23) entails B's utterance in (21), it seems that it could play any cognitive role 
that (21B) plays in the mental life of either A or B. What prevents us from using the 
independence principle to justify treating all of the conversational implicatures of an utterance 
as part of the explicit content of what is said? 
Carston's solution to this problem is to be found in Sperber and Wilson's relevance 
theory. One could, she notes, try to give an account of independence which allowed in the 
richer interpretations of the sentences in (20) but ruled out (23) (Carston 1988, 167-168), but 
she thinks that relevance theory provides a more satisfactory account for two reason. First, it 
allows a general, rather than ad hoc, account of the upper bound to the independence 
principle, and secondly, it provides support for the independence principle itself, thus 
answering the first criticism noted above. 
Relevance theory, as discussed above, cashes out Grice's maxim be relevant in terms 
of a notion of cognitive economy: the more cognitive effects an utterance has the more 
relevant it is, and the less processing power an utterance requires to be understood, the more 
relevant it is. What is wrong, on Carston's view, with treating (23) as the explicit content of 
B's utterance is that interpreting it as (23) wastes processing power. In order to retrieve (23) as 
the explicit content of B's words a hearer would have to go through the process of interpreting 
(21B) (i.e. reference assignment, etc.), followed by the process of arriving at the second 
conjunct ("he may have a girlfriend in New Y ork") in his attempt to make the utterance 
sufficiently relevant, and then conjoin the two to produce (23). This last cognitive act will 
take additional effort, thus decreasing the relevance of the utterance, without adding to the 
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cognitive effects (in fact, the hearer may then have to perform an and-elimination process in 
order to achieve the full set of cognitive inferences possible, thus doubling the extra labour). 
These same principles of cognitive economy are what provide independent support for the 
independence principle. In the case of (20a), the interpretation on which John jumped off the 
c1iffhas all the cognitive effects of the minimal proposition (without requiring extra steps like 
and-elimination) and additional effects besides-it is thus of greater relevance, and the extra 
cognitive effort required to process it is justified. In general, where the enriched proposition 
has all the cognitive effects of the minimal proposition without requiring redundant 
processing steps (such as and-introduction and elimination), the richer proposition will be 
more relevant, and it is this fact which Carston takes to support the independence principle. 
The first problem with the independence principle then is that its plausibility rests 
upon an acceptance of relevance theory. However, even if one accepts relevance theory the 
independence principle faces further difficulties. As we noted, the independence principle 
treats (17) uttered by me this morning as saying that I have had breakfast today because that 
proposition entails the minimal one expressed by (17). 
(17) I have had breakfast. 
However, as Recanati points out (Recanati 1989, 104), this same treatment cannot be applied 
to (24). 
(24) I haven't had breakfast. 
Uttered in the same circumstances as above, (24) is generally taken to say "I haven't had 
breakfast today." However, the independence principle doesn't support or explain this, as "I 
haven't had breakfast today" does not entail the minimal proposition expressed by (24)-
namely, that I haven't had breakfast ever. Similarly, "Every postgraduate student went to 
Auckland" does not entail "Everybody in the world went to Auckland", and yet in some 
circumstance the former will seem to be the right reading of (19). 
(19) Everybody went to Auckland. 
Not all of the propositions which result from the process of free enrichment have all the 
cognitive effects of the minimal proposition plus some of their own-in cases like (19) and 
(24) the cognitive effects of the enriched and minimal propositions are disjoint. The 
independence principle treats the parallel cases of (17) and (24) differently and so does not 
accomplish the task of accounting for when the results of free enrichment contribute to what 
is said. 
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3.5 The availability principle 
Given the failure of this attempt to accommodate the intuition that sometimes what is 
said goes beyond the minimal proposition expressed by an utterance we might be tempted to 
retain minimalism. However, Recanati (1989) argues that even if the minimal truth-
evaluability principle is the right one, it cannot be used as a test (a working criterion) for 
whether a pragmatically determined aspect of meaning is part of what is said (part of the 
semantic content of the utterance) or an implicature. 
The problem, as he sees it, is that the principle is a biconditional: it says that "a 
pragmatically determined aspect of meaning is part of what is said if and only if its 
determination is necessary for the utterance to express a complete proposition" (Recanati 
1989. 105). This means that in order to use the principle to determine whether a particular 
pragmatically provided aspect of meaning is part of what is said one has to already know 
what is needed for an utterance to express a complete proposition. However, as the discussion 
of quantificational domains in the previous section suggests, there will often be two 
competing accounts of the linguistic form of the utterance, and thus of the slots which need to 
be filled in order for it to express a proposition, each of which goes with a particular view 
about what the semantic content of the utterance is. Both accounts will be compatible with 
minimalism, as what they disagree about is what the minimal proposition is. The minimal 
truth-evaluability principle is only useful if one already has a complete semantic analysis of 
the sentence uttered, but if one has that one doesn't need the principle. 
Reflection on our actual processes, suggests Recanati, shows us that in general we 
start with some intuitions about what a sentence says in various contexts, and move from that 
to an account to one of what the sentence's linguistic meaning is. What is important to realize 
is that linguistic meaning is an abstract and theoretical entity, one to which we do not have 
direct access. What we do have direct access to is what is said by an utterance. Thus, Recanati 
disagrees substantially with Salmon, who suggests in the quotations above that at best what 
we have access to is what is conveyed by an utterance. Recanati would agree that we have 
access to what is conveyed (in his terminology, what is communicated), but he thinks it is a 
mistake to view what is conveyed as something above and beyond the conjunction of what is 
said and what is implied. 
We can better understand this disagreement by considering the following diagrams 
(adapted from Recanati 1989): 
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what is conveyed (communicated) 
what is said 
sentence meaning 
Figure 1 
what is implicated 
contextual elements needed to fill 
slots in sentence meaning. 
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In figure 1, representing Salmon's view, what is conveyed is the result of a final level of 
cognitive processing. Now, there is in general no reason to think that anything other than the 
result of the final step of the process of understanding an utterance will be consciously 
accessible. Accordingly, knowledge of what is said could be just as tacit as knowledge of 
sentence meaning. Every level other than what is conveyed will be properly seen as sub-
doxastic. In contrast, Recanati's view (represented in figure 2) sees what is conveyed as just 
another name for what is consciously accessible. 
What is conveyed 
(consciously accessib Ie) 
sub-doxastic 
Figure 2 
what is said 
sentence meaning 
what is implicated 
contextual elements needed 
to fill slots in sentence meaning. 
Since for Recanati what is said is consciously available to us, we can use that availability as a 
criteria for distinguishing implicatures from what is said: 
Availability: in deciding whether a pragmatically supplied aspect of what is 
communicated is part of what is said we should always attempt to preserve our pre-
theoretic intuitions on the matter. 
This is, he notes, what we have been doing all along anyway when we considered the viability 
of the other proposed principles. 
3.6 Theory and intuitions 
Why should we accept the availability principle? After all, isn't the distinction 
between s~mantically encoded and pragmatically imparted information something about 
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which, as Salmon and Soames suggest, there is widespread ignorance? Isn't it after all a 
technical theory, which shouldn't be held to the requirement that it match our intuitions on the 
matter? If we held physics to such a standard, one imagines the respondent saying, we never 
would have gotten this far in understanding the universe. 
There is of course a theoretical account under discussion here-the one which 
distinguishes between elements of what are said that are provided by the linguistic meaning 
and those provided pragmatically. And this account certainly should not be held hostage to 
our intuitions, as these regularly conflate the linguistic meaning of a sentence with the 
meanings of particular utterances. However, the distinction between what is said and what is 
implied is an ordinary distinction, one which Grice attempted to elucidate. As such, the theory 
explaining the difference between them is in part a theory explaining those very intuitions. 
We may go beyond our intuitions, Recanati notes (1989, 115), when we demonstrate that 
pragmatic processes similar to those which produce implicatures contribute to what is said. 
Nevertheless, we should not loose sight of those intuitions, he suggests, as this is: 
a very special field: in this field, our intuitions are not just a first shot at a theory-
something like Wittgenstein's ladder, which may be thrown away after it has been 
climbed up-but also part of what the theory is about, and as such they cannot be 
neglected (Recanati 1989, 115, italics in original). 
The peculiarity of the Salmon and Soames view, on this picture, would stem in part from the 
fact that an account of the semantic content of names is supposed to be an explanation of our 
use of names and intuitions about them, and yet it makes our actual use seem mysterious and, 
bizarrely, incorrect. 
As it stands however, very little has been said in favour of the availability principle. 
Certainly, on the model of linguistic processing Recanati offers it looks plausible, but why 
should his model be preferred to that in figure I? Similarly, we may accept that we need to 
explain our intuitive distinction between what is said and what is implied, but think that we 
can do so without identifying the ordinary notion of what is said with the semantic content of 
an utterance. We might explain it, for example, in terms of a distinction between two classes 
of merely implied (in our technical sense) information, one of which is combined with the 
semantic content of an utterance and identified with what is said, and one of which is 
identified with what is implied. On this account, our ordinary notion of what is said might be 
seen as an attempt to distinguish between semantic content (i.e., what is truth evaluable) and 
the merely implied, but one which misfired because of confusion of truth and assertibility. 
Indeed this version of the defense of the naIve view might be what Crimmins had in mind 
when he wrote: 
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it is not always transparent to us as competent language users whether our intuitions of 
incorrectness are really intuitions about truth or about propriety (Crimmins 1992, 4) 
Can anything be said about why the availability principle, and the hypothesis about linguistic 
processing that goes with it, should be preferred to its alternatives? 
3.7 Is the availability hypothesis defensible? 
One advantage of the availability hypothesis is that views guided by it will in general 
not be put in the position of saying that we are wrong about our own language. There is 
something very peculiar about saying that we collectively use our language wrong, though it 
is hard to explain just what this peculiarity amounts to. Also, there seems to be very little 
point to saying that we are mistaken in our use of language-those to whom the mistake is 
pointed out are not going to change their use of such locutions. Indeed, they will continue to 
misuse them-but now they will do so deliberately. 
Perhaps more significantly, it seems that even Salmon and Soames must accept some 
limited version of the availability hypothesis. After all, the account they wish to defend 
depends on taking some uses of names and our judgements about what is said with them as 
reflecting the right account of their semantic content. Further, it is hard to see how we could 
go about natural language semantics in any other way. How else might we identify the 
meanings and truth conditions of sentences other than by considering our intuitions about 
various possible cases? 
Some more substantial evidence in favour of the availability hypothesis can be found 
in the fact that we ordinarily find it relatively easy to explain the origins of conversational 
implicatures. In the Susan case, for example, one does not need a course in Gricean 
pragmatics or relevance theory in order to say quite a bit about what the implicatures are and 
how they relate to the uttered sentence. 
(22) A: Have you read Susan's book. 
B: I don't read biographies, 
These ease of accessibility of traditional conversational implicatures is quite mysterious to 
someone who subscribes to the model of figure 1, as they are not supposed to be consciously 
accessible. In contrast, Recanati's model makes their accessibility perfectly explicable. In 
suggesting that some cases are teaching cases, Saul was attempting to account for this 
phenomena, but this is not an adequate account. Why should any of the information about 
conversational implicatures be consciously available on the model of figure 1? In so far as the 
advocate of a figure 1 model allows that some information about what is said and what is 
implied is consciously available, they will be hard pressed to explain why only some is, and 
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may be forced back to Recanati's view. Thus, it seems that the availability view has the 
further advantage of not positing an ad hoc distinction between the accessible conversational 
implicatures and the inaccessible ones. It seems on balance that the availability view has the 
advantage and that in the absence of a compelling argument against, or a defense of any of the 
competing theories against the criticisms leveled against them, we should accept it. 
4. The pragmatics/semantics distinction 
In defending the naIve view Salmon and Soames emphasize the plausible claim that 
competent speakers of English and other natural languages may well be insensitive to the 
difference between pragmatically provided information and semantically provided 
information. However the success of this strategy in defending the naIve view's claim that 
what is literally said by (1) and (2) or (3) and (4) is the same depends upon the identification 
of pragmatically provided information with what is merely implied by an utterance. 
(1) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman came out. 
(2) Superman went into the phone booth and Superman came out. 
(3) Lois believes that Superman can fly. 
(4) Lois believes that Clark Kent can fly. 
Consideration of this aspect of the naIve view in light of actual theories about pragmatically 
conveyed information quickly shows that this identification will not do. Since aspects of what 
is said by an utterances are provided pragmatically, the identification of semantic content with 
what is semantically encoded (that is, the linguistic meaning) must be given up. We have two 
distinctions: that between what is said (semantic content) and what is implied; and that 
between the linguistic meaning and pragmatically provided information. On this account, 
even if we suppose that our intuitions about the various puzzle cases can be explained in 
terms of pragmatically imparted information, this is not sufficient to justify the naIve view's 
judgement that the intuitions do not concern what is literally said by the utterances in 
question. 
We need further reasons to think that the pragmatically imparted information posited 
by the naIve theory is not part of what is said. However, since our best candidate for a 
principled way to make such a decision is the availability principle, the strength of people's 
intuitions does provide good reason for thinking that the pairs differ in semantic content. In 
short, pragmatic theories do not provide the explanation that the naIve theory needs to make it 
plausible. 
This conclusion leaves us at an impasse. The naIve theory appeared to have the best 
chance of giving an account that accommodated and explained all the puzzles of chapter 
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three. Now that its theoretical foundation has been undermined we must find some other way 
to account for what is said by the various utterances. It is to this task that I now tum. 
206 
CHAPTER 7 
The new no-theory theory 
In this chapter I argue that the right conclusion to draw from the considerations of the 
earlier chapters is that no account of the semantic content of proper names can be given. I say 
more about what this means below, but the essence of the claim is that there can be no 
account of the relationship between the linguistic meaning of names or the referents of names 
and the context of the utterance that will provide what is needed for a compositional meaning 
theory for a natural language like English. In short, there can be no such theory. 
This description and the title of this chapter no doubt bring to mind the position put 
forward by Stephen Schiffer in Remnants of Meaning (Schiffer 1987). The resemblance is not 
accidental. However, there are important differences between his position and the one this 
chapter defends. Since the central claim made by Remnants of Meaning is that there is no 
correct compositional theory of meaning for natural languages like English, I should say a 
little more about the relationship between this argument and mine. The central problem for 
Schiffer is giving an account of the meaning of the predicate 'believes'. He maintains that the 
only account of this predicate compatible with a compositional semantics for English is to 
treat it as a relation. The majority of Remnants of Meaning is devoted to arguing that there are 
no appropriate objects for 'believes' to be a relation to and that there are no properties (in the 
ontologically significant sense) that correspond to predicates of the form 'believes that ~', 
though of course there are physical states that realize a particular belief that ~ (Schiffer 1987, 
chapter 6). The further suggestion made by Schiffer is that his arguments could be extended to 
show that there are a number of predicates in English to which no non-pleonastic properties 
correspond (Schiffer 1987, 71). 
On Schiffer's view the predicate 'believes' has no meaning which can be expressed in 
non-intentional language and no referent at all-there is no such relation. The analogous 
position for proper names would be to claim that there are no individuals corresponding to 
any of the names of a language like English. Such a view seems manifestly absurd. It is not 
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my view. There is a perfectly good sense in which the planet Venus corresponds to 'Hesperus' 
and 'Phosphorus', the individual MarilynINorma Jean corresponds to 'Marilyn Monroe' and 
'Norma Jean Baker' and the city Leningrad/St. Petersburg corresponds to 'Leningrad' and 'St. 
Petersburg'. One perfectly good name for this correspondence is 'reference'. In particular, the 
truth conditions of sentences containing these proper names are bound up with the various 
physical states of their referents. 
Finally, it is not part of the view defended here that there are no meanings. As is made 
clear in what follows the problem with proper names is that in some utterances we cannot 
specify their contribution to semantic content in any independent way-the only thing that 
unifies the circumstances in which those utterances are true is that they are circumstances in 
which those utterances are true. However, the fact that there is no property that all these 
circumstances share is no more a reason to think that the utterance is meaningless than, as 
Wittgenstein showed, is the fact that there is no property that all games share a reason to think 
that the word 'game' is meaningless. 
The problem, as I see it, is that there is no straightforward relationship between the 
linguistic meaning of a proper name (or its referent), the context of utterance, and the 
contribution of that name to the semantic content of utterance. As a consequence, we cannot 
specify a unitary semantic unit--even a context sensitive one-which can serve as a building 
block in a compositional semantics. Thus there cannot be a finite and complete compositional 
semantics for natural languages like English. 
In the rest of the chapter I proceed as follows. First I return to the examples of chapter 
four and draw out some of the consequences of the need to accommodate them at some level 
of our analysis of language. Secondly, I argue that there can be no treatment of proper names 
that provides the right semantic content in all contexts. I discuss the hitherto suppressed 
problem of empty names and note that similar considerations apply to other singular terms 
such as pronouns and demonstratives. I then show that this means that there can be no 
compositional meaning theory. Third, I discuss the arguments in favour of compositionally 
and conclude, with Schiffer, that they are largely unconvincing. I then take one final look at 
the claim that the naIve view is to be preferred to the no-theory account. Finally I argue that 
the claim that there is no substantive theory of the meaning of singular terms is not 
tantamount to giving up on the projects of the philosophy of language. 
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1. What do the simple sentences show? 
Traditionally the problems caused by co-referential names in propositional attitude 
contexts have promoted the view that the problems of co-reference are problems of ignorance 
of co-reference. What the simple sentences illustrate, however, is that sometimes it is the 
knowledge of co-reference that feeds the puzzles. Bringing the fact of co-reference, and the 
circumstances surrounding it, to the audience's attention allows the speaker to use the names 
in another way. Consider, for example, the following comment. 
St. Petersburg, known throughout the period of communist rule as Leningrad, is a 
changed city. Where Leningrad was a city of repressed religious sentiment, covered 
with the shadow of official atheism, St. Petersburg is alive with expressions of faith. 
The reader of this is under no doubt that while in the first sentence 'St. Petersburg' picks out 
the city throughout the 20th century (at least), the sense of the second sentence depends on the 
name referring to the post-communist temporal slice. What our attention should be called to 
however, is that this shift is accomplished by drawing the fact of co-reference to the readers 
attention, not by the ignorance of any party. 
This is one important limitation on any theory of proper names, as the existence of two 
proper names with the same reference, together with facts about the non-linguistic 
conventions which are the origins of the names, can make it pragmatically possible to use the 
names in previously unanticipated ways. Similar considerations apply to various characteristic 
or stereotypical properties associated with the bearers of proper names. It is easy to see how 
knowledge about a very well known person could be exploited in the use of the proper names 
with which they are associated. It is this that is going on in utterances like (1) (the second use 
of the name would no doubt be said with a slightly different emphasis). 
(1) Nixon didn't have to become Nixon. 
Nor are these sorts of utterances confined to names associated with public figures. I may well 
say to you, when you inquire about my dinner with our mutual friend Arthur, that he was very 
Arthur last night. My utterance depends on knowledge of Arthur, but it only need be shared 
among us. Bezuidenhout offers a similar example in which you and I share the belief that Jane 
is a timid, wimpy sort of person, and you are telling me a story in which she allows someone 
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to take advantage of her. If I ask why she didn't do anything to prevent this from happening, 
you might well reply with an utterance of (2). 
(2) Oh, you know, Jane is just Jane. 
What is interesting about this particular example is that our shared belief in Jane's wimpyness 
is utterly inessential. Even if I have never met Jane and have no beliefs at all about her 
character, an utterance of (2) in response to my query will still say that Jane is the sort of 
wimpy, timid person who allows people to take advantage of her. Similar examples arise in 
cases without identity, as in (3). 
(3) The U.S. Constitution gives Clinton the power to appoint Supreme Court justices. 1 
When a reporter utters (3) he is not claiming that the Constitution names Clinton, or that the 
authors of the Constitution had Clinton in mind. Instead, (3) is true just in case whoever is the 
president has the power to appoint Supreme Court justices. The phenomena also arises for 
pronouns, as can be seen in (4) and (5). 
( 4) You are entering Calgary. 
(5) We traditionally have a break before questions? 
When (4) is written on a road sign just outside Calgary it says something like: the 
appropriately positioned reader of this sign is entering Calgary, and an utterance of (5) by the 
chair of a seminar series does not refer to the group currently present but means something 
like: there is a tradition that there is a break between the speaker's talk and the question 
period. While (1)-(5) do not involve any anti-substitution intuitions, their semantic content, 
like that of examples from chapter four, cannot be captured by the singular or quasi-singular 
propositions that the competing contemporary views associate with them. 
I This example is an adaptation of one found in Nunberg (1993, 21) and discussed in Bezuidenhout (1997,384). 
2 These examples are adapted from those in Bezuidenhout (1997,384-385). 
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1.1 Is this just the referential/attributive distinction at work? 
One possibility that consideration of examples like (1)-(5) might bring to mind is that 
the distinction between referential and attributive uses applies to singular terms as well as 
definite and indefinite descriptions. This is the position taken on examples involving 
indexicals and demonstratives by Anne Bezuidenhout (1997). She argues that pronouns, 
descriptions (both indefinite and definite), and demonstratives are best seen as being 
semantically underdetermined. In order for sentences in which they occur to be interpreted 
pragmatic processes must be bought to bear on the utterance (Bezuidenhout 1997, 385). It is 
these processes which determine whether the proposition expressed is general or object-
dependent, and also what the content of the attributive uses is. Could we accommodate the 
problems with proper names by positing both referential and attributive uses? 
Unfortunately the distinction between referential and attributive uses will not 
accommodate all of the problematic cases. Consider Lydia's utterance of (6). 
(6) No ancient astronomers believed that Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
The difficulty of arriving at an account of the truth-conditions (or pragmatic implications) of 
(6) was precisely that there are no particular descriptions which putative counterexamples to 
(6) need to think apply to Venus, but not just any two descriptions will do. Even if we allow 
that the names in (6) are being used attributively, we will encounter the same difficulty as 
before if we attempt to determine what the content of that attribution is. Similar problems 
arise for the simple sentences. It was precisely because there is no description available that 
will allow for the right truth conditions in cases like (7) that Forbes and Moore were forced to 
resort to the notions of persona and aspects which serve as the referent of the name in these 
cases. 
(7) Clark went to the fancy-dress party as Superman. 
The difficulty might be expressed by saying that the propositions expressed by (7) and (6) 
would seem to be object-dependent, except that there is no appropriate object. 
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1.2 Linguistic and non-linguistic infonnation 
While the distinction between referential and attributive uses does not provide and 
account of all our problem cases, Bezuidenhout's observation that the linguistic meaning of 
pronouns, descriptions and demonstratives underdetennines their semantic content seems 
correct. The right moral to draw from the similarity between our problem cases and sentences 
like (3) is twofold-first, proper names are also semantically underdetennined, and second, 
non-linguistic infonnation is an essential ingredient in an understanding of what is said by 
utterances of such sentences. 
(3) The U.S. constitution gives Clinton the power to appoint Supreme Court justices. 
While (3) can be understood as an attributive use in which the name is going proxy for the 
property of being the president, in order to correctly understand what is said by the reporter's 
utterance of (3) the audience must have substantial non-linguistic infonnation. In particular, 
the audience must be in a position to know that the constitution is not the sort of document 
which would bestow powers on Clinton in particular, that Clinton is the president, and so on. 
Someone without the requisite infonnation is simply not in a position to understand the 
reporter's utterance. 
Similar considerations apply to (6). Neither Lydia nor her audience know what sorts of 
ways of thinking about Venus there are. But they do know that there are multiple ways to 
think of Venus such that it is not obvious that they are modes of presentation of the same 
thing. Furthermore, they know that the discovery of the identity is an astronomical 
discovery-----or more generally, a scientific discovery. The ability to recognize a scientific 
discovery (though not criteria for being one), is part of the knowledge that allows us (and 
Lydia) to recognize the seasonal-cycle astronomer as a counterexample. 
This emphasis on the role of extra-linguistic infonnation also helps to make sense of 
puzzles like Kripke's Paderewski (Kripke 1979). Peter hears Paderewski play the piano, and 
enjoys it very much. On account of this it seems that (8) is true. 
(8) Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent. 
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Nevertheless, when Peter later learns about Polish politics, his general belief that the pursuit 
of politics is incompatible with musical excellence seems to make (9) also true. 
(9) Peter disbelieves that Paderewski has musical talent. 
The puzzle is how to explain this without making Peter guilty of poor logic, for his difficulty 
(if there is one) is ignorance of Paderewski's multiple roles rather than logical ineptitude. One 
is tempted to think, as Kent Bach suggests, that neither (8) or (9) fully specify Peter's belief-
Peter believes that Paderewski the pianist had musical talent, but disbelieves that Paderewski 
the statesman had musical talent (Bach 1998). Bach's concern is that this will not be enough 
to specify the belief either-we can imagine that Peter has heard two recordings by 
Paderewski, one beautiful classical piece and one horrible jazz improvisation, and takes them 
to be by two pianists. Then we must say that Peter believes that Paderewski the classical 
pianist has musical talent, but disbelieves that Paderewski the jazz pianist has musical 
talent-and so on. As Bach puts it, it seems like "we can always say more, but ... can never 
say enough" (Bach 1998, section 3). When all the information we have is that Peter has heard 
Paderewski play we are able to treat (8) as expressing something determinate (and true). In 
light of further information, (8) no longer seems to have the same truth-value because it no 
longer seems to say the same thing-indeed, it becomes ambiguous, and the clarifying phrase 
is needed to fix the content of the attribution. 
Of course to comment on the role of non-linguistic information in understanding these 
utterances is not to explain what the semantic content of the name is in each case. Bach's 
observation-that we can never specify the content, but only characterize it-applies just as 
much to the case of Lydia and the astronomers and to the simple sentences. The reason we 
had so much trouble accounting for what appearances of the individual Clark/Superman count 
as 'Superman' appearances is that we can only characterize those appearances. That is, it is 
always possible to imagine a new counterexample, or to add an extra piece of information to 
the context. 
2. The semantic content of names 
The contemporary views differ widely on what the semantic content of a proper name 
IS. On the neo-Russellian views both the semantic content and the linguistic meaning of 
proper names are exhausted by their referent. The naIve theory and hidden-indexical accounts 
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differ over the linguistic meaning of the propositional attitude predicates. On their view 
linguistic competency requires knowing that for any simple sentence containing a proper 
name the proposition expressed is singular, and the contribution of the name is its referent? 
On the neo-Fregean account the linguistic meaning of a proper name can usefully be regarded 
as its referent, but its semantic content will always be a de re sense. On Recanati's indexical 
view the linguistic meaning of a proper name NN is composed of the description 'the thing 
called NN' and the stipulation that the truth conditions of the utterance are singular, and the 
semantic content is divided into the truth-conditional content-which is the referent of NN-
and the de re sense which enters into the proposition expressed by the utterance. 
This plethora of views resulted from the desire to accommodate two phenomena: (a) 
the behaviour of names in modal contexts; and (b) the opacity of propositional attitude 
contexts. As we have seen, none of the views easily extend to accommodate the wide variety 
of roles that proper names actually play. Nor does some third candidate other than the referent 
or a de re sense of the referent come easily to hand as an alternative. Consideration of the 
difficulties encountered by Forbes and Moore in accounting for the behaviour of Saul's simple 
sentences suggests that the kind of semantic content contributed by proper names varies from 
context to context and that sometimes it will be difficult, if not impossible, to specify what 
this content is in terms that are free from the use of the particular name in question. This later 
phenomena seems to arise when the content is not an individual or a property but is connected 
with features of our non-linguistic practices (e.g., our collective disposition to apply a name; 
our collective disposition to describe something as an scientific discovery). 
2.1 Index and content 
One aspect of the right way to accommodate this range of uses is to treat the referent 
of a proper name not as the semantic content but as an index for the semantic content of the 
name. Suppose that two child care workers are discussing the occupations of the mothers of 
their children they care for. One of them points to one of the children in the class and utters 
(10). 
3 Mastery of all proper names is not required for linguistic competence, so the competent speaker may not know 
what the referent is. That is, while the practice of naming is a linguistic phenomena, the fact that there is a 
practice of using 'Nicole' as a name for me is a non-linguistic fact. 
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(10) She's a banker.4 
Interpretation of (10) requires the audience to identify of the child, who is the index of the 
pronoun 'she' and then identify the child's mother, who is the referent.5 Similarly, 
interpretation of an utterance using the pronoun 'we' requires that the audience identify the 
speaker-who is the index-and then on that basis the group which is the referent of the 
pronoun. 
In the case of the first person pronoun the referent and the index usually coincide, but 
Bezuidenhout has noted that once we have the distinction between the index and the referent 
of the pronoun in hand we can easily interpret otherwise problematic utterances 
(Bezuidenhout 1997,403). Imagine that Clinton utters (11) at a press conference. 
(11) The U.S. constitution gives me the power to appoint Supreme Court justices. 
The semantic content of (11) is not any different from that of (3) when uttered by our reporter. 
(3) The U.S. constitution gives Clinton the power to appoint Supreme Court justices. 
In each case, the contribution of 'me' and 'Clinton' to the semantic content of their respective 
sentences is roughly that of 'the president, whomever he is'. In the case of (11) Bezuidenhout 
takes Bill Clinton to be the index of 'me' and the property of being the president to be the 
semantic content of 'me'. It seems natural to say that exactly the same phenomena is occurring 
in (3)-that 'Clinton' has both an index, which is Clinton himself, and semantic content, 
which is the property of being the president. 
If the referent of a proper name serves as the index, what is the relationship between 
the referent and the semantic content in a given context of utterance? In some cases the 
referent itself-or if you prefer a de re sense of it-will be the semantic content of the 
utterance. In cases like (3) and perhaps some cases of attitude attribution the semantic content 
will be a property or set of properties possessed by the referent, so that the name is being used 
4 This example is from Bezuidenhout 1997, 40l. 
5 The index is required even though we assume that the mother is known to the child care workers and that the 
proposition being expressed is an object-dependent one concerning the mother rather than the proposition 
expressed by: that child's mother is a banker. 
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attributively. However, in many cases the relationship and the semantic content itself will be 
much more complicated. 
2.2 Unspecifiable content 
What is common to the simple sentences and the case of Lydia and the astronomers is 
that even when we allow that the semantic content of the name (or the content traceable to the 
use of the name) is more than just its referent it is very difficult to specify what the additional 
content is. In Lydia's case the possibilities of ignorance and idiosyncrasy frustrated attempts 
to specify it in terms of either her intentions or her dispositions. In the case of utterances such 
as (12) we faced related difficulties. 
(12) Superman is more successful with women than Clark Kent. 
In order to give the right truth conditions we found ourselves forced to posit the existence of 
aspects of the individual Clark/Superman that were more than just ways of thinking of an 
individual, since they must be able to walk, be successful with women, etc. Putting aside 
whatever metaphysical worries we might have, the biggest problem with the proposals 
exploiting this device was that they can only accommodate the use of sentences like (12) by 
the enlightened utterer. Those not in the know are, because of their ignorance, unable to form 
the requisite intentions. Jennifer Saul has pointed out the peculiarity of an account on which 
"the people most likely to utter [(12)], the unenlightened, are the ones who cannot utter it 
truthfully" (Saul 1999c, 108). Even more problematically, advocates of this sort of view are 
forced to explain our intuition that (12) and (12*) say something different in unenlightened 
contexts in terms of pragmatic features (if at all) while simultaneously defending the view that 
the same intuition about enlightened contexts must be treated at the level of semantics. 
(12*) Superman is more successful with women than Superman. 
Just as in the case of Lydia, it is partly the ignorance of the unenlightened utterer of (12) that 
seems to prevent us from ascribing the right content. There is in these cases however the 
additional problem of specifying what that content is. There seems to be nothing that unifies 
'Superman' appearances of Clark/Superman than our inclination to use 'Superman' in 
connection with them-but we all agree on which are the 'Superman' cases. 
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The right thing to say about these cases seems to be that sometimes our practice of 
using a particular proper name may not reflect any genuine properties. There may be no way 
to specify the content of the name without using the name itself because there is no content-
only the practice of using the name in this way. Of course we can go some way to explaining 
our use of particular names by explaining about the double life of the individual or the 
noncontiguous appearances of the object or the political origins of the names of the city. 
However telling this story does not serve to give the content of the name, though it may well 
allow someone become competent with the name. Similarly, understanding that there are two 
names for Venus and that the discovery that they named the same planet was an astronomical 
one is enough to enable Lydia to utter (6) and communicate that the seasonal-cycle 
astronomer would be a counterexample, but it is not enough to allow us to specify the content 
of her uses ofthe proper names. 
(6) No ancient astronomers believed that Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
The ability to use a proper name correctly seems to come with the ability to say how it 
would be used if some hitherto unknown identity came to light. Suppose that the philosopher 
Saul Kripke turned out to having been living an alternate life under an elaborate disguise as 
the philosopher David Lewis. In the long run the use of the two names might die off.6 In the 
short term however, none of us would have difficulty in distinguishing Lewis appearances 
from Kripke appearances. Nor would we give up our judgement that an article containing (13) 
and (14) was accurate, though we might wonder what the individual Lewis/Kripke actually 
thought. 
(13) Lewis advocates modal realism. 
(14) Kripke does not advocate modal realism. 
In the case of the Superman/Clark Kent examples, it is Lois's mastery of the names-and thus 
her ability, upon being enlightened, to continue to use the names in distinct ways and in 
accord with our enlightened use-that allows us to understand her utterance of (12) and her to 
understand our utterance of (12). 
6 I suspect it wouldn't. The use of both names would continue to be useful precisely because it would enable us 
to say things like (13) and (14), the expression of which would otherwise become laborious. 
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In short, language users are possessed of all sorts of extra-linguistic abilities and 
knowledge that allow them to identify what is said by a particular utterance and what is meant 
by a particular use of a name. In each case, what is said and what is meant will be highly 
context sensitive. The same sentence can say different things as a result of small changes in 
the context of utterance. One result of this is that unless an example includes, per impossibile, 
a full specification of the context, there is always the possibility that the addition of more 
information will result in a changed intuition about the truth value of a particular utterance. 
The problem posed by the Paderewski case-that we can always say more-is a result of this. 
The problem is not so much that we cannot specify what belief is ascribed to Peter in any 
given case, but that we can always imagine slight modifications to the context. These changes 
in context result in the utterance having slightly different semantic content. It is only if we 
assume that what is said by an utterance of (8) is not context sensitive (or not this context 
sensitive) that the Paderewski case is puzzling. 
(8) Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent. 
In some cases there will be no semantic content as we normally understand it, though 
it will be possible to say what kinds of ways the world could be would make it true and what 
kinds would make it false. One way to describe the situation would be to say that the truth 
making circumstances share a family resemblance rather than a particular property or set of 
properties. The content of the utterance is this family resemblance rather than a description of 
necessary and sufficient conditions. 
2.3 Singular terms 
In chapter four I discussed a number of cases (due to Bezuidenhout) of utterances 
involving demonstratives where anti-substitution intuitions parallel to those involving names 
arise. Indexicals like pronouns and demonstratives also exhibit the same sorts of 'attributive' 
uses as can be found in proper names, as is illustrated by the parallelism of (3) and (11) 
(Bezuidenhout 1997: Nunberg 1992). 
(3) The U.S. constitution gives Clinton the power to appoint Supreme Court justices. 
(11) The U.S. constitution gives me the power to appoint Supreme Court justices. 
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We can also find cases like the 'Jane is just Jane' case, as when we utter (13), and perhaps also 
(14). 
(13) She is who she is. 
(14) She isn't herself.7 
This parallelism suggests that other singular terms exhibit precisely the same behaviour as 
proper names. There is a temptation to regard the relationship between an indexical and the 
content of a particular use as a function from context to content. This view is encouraged by 
focus on the first person singular pronoun as a model for all indexicals. The actual state of 
affairs is that the move from the linguistic meaning of the indexical to the referent is a highly 
pragmatic affair which depends upon the possession of non-linguistic information. 
This can be seen by considering an example of use of the first person plural drawn 
from a biology text. 
(15) We do not know much about this part of the brain, which plays such an important 
part in our lives, but we will see in the next chapter .... 8 
In each case the pronoun picks out a group of which the speaker is a part, but in each case a 
different group-the scientific community, humanity in general, and the reader and writer. 
Knowing which group is relevant to which token of the first person plural requires knowing 
who are the primary producers of knowledge about the brain, whose lives the brain plays an 
important role in, that members of the academic community often adopt a 'tour-guide' 
convention for text books, and that the speaker-the index-is a member of these groups. 
Once the role of non-linguistic information in determining the semantic content of 
both names and indexical is acknowledged, it seems clear that Bezuidenhout's puzzles about 
demonstratives are genuinely analogous to the simple sentence puzzles involving names. In 
each case we may have difficulty specifying the semantic content of either the singular term 
7 It's not entirely clear what view we should have about the pronouns 'herself, 'itself and 'himself, as they are 
often used for emphasis rather than as singular terms, as in 'The Pope himself visited her'. 
8 This example is taken from Nunberg 1993, who reports having taken it from a biology text but does not cite the 
source. 
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or the utterance as a whole, but we can nevertheless recognize the situations in which the 
utterance is true. 
2.4 Fictional contexts 
The ability to provide an account of apparent reference to non-existents, particularly 
that of fictional names, is sometimes regarded as a litmus test for any account of the semantics 
of proper names (e.g., Proudfoot 1998). However it is important to note that there are not one 
but three discrete problems connected with ordinary talk about fictions. The first problem is to 
explain why it is that sentences like (16) are not, given the absence of a referent for 'Emma 
Woodhouse', meaningless. 
(16) Emma Woodhouse was a bad matchmaker. 
Call this the semantic problem. Solutions to this problem are further constrained by the need 
to account for negative existential statements like (17). 
(17) Emma Woodhouse doesn't exist. 
The second problem is to explain why it is that, given they are not meaningless, (18) seems 
false but (19) seems to be indeterminate. 
(18) Mr. Knightley had three heads. 
(19) Mr. Knightley wore a hat on the day Emma was born. 
After all, neither issue is directly addressed in Jane Austen's Emma. Call this the content 
problem. The third problem is to explain our reference to the entities of literary criticism in 
sentences like (20) and (21). 
(20) Emma is Jane Austen's most interesting character. 
(21) Emma is the most realistic of Austen's female characters. 
Call this the criticism problem. 
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Of course these three problems are related to one another, and some proposed 
solutions give the answer to more than one. For example, one might maintain that utterances 
like (16) are implicitly prefixed with a conditional, so that something like (16a) represents the 
true logical form of (16). 
(16a) If Emma was a true record of events then Emma Woodhouse would have been a 
bad matchmaker. 
This sort of solution is easily generalized to accommodate (20), which would thus have a 
logical form somewhat like (20a).9 
(20a) If all of Jane Austen's novels had been true records of events, Emma would have 
been the most interesting person described by those histories. 
However, while this sort of solution also provides a paraphrase of (19), it does not explain 
why it seems to have an indeterminate truth value-after all, if Emma was a true record of 
events then Knightley would have to have either worn a hat or not on the day in question. 
Similarly, an account which explains an utterance like (21) by positing the existence of 
abstract entities-namely fictional characters-will still need to say more about sentences like 
(16), (17), (18) and (19). 
It is surely not a requirement of a semantic theory of names that it give a full and 
complete answer to all of these problems. What is required of a theory of proper names is 
twofold. First, it must accommodate whatever are the correct solutions to the content and 
criticism problems. That is, it must allow the proper names in (18), (19), (20) and (21) to have 
whatever content the correct accounts of truth in fiction and ontological commitment in 
literary criticism require. Secondly, it must provide an answer to the semantic problem. 
However, this answer must itself be somewhat schematic, as the content of sentences like (16) 
will themselves be constrained by the correct answer to the content problem. My strategy in 
the rest of this section is to show that the no-theory account of proper names provides an 
approach to the semantic content of names that is compatible with various popular approaches 
9 I am not suggesting that this provides an adequate account of all of the sorts of claims made by literary 
critics-indeed, I do not think that this particular approach to the problems can get off the ground. The point is 
merely that the problems, while closely related, are not just aspects of the same problem. 
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to the problems of content and criticism. The discussion makes clear that the strategies used 
are perfectly general, and thus that the no-theory account will be compatible with whatever 
turns out to be the correct treatment of these issues. 
2.4.1 Creatures of fiction 
Peter van Inwagen has argued that literary criticism-in particular sentences like 
(2l)-commits us to the existence of abstract entities (van Inwagen 1977; 1983). These 
entities, which include characters in novels, plots, sub-plots, novels (but not copies of novels), 
episodes, digressions, and the like, are the theoretical entities of literary criticism. That is, we 
are in van Inwagen's view committed to the existence of these entities if we endorse any 
literary criticism as literally correct, just as an endorsement of contemporary physics as (by 
and large) correct commits us to the existence of various theoretical entities of physics 
(quarks, black holes, and the like). 
Among the theoretical commitments of literary criticism are what van Inwagen dubs 
creatures of fiction: which include characters in novels, fictional places, and entities like the 
Lady of Shalott and Moriarty's book The Dynamics of an Asteroid. These entities are abstract, 
but they genuinely exist. It is this sort of entity that is referred to by 'Emma' in sentences like 
(20) and (21). 
(20) Emma is Jane Austen's most interesting character. 
(21) Emma is the most realistic of Austen's female characters. 
'Emma', and other fictional names are special not because they do not name anything, but 
because they name abstract entities. 
This solution to the criticism problem does raise a problem for utterances like (16) 
(18) and (19), since if 'Emma' and 'Mr Knightley' are the names of theoretical entities of 
literary criticism they must all be false. Such entities do not make matches (well or badly), 
have heads (of any number) or wear hats (at any time). van Inwagen suggests that we solve 
this problem by positing that while creatures of fiction do not have the properties ascribed to 
them in such utterances, they do bear another relation to those properties-that of holding. A 
creature of fiction holds a certain property $ just in case $ is ascribed to that creature in a 
work of fiction or any part of a work of fiction (van Inwagen 1977, 305-306). Utterances of 
(16), (18) and (19) are false if they are taken to claim that the characters in question have or 
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exemplify the properties in question, but they may be true if we read them as merely claiming 
that a character holds certain properties. One important feature of relation of holding is that it 
is possible to hold incompatible properties or to fail to hold both a property $ and its negation, 
which allows van Inwagen to explain the apparent indeterminacy of (19). 
This by itself is not a complete solution to the content problem, since it cannot account 
for the apparent truth of (22) 
(22) Mr. Knightley had one head. 
Jane Austen simply never saw fit to mention how many heads Knightley had. 1o However, 
whatever its flaws it is clear that the no-theory theory can accommodate the view that fictional 
names refer to creatures of fiction, since on this view they are simply another kind of entity 
which can be named. Moreover, those who endorse van Inwagen's solution to the criticism 
problem but reject his approach to the content problem will also find support from the no-
theory theory, since they may maintain that in (20) and (21) 'Emma' is used to name the 
character without being committed to the claim that the name serves the same function in 
(16). 
2.4.2 Make-believe 
One account of truth in fiction that is particularly popular among those eager to reduce 
our ontological commitments is that developed by Kendall Walton (1978). Walton 
distinguishes between two kinds of fictional truths-those that we will call stipulated truths, 
and those that we will call generated truthS. 11 Consider a simple fiction-a child's mud pie 
game. In such a game it is stipulated as part of the make-believe that globs of mud are pies, 
and that a certain orange crate is an oven. Given these stipulations there are principles linking 
the actual properties of globs of mud to the make-believe properties of pies. Accordingly, 
actual facts---e.g., that the glob of mud has been in the orange crate for twenty minutes-will 
10 van Inwagen claims that ascription must be taken as a primitive relation because of various difficulties which 
arise when we attempt to give an account of it (van Inwagen 1977, 306-307). Perhaps given this he would 
maintain that the absence of any sentence mentioning the number of heads Knightley had does not mean that 
Emma does not ascribe the property of having one head to him. 
11 Walton describes the first as what we imagine and the second as consequences of principles covering the 
fiction in question (Walton 1978, 10-11). 
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generate make-believe truths--e.g., *the pie has been in the oven for twenty minutes* (Here I 
use Walton's device of writing 'P is make-believe true' as *P*). As Gareth Evans points out, 
this make-believe truth may then generate further make-believe truths through its interaction 
with true counterfactuals (Evans 1982, 354-355). Thus, given that it is true that if this object 
was a pie and that one an oven and the first had been in the second for twenty minutes then 
the first object would be burnt, it follows that *the pie in question is burnt* . 
Walton's idea is that this approach to the make-believe game can be extended to cover 
all cases of fiction. Thus what makes (16) true, (18) false, and (19) indeterminate is on his 
view the combination of the stipulated truths and generating principles for realistic novels. 
(16) Emma Woodhouse was a bad matchmaker. 
(18) Mr. Knightley had three heads. 
(19) Mr. Knightley wore a hat on the day Emma was born. 
In order to properly evaluate this view as a solution to the problem of content we would have 
to attempt to actually spell out these principles and see if they could provide the correct 
division of statements into the fictionally true, the fictionally false, and the fictionally 
indeterminate. However given our purpose this sketch of the view is adequate. 
Evans used Walton's approach to the content problem as part of his own account of the 
semantics of fictional names (Evans 1982, chapter ten). Evan's view is roughly this. When we 
participate in fictions we are exposed to information in some form or another. It may be the 
images produced in a film, or the perceptual experience of a known illusion or that reported 
by the text of a novel. And that information will appear to be information about things. The 
image projected on the screen in theater appears to be an image of an alien, and the sentences 
in the novel appear to report information about people. Given this information it is possible 
for us to behave as if it was veridical. Thus I may gesture at the rock upon which my 
perceptions suggest there is a diminutive biped and say 'that's an elf. In Evan's view my 
doing so makes it fictionally true that 'that' refers to the elf on the rock. What guarantees this 
is the truth of the following counterfactual: if the perceptual information I was receiving was 
really caused by an elf on the rock, then 'that' would have referred to him (Evans 1982, 360-
365). We may extend this account to the case of names by noting that we make as if to fix 
(learn) the reference of the name, and thus generate fictional truths that they do refer. 
These fictional truths create the genuine serious truths that (16) and the like seem to 
express when we exploit the make-believe or fictional truths: 
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any of the games of make-believe we have been discussing can be exploited in the 
making of serious statements about the game, and about what is make-believedly the 
case within it. One makes such a statement by *making a statement* (i.e. making a 
move within the game), but in such a way as to manifest the intention that what one 
does should really be up for assessment as correct or incorrect (i.e. really correct or 
really incorrect) according to whether or not *the statement one makes is correct or 
incorrect*. Thus the speaker says something absolutely true or false by *saying 
something true* or *saying something false* (Evans 1982, 363-364). 
Evans describes the use of names and demonstratives in this way-that is, as if they had a 
referent-as a conniving use. On the no-theory view however, this use would be merely one 
more among many. What it would share with the others is the role of contextually provided 
information in determining what is said. In order to understand the utterance I must bring to 
bear both my knowledge of the fictional nature of the information on which my understanding 
of the name is based and the pragmatically provided information that the speaker intends his 
utterance to be really up for assessment as true or false. 
In other words, if the Walton/Evans approach to the content problem is right, then on 
the no-theory theory what ensures that utterances like (16) are meaningful is the context 
sensitivity of names. I am not in a position to understand what is said by an utterance of (16) 
unless I know that Emma Woodhouse is not real. Indeed in this case (though perhaps not in 
all) it seems reasonable to say that I have not mastered the name 'Emma Woodhouse' unless I 
know this. Given this information however I am in a position to recognize that the 
contribution made by the name to the utterance in which it occurs is not, as it were, real 
semantic content, but only make-believe semantic content, and that the actual truth of the 
utterance depends on the make-believe truth of the proposition that the sentence make-
believedly expresses. Its worth noting in this respect that the make-believe content of a 
fictional name would not be limited to its make-believe referent. If in a (realistic) film the 
character who is president of the United States uttered (11), the no-theory account would 
accommodate the fact that the content to be evaluated for make-believe truth would be that of 
(23). 
(11) The U.S. constitution gives me the power to appoint Supreme Court justices. 
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(23) The U.S. constitution gives the president the power to appoint Supreme Court 
justices. 
2.4.3 Negative existentials 
As I mentioned earlier the semantic problem-the problem of how fictional names can 
contribute semantic content to the utterances in which they occur-is closely associated with 
the problem of accounting for the meaning of negative existential sentences like (24). 
(24) Santa Claus doesn't exist. 
How does the no-theory theory account for these sorts of utterances? 
First of all, it is worth pointing out that despite the popularity of these sorts of 
sentences with philosophers they are actually slightly unusual. l2 In ordinary conversation one 
would be much more likely to utter (24a). 
(24a) There is no Santa Claus. 
Why does this matter-after all, doesn't the (a) sentence say just the same thing as the 
original? The right answer to this is yes, it does, but considering the more natural versions of 
the sentence can give us a better idea of what is being said by means of it. In particular, I 
think it is no coincidence that (24a) has a form that is also the perfectly natural one to use 
when claiming that nothing satisfies a definite description, as in (25), or that there are no 
exemplars of a particular property, as in (26). 
(25) There is no present king of France. 
(26) There are no orange ravens. 
12 We do occasionally use sentences like (a) and (b). 
(a) Santa Claus doesn't really exist. 
(b) Emma Woodhouse isn't real. 
These seem to be tantamount to saying that Santa Claus and Emma are fictional characters, which lands us in the 
criticism problem again. 
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That is, it is a familiar locution for denying that a particular property is instantiated. This 
suggests that in (24a) the semantic content provided by 'Santa Claus' is not a fictional 
character or an indication that it is make-believe truth that is to be evaluated, but a description 
(presumably a characteristic one that is easily recovered by those familiar with the use of the 
name 'Santa Claus'). This of course is easily accommodated by the no-theory account, since it 
all ready acknowledges that the semantic content contributed by a name is sometimes a 
description. Furthermore, this is perfectly compatible with whatever is the correct account of 
the problems of content and criticism, since the whole point of the no-theory account is that 
the semantic content of names is context sensitive. 
2.4.4 Information and indexes 
In my discussion of the contrast between the index of a term and its semantic content I 
suggested that the index of a proper names was its referent. However, this cannot be quite 
correct, as the case of fictional names shows. Just as an ordinary name is associated with a 
referent, a fictional name is associated, by similar non-linguistic convention, with a body of 
'information'-whether mythological or literary or fiction of another sort. Mastery of these 
names will require a certain familiarity with the information in question-just as mastery of 
ordinary names requires a certain familiarity with the referent. Whether or not that mastery 
requires knowing that there is no referent depends to some extent on the kind of fiction 
involved. It is worth remarking that even the sketchiest knowledge of the referent of an 
ordinary name is enough to allow some use of the name, though perhaps not enough to 
understand every use of it. 
Cases of fiction are not the only ones which suggest that the index of a name is not its 
referent. Some of the problematic simple sentences also indicate this. It may still be helpful to 
think ofthe process of understanding utterances of (12) or (27) as involving the recognition of 
the indexes of the terms 'Superman' and 'St. Petersburg', but given the possibility of 
unenlightened use this index cannot be the referent. 
(12) Superman is more successful with women than Clark Kent. 
(27) I've never been to Leningrad, but I visited st. Petersburg last week. 
(Given the context, I remind the reader that for our purposes the Superman story is to be 
treated as fact.) That is understanding an utterance of (12) does not require that hearer 
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correctly identify the referent and then (via pragmatic processes) the content. Instead the 
hearer must correctly identify the practice of sometimes using the term 'Superman' to pick out 
a particular group of appearances of the individual Clark/Superman. Since all that may unify 
these appearances is the practice of using 'Superman' to pick them out, it seems more 
plausible to think that the index is the naming practice. This has the further advantage of 
being something both enlightened and unenlightened users of the names in question are 
competent with. Fictional names and ordinary names are thus not really two separate kinds. If 
an account like that of Walton is correct then fictional names will not be able to be used to 
express a true object-dependent proposition, but in any case the practice of using the name is 
just as able to serve as an index as in the case of an ordinary name. 
On a treatment of proper names on which it is recognized that the contribution of the 
name to the semantic content of an utterance is both context sensitive and on occasion can not 
be specified but only characterized in terms of our practice of using the name, the case of 
fiction~l names does not present a discrete problem. Fictional names are neither meaningless 
nor a different kind of linguistic item than ordinary names. It is the non-linguistic practices 
and facts that differ. 
2.5 Underdetermination 
The claim that the linguistic meaning of proper names underdetermines their semantic 
content is a central component of the no-theory account of proper names. I now want to say a 
little more about what this underdetermination amounts to. I will begin by discussing 
Bezuidenhout's analogous claim for descriptions of the form 'the F is Gil. 
Bezuidenhout suggests that the unitary linguistic meaning for definite descriptions can 
be analyzed as (Bezuidenhout 1997, 394;397): 
[[Feature F is instantiated <uniquely/accessibly> by an X which has feature G]]. 
This incomplete representation needs to be contextually completed. Pragmatic processes will 
determine whether the proposition expressed is general or object-dependent (Bezuidenhout 
1997, 394). There are a couple of points that should be noted. First of all, the proviso that the 
referent be either the unique F or the accessible F is not necessarily part of the content of the 
utterance, but instead encode procedures for identifying the referent in the context 
(Bezuidenhout 1997, 397. If the proposition expressed is a general one then additional 
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features may be added to the description in order to secure uniqueness. Suppose that we 
witness a riot at a school, and I utter (28). 
(28) The principal should call the police. 
The accessible principal is the principal of the school at which the riot occurs. Thus, if I am 
taken to be uttering a general rather than object-dependent proposition, my utterance will have 
the content of 'the principal of this school should call the police'. Secondly, the existential 
presupposition is not built into the analysis but the inference to the existence of the F will be 
made unless there is reason to do otherwise-e.g., if the context is a fictional one or the 
description is inside the scope of a appropriate modal operator then the inference will be 
blocked (Bezuidenhout 1997, 394). 
Bezuidenhout's analysis is intended to provide an explanation of the wide range of 
propositions that can be expressed using descriptions without positing any ambiguity at the 
level of linguistic meaning. The different semantic content arises as a result of the pragmatic 
processes which operate on the linguistic meaning, and the outcome of these processes is not 
determined by the linguistic meaning, but merely constrained by it. 
The account of proper names that I am advocating has a similar desideratum-an 
account of the linguistic meaning of names that allows particular uses of them to vary widely 
in their contribution to the semantic content of the utterances in which they occur. Unlike the 
case of definite descriptions, however, it is unclear that there is any analysis of the linguistic 
meaning of names to be had. As Russell observed, descriptions possess a common structure 
and parts which affect the linguistic meaning of the whole. In the case of proper names 
however, there in no unifying structure and it seems, no one thing that the competent user of 
the name must know beyond that the name is used to talk about whatever has that name. This 
might tempt you to think that names have no linguistic meaning at all, and it is certainly part 
of the inspiration behind the view that the meaning of a name is exhausted by its referent. 
However, while there may be no fact which every user of the name must know, there 
is an ability which one must possess in order to use a name-vis-a-vis, the ability to identify 
the referent. (I here use the term loosely to cover both the cases where there is an individual 
which is the referent and the cases where there is only a practice of using the name thus and 
so.) This need not be the ability to recognize the referent myself. Consider this example from 
Jackson (1998b). Suppose I read in the newspaper about Smith being robbed in Washington 
yesterday. I cannot identify Smith by appearance-there is no picture accompanying the 
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story-and I certainly cannot assume that there was just one person called 'Smith' who was 
robbed in Washington yesterday. Nevertheless I do know how to identify him in principle (in 
practice it might be very hard). I know that the Smith I refer to when I report on the robbery to 
you or a friend is whichever Smith was the causal origin of the report in the newspaper 
(Jackson 1998b, 7). 
Consequently, if the Smith whose report that he was robbed was the causal origin of 
the story turned out to be committing insurance fraud we would say that Smith wasn't robbed 
at all, and if the reporter turned out to have fabricated the story we would say that there was 
no Smith (and here the name would contribute some description to the content of the 
utterance). Jackson discusses the case where there were several robberies of people named 
Smith and the reporter mixed them up, so that the story wasn't entirely about any of them. His 
suggestion is that here we would lose the intuition that I refer at all (Jackson 1998b, 8). My 
intuition is also that in this case we would simply withdraw the utterance. Thus whether we 
say the utterance is false or meaningless will be a theoretical choice. My view is that in this 
case the speaker intends to express an object-dependent proposition about the causally 
relevant Smith and that when he turns out not to exist she discovers that she has (in some 
sense) not said anything at all. 
Thus my view is roughly that the linguistic function of proper names (meaning being 
an odd word to use here) is to make the naming practice salient to the process of 
interpretation,13 and competency with a name consists in having some means of identifying 
the referent. 14 The contribution made to what is said by this particular use of the name-i.e., 
its semantic content-will then be worked out by pragmatic means. However, as in the case of 
descriptions this content is merely constrained, not determined, by the naming practice in 
question. As the Clinton example shows, I may need to know more than this about the 
13 There is thus some sense in which I agree with the claim that the linguistic meaning of a name NN is 'the thing 
called NN'. I have avoided this formulation because it suggests that names come with the guarantee or the 
presupposition that there is some thing, in the metaphysically significant sense, that they are names of. 
14 The first use of a name may serve to create this means, as when I utter a sentence like 'My friend Sara has a 
son' to someone who has never heard of Sara before. My sentence creates the knowledge that Sara could be 
identified by asking me. While on this point it is worth noticing that the only context in which it is acceptable to 
introduce a name without either an adjective of some sort or a descriptive phrase is in fiction. I may start a novel 
with the sentence 'Sara had one son', but should I utter it in conversation with people who were not already 
familiar with the name my audience would rightly interject with 'Who's Sara?' Presumably this is because the 
description 'one of the characters in this book' is available to any reader of the novel. 
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referent (again used in the loose sense) of a name in order to understand a given utterance 
using the name. 
3. Compositionality 
The quest to identify the contribution of proper names to the semantic content of the 
utterances in which they appear is partly driven by the goal of giving a compositional 
semantics for natural language. Compositionality is often explained by means of the truism 
that the meaning of a sentence is determined by the meanings of its constituent expressions. 
This is often all those who invoke the principle of compositionality have to say about it. 
Nevertheless, it is as it stands too vague to be helpful. For our purposes we will need to 
tighten things up considerably. First of all we need to distinguish between two different 
readings of 'meaning' in the sentence above. It could, in the first instance, be a claim about the 
linguistic meaning of an sentence, as in (CLM). 
(CLM) The linguistic meaning of a sentence is determined by its syntax and the 
linguistic meanings of its constituent expressions. 
That is, the rule for determining the linguistic meaning of a sentence needs only the linguistic 
meanings of the parts as inputs. Alternatively, it could be a claim about the semantic content 
of a given utterance of a sentence, as in (CSC). 
(CSC) The semantic content of an utterance is determined by its syntax and the 
semantic contents of its constituent expressions. 
I want to distinguish between (CLM) and (CSC) because I think the failure to do so can lead 
to implicit reliance on hybrid principles that equivocate on the meaning of 'meaning'. 
However, these two principles are also truisms-it is certainly the case that the semantic 
properties of complex expressions depend in some way of the semantic properties of their 
parts. 
The substantive thesis that is often invoked under the name 'compositionality' is the 
claim that natural language have what we shall call a compositional meaning theory. A 
language has a compositional meaning theory iff the meaning of its complex expressions are 
determined, in a way which could be spelt out by finite means, by its syntax and the meanings 
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of its constituent expressions. IS Here again we must distinguish between a language having a 
compositional theory of linguistic meaning (CTLM) and a compositional theory of semantic 
content (CTSC). Notice that in each case the appropriate principle of compositionality could 
be true for a language which fails to have a compositional meaning theory. 
The requirement that a compositional theory of semantic content (linguistic meaning) 
be finitely expressible combined with the fact that there are potentially infinitely; many 
expressions in a natural language means that such a theory must specify the semantic content 
(linguistic meaning) of a finite number of basic expressions and rules for generating the 
semantic content (linguistic meaning) of more complex expressions on the basis of their 
syntax and the semantic content (linguistic meaning) of the basic expressions out of which 
they are formed. 
3.1 Compositionality and the no-theory view 
One consequence of the claim that there is nothing which is the content of proper 
names and that in some instances it will not be possible to state what the contribution of the 
proper name is to the utterances in which it occurs is that there cannot be a compositional 
theory of semantic content. The problem is that names (having no meaningful parts) must be 
accommodated as part of the list of basic expressions. This is a difficulty partly because 
names can make different contributions to the content of utterances. However, if this was the 
only barrier it could be handled by treating each name as ambiguous. The more pernicious 
problem is that sometimes the semantic content of the name cannot be specified at all. That is, 
for sentences like (6) and (29) we may be unable to point to anything that unifies the 
circumstances in which they are true (false) other than that the circumstances are ones in 
which they are true (false). 
(6) No ancient astronomers believed that Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
(29) Superman kissed Lois before Clark did. 
The problem is not that we cannot point to the features that make (29) true in a particular 
circumstance, but that we cannot give an independent account of what makes something a 
15 This is adapted from Richard (1997, 199). A theory may have infinitely many axioms but still be spelt out by 
finite means if those axioms are specified recursively. 
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circumstance in which (29) is true. The problem for (6) is that we cannot give an account of 
the contribution of the names 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' that specifies what will count as a 
counterexample but is also compatible with Lydia's knowledge, not ad hoc, and not circular. 
That is, we cannot give an independent account of what makes (6) false. Sentences like (6) 
and (29) express what we might call family resemblance propositions. What unifies the 
circumstances in which they are true is, to paraphrase Wittgenstein, a network of overlapping 
and criss-crossing similarities. 
One other way to give the semantic content of the basic expressions would be to 
specify the linguistic meaning of each of the basic elements and provide rules taking one from 
the linguistic meaning and the context to the semantic content. One immediate problem with 
this is that it is difficult to see how one can give a rule to take you from the linguistic meaning 
of the names to the semantic content when that content is unspecifiable. However this 
suggestion faces another problem as well. 
One of the lessons of Kripke's Paderewski case is that sometimes we cannot specify 
the context either. The assumption that we can give a rule that maps contexts to contents is 
based on the simplified view that specifying the context means specifying the speaker, the 
audience, and perhaps the salient objects. This view is supported by overly simplified views 
of indexicals on which their content in a given context is whomever (whatever) is the speaker, 
audience, or salient object with property ~. Attention to the actual degree of context 
dependence, the range of types of propositions expressible by means of singular terms, and 
the role of extra-linguistic information reveals that this model won't do. Specifying the 
context in the case of (6) and (29) and similar sentences requires specifying what counts as a 
scientific (or worse, astronomical) discovery, and when an appearance of the individual 
Clark/Superman counts as a 'Superman' appearance. What the failures of the accounts which 
try to specify what the content of (6) and (29) are have shown is that this cannot be done in a 
non-circular way. 
3.2 Should we think that natural languages are compositional? 
At least some readers will construe the incompatibility of my 'account' of the semantic 
content of names with a compositional theory of semantic content as a reductio of the no-
theory view. Compositionality, it is thought, must be true, and so the no-theory account must 
be false. In this section I want to consider whether there are any good reasons for thinking that 
natural languages must have compositional theories of semantic content. 
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One of the most commonly stated reasons for thinking that compositionality of some 
sort is true is the claim that this supposition is required in order to explain how it is that we 
gain the ability to recognize novel sentences. The picture is something like this: 
Mastery of a natural language consists in the ability to understand infinitely 
many sentences of that language. We are able to understand novel sentences because 
they consist of familiar words put together using familiar constructions. What is novel 
is the particular combination of words and constructions, not the words and 
constructions themselves. Explaining our understanding of a natural language must 
involve explaining the mechanisms by which the meaning of the complex novel 
expression can be generated on the basis of knowledge of the familiar parts. Since one 
does not understand an assertive sentence unless one understands its truth-conditions, 
the mechanisms which generate the meanings of complex expressions must also, for 
each sentence, serve to specify a condition (or set of conditions), such that the 
sentence is true iff that condition obtains. 16 
On this picture the compositional theory of meaning for a natural language encapsulates what 
it is that competent speakers of the language implicitly know. 
The first question we should ask is: which compositional meaning theory? The first 
part of this picture concentrates on understanding a complex and novel expression. There is a 
perfectly good sense of 'understand the meaning' of an expression on which I can understand 
an utterance like (30) without knowing anything about the context. 
(30) You should put the paper in that box while I fill in this form. 
I know, for example, that it is an imperative rather than assertive utterance, and that if it was 
uttered to me the speaker would want me to do something with a paper, though without a 
context it is unclear whether what is meant is a newspaper or an essay. I also know that if it 
were uttered to me and the paper in question was easily locatable the next thing to do would 
be to look for a box, and that box is likely to be further away from the speaker than the form 
he or she is filling out. In as far as that is the sort of knowledge that a compositional meaning 
theory is supposed to explain then what is at issue is a compositional theory of linguistic 
16 See, for example, Davidson (1965,8). 
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meaning. If this is all that is required then my view offers no difficulty, as I do not deny that 
there is something like a compositional theory of linguistic meaning, provided it is understood 
that the linguistic meaning of a name is more like a pointer to the index (which serves as a 
placeholder)--that is, more like a procedural instruction, though not an effective one-than 
like a property, a Kaplan style character, or a Fregean sense. 
However, the further requirement that the theory of meaning serve to specify truth 
conditions for assertive sentences makes clear that what is issue is not a compositional theory 
of linguistic meaning but a compositional theory of semantic content (CTSC), for it is the 
semantic content of an utterance that is truth-evaluable. On the no-theory account of names 
there can be no CTSC because there can be no appropriate specification of the semantic 
content of proper names, either directly or by means of a function from context to content. Of 
course given that the universe will eventually come to an end we can be sure that there will be 
some finite description of the relationship between context and content-namely a list of 
ordered pairs which matches each utterance of a name with content of that utterance. 17 But 
this description cannot explain our understanding of natural language and is not what is 
wanted by advocates of the view that natural languages must have a compositional theory of 
semantic content. 
What this makes clear is that the issue is not actually our purported ability to 
understand infinitely many utterances, but our known ability to understand a finite number of 
utterances. Given a vocabulary of 200 nouns and 50 transitive verbs in their present tense 
forms and mastery of only the simple sentence form 'noun phrase transitive verb noun phrase' 
an English speaker will be able to understand two million sentences (Grandy 1990, 558-559). 
It may well be thought that a finitely stateable compositional theory of semantic content is 
required just to explain this ability. The no-theory view of names is committed to the claim 
that there is no such theory. The question at hand is whether this makes our ability to 
understand natural languages a mystery. 
3.3 Schiffer's counterexample 
Schiffer argues that there is no reason to think that natural language understanding 
requires a compositional semantics by describing a possible language user whose language 
17 Of course, if that content is not independently specifiable the list may not be particularly useful to one who 
does not already know what the semantic content of each utterance of each name is. 
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processing ability does not exploit any sort of compositionality (Schiffer 1987, Chapter 7). 
This language user, Harvey, is an information processor who processes by means of a neural 
machine language, which we, following Schiffer, shall call M. Harvey's neural construction is 
such that he has a belief iff he stands in a certain computational relation to a token sentence of 
M. We may represent this abstractly by saying that the sentence tokens which correspond to 
Harvey's beliefs are recorded in a belief box B. For each belief that Harvey is capable of 
having there is a unique sentence of M that would occur in B iff Harvey had that belief. Thus 
it is reasonable to say that, where a is the sentence of M that would appear in B iff Harvey 
believed that snow is white, a means that snow is white and that where J.t is the part of a that 
is the inner counterpart of 'snow' J.t refers to snow (Schiffer 1987, 193). 
Harvey is endowed with various belief forming mechanisms which determine which 
circumstances will result in a formula a being recorded in B at a given time t. These 
mechanisms may involve sensory stimulation and/or the presence of other formulas in B at 
moments prior to t. Corresponding to each formula a will be a complex counterfactual 
property which details these mechanisms. Schiffer calls this property the formula's conceptual 
role. I8 The task then is to show that Harvey's ability to process utterances in his natural 
language El does not depend on El having a compositional semantics. EI is non-indexical, 
unambiguous English (Schiffer 1987, 194). 
Suppose Carmen utters the sounds 'Some snow is purple'. What must be explained is 
how Harvey can move from his belief that Carmen uttered these sounds to: 
(a) His beliefthat Carmen said that some snow is purple, and 
(b) His belief that what Carmen said is true just in case some snow is purple, 
and this must be explained without relying on a compositional semantics for E1• This is 
accomplished by stipulating the conceptual roles of certain of the expressions in M (Schiffer 
1987, 194-195). In particular, we will stipulate the conceptual roles of 'said that' and 'true'. We 
assume that there is a function/from EI to M such that/is definable by means of the formal 
features of the expressions alone and that, where 8 can be used to say that p, f(8) tokens the 
belief that p. For convenience we shall adopt the assumption that Harvey speaks the same 
18 Schiffer emphasizes that he is not making any theoretical claims about conceptual roles and is not offering 
them as part ofa theory of mental content, as he thinks there can be no such theory (Schiffer 1987, 194). 
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language as he thinks-i.e., that E1 is M-I hope it is clear that nothing that follows in any 
way depends upon this convention. 19 Thus in what follows/is a disquotational function. 
We begin with the conceptual role of 'said that'. 
If the sentence 
r a uttered 01 
is in Harvey's B-box andfio) = 11, then, ceteris paribus, so is the sentence 
r a said that III 
So, since Cannen uttered 'Some snow is purple', the sentence 
'Cannen uttered 'sum'-'sno'-'iz'-'pur'pel" 
is in Band sincefi"sum'-'sno'-'iz'-'pur'pel") = 'some snow is purple', then, ceteris paribus, 
'Cannen said that some snow is purple' 
is also in B. The conceptual role of 'said that' guarantees that whenever Cannen utters 'Some 
snow is purple' Harvey will, providing no overriding conditions obtain, come to believe that 
she said that some snow is purple (Schiffer 1987, 196-197). The overriding conditions in 
question will in Schiffer's view consist of various defeater sentences appearing in Harvey's B-
box. 
We tum now to the conceptual role of 'true'. 
19 Schiffer (1987, 196-198) shows how to do without it. . 
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If the sentence 
r a said that 1-11 
is in B, then so is 
r What a said (viz., that 1-1) is true iff 1-11 
Thus, to continue the example, since 
'Carmen said that some snow is purple' 
is in B, so is. 
'What Carmen said is true iff some snow is purple' 
"So much," writes Schiffer, "for Harvey's mastery of his public language E 1" (Schiffer 1987, 
199). The point is that Harvey's ability to move from his belief that Carmen uttered a certain 
series of sounds to his belief that she said 1-1 depends solely on syntactic features of Eland the 
conceptual roles of some of the expressions of M. It in no way depends on there being a 
compositional theory of semantic content for either E 1 or M. 
3.3.1 Harvey and Indexicality 
Harvey's public language E1 contains no indexicality, and it may be thought that the 
context sensitivity that underpins the no-theory theory is what paradoxically requires 
compositionality to be true. The example of Harvey can be extended to cover a language E2 
which includes indexical expressions. This extension does require that we pay some attention 
to the structure of expressions in M, and thus in E2, but this weak compositionality does not 
carry with it any commitment to a compositional theory of semantic content (Schiffer 1987, 
200-201). The difficulty for my view is that Schiffer's extension of the Harvey example to 
cover indexicality does involve specifying a co-reference relation on singular terms. I will 
begin by laying out Schiffer's account. 
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We suppose that M contains a predicate 'Ref(x, y, z)' which should be read as x's 
utterance of y refers to z, where z is a singular term in M, The conceptual role of 'Ref will be a 
complicated one that takes account of many contextual features of an utterance, including 
speaker intentions, We then revise the conceptual role of 'says that' as follows, Where a and 
Pi are singular terms in M and 'L(tI, "" tn)' is a structural description of a sentence in which 
the indexicals tI, .. " tn occur: 
If the sentences 
r 1 a uttered L(tI, .. " tn) 
and 
r 1 Ref(a, t1, PI) and .. , and Ref(a, tn, Pn) 
are in B then, ceteris paribus, so is 
Thus, if 
'Ralph uttered 'He is retired" 
and 
'Ralph's utterance of 'he' refers to Nixon' 
are in B, then ceteris paribus, so is 
'Ralph said that Nixon retired' (Schiffer 1987, 201), 
The important questions from my point of view are (a) how sentences including 'Ref 
might come to be entered into Harvey's B-box, and (b) what are the status of the singular 
Chapter 7: The new no-theory theory 239 
terms of M. If both of these can be accounted for without presupposing that the semantic 
content of singular terms can be specified then Harvey will be just as good a counterexample 
for me as for Schiffer. I begin with (b). 
3.3.2 Harvey and the no-theory view of singular terms 
Recall that in Schiffer's counterexample the conceptual role of an expression of M is 
connected with the mechanisms under which sentences involving that expression get entered 
into Harvey's B-box. It is important to note that neither this nor the trivial sense in which an 
expression of M may be said to mean something (or refer to something) requires that M itself 
have a semantics at all-never mind a compositional semantics. There is an isomorphism 
between Harvey's internal language M and his public language E2, such that for each 
expression p there is an expression Il such that a sentence of the form 'Harvey believes that p' 
is true just in case Il is recorded in Harvey's B-box. Here p is a substitutional quantifier 
ranging over those expressions of E2 which can be combined with 'Harvey believes that' so as 
to form a grammatical expression of E2. As a result, it is reasonable to regard the expressions 
of M as inheriting the semantic properties of the expressions of E2 with which they are paired. 
For example, if there is a singular term u in Harvey's neural language such that 
whenever ... u ... appears in Harvey's B-box then Harvey believes that ... Superman ... , then it 
is reasonable to regard u as, derivatively, possessing the semantic properties of 'Superman' 
(Schiffer 1987, 190-191; 193). For example, given that the individual Clark/Superman is the 
referent of 'Superman', we may regard him as the referent of u. The important point to notice 
is that u inherits its semantic properties from the intentional properties of Harvey's beliefs, 
rather than vice versa. That is, we are licensed to regard u as having the individual 
Clark/Superman as its referent-and as having the other semantic properties of'Superman'-
because of the fact that whenever sentences of the form ... u ... appear in Harvey's B-box then 
we also judge it to be the case that Harvey believes that ... Superman. .. . This latter 
judgement must be made on independent grounds. We should not conclude that the contents 
of Harvey's beliefs are explained by the meanings of the inner formula?O A formula of M-
say Il-means ~ derivatively, as a consequence of the fact that whenever it is recorded in 
Harvey's B-box it is also true that Harvey believes that ~. 
20 Schiffer's view is that there can be no explication of belief content (Schiffer 1987, 190). 
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In particular, we have no independent reason to suppose that singular tenns in 
Harvey's lingua mentis have any semantic content, and we especially have no reason to 
suppose that they have specifiable semantic content. Given that a singular tenn a in M is 
correlated with a singular tenn p in E2 (or a particular token of P), if it has any semantic 
properties at all the most reasonable assumption is that it has just the same semantic properties 
as p (or that token of P). 
3.3.3 Weak compositionality 
What about the question of sentences involving 'Ref being entered into Harvey's B-
box? I want to take this in two stages. First of all, I think in the case of proper names and the 
kind of sensitivity I am suggesting they have this claim is not essential to the counterexample. 
Harvey must implement the function f which takes utterances in E2 as input and gives 
sentences of M as output. This translation function could translate the names of E2 into 
singular tenns of M on the basis of their syntactic properties before the sort of processing that 
Schiffer is discussing has occurred at all. The singular tenns of M would then have the same 
context sensitive content as the names of E2, but as they only have their content derivatively 
anyway this is not a worry. 
However, sentences of the fonn 'a's use of ti referred to P' are needed to show that 
Harvey has the ability to report on what someone has said using appropriately transfonned 
pronouns or names. As an English speaker I am able to echo Nixon's utterance of (31) by 
using (32) or (33). 
(31) I am not a crook. 
(32) He is not a crook. 
(33) Nixon is not a crook. 
A natural way to explain this phenomena would be to say that I know that (in this context) my 
utterance of (33) has the same semantic content as Nixon's utterance of (31). The problem is 
to show how an infonnation processor like Harvey could demonstrate this ability without 
exploiting a compositional semantics. Schiffer's solution is to allow that there is some weak 
compositionality exploited in language understanding. Harvey's ability to move from his 
recognition of Ralph's utterance of (32) to the belief that Ralph said that Nixon is not a crook 
Chapter 7: The new no-theory theory 241 
depends on the conceptual role of 'said that' in Mbeing sensitive to some parts of the structure 
of E2. This is acceptable for his purposes as long as all the predicates of E2, however complex, 
are treated noncompositionally. It might appear, however, that this is a problem for the no-
theory view of names, since the element of the utterance to which 'said that' is sensitive is the 
singular term. 
Schiffer does not tell us what the conceptual role of 'x's utterance of y refers to z' 
(Ref(x, y, z)) in M is, but he does say that it will be linked with various predicates which 
ascribe communicative intentions to the utterer (Schiffer 1987, 200). Intuitively, the idea is 
that as a result of his sensory perceptions and sentences of M already entered in Harvey's 
belief box, a number of sentences of M that ascribe communicative intentions to a speaker 
will be also be entered in his belief box. Perhaps these include the mentalese equivalent of 
'Carmen intended that gesture to draw my attention to Nixon'. In any case whenever sufficient 
numbers of these sorts of sentences are recorded in Harvey's belief box, so will Ref(Carmen, 
'he', Nixon). The important point to notice is that this process does not require that the 
singular terms of E2 or M be assigned any determinate semantic content. That is, Harvey's 
understanding does not operate by having any sentences of the form 'x means y' recorded in 
his belief box for once and for all for any singular terms x and y. Ref(x, y, z) is a relation that 
holds between utterances of singular terms in E2 and terms of M. 
In some ways Schiffer's use of 'refers' as part of this predicate of M is (for my 
purposes) unfortunate, since it suggests the naIve view of the content of singular terms. We 
can see that the use of the word 'refers' to parse Ref(x, y, z) is merely incidental when we 
consider how Harvey would come to have 'Carmen said that (23)' recorded in his belief box as 
a result of hearing Carmen utter (3). 
(3) The U.S. constitution gives Clinton the power to appoint Supreme Court justices. 
(23) The U.S. constitution gives the president the power to appoint Supreme Court 
justices. 
This would happen just in case Ref(Carmen, 'Clinton', the president) came to be entered in 
Harvey's beliefbox. And just like in the case of 'he', what is required for this to happen is that 
certain mentalese sentences representing Carmen's intentions be recorded in his belief box. 
The role of Ref(x, y, z) is to license substitution in a particular instance, not encode any claims 
about the uniform content of singular terms in E2 or M. 
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3.3.4 But what about Lydia? 
This is all well and good, but it may seem that the no-theory view of names now faces 
another problem. I have just said that Harvey can come to have instances of Ref(x, y, z) 
recorded in his belief box as a result of his recognition of Carmen's intentions. But the whole 
point of the example of Lydia and the astronomers was to show that speaker intentions don't 
fix the content of singular terms. So whatever else Harvey can do, it might seem that he can't 
understand those kinds of singular terms. 
This would be a worry ifinstances of Ref(x, y, z) were only recorded on the basis of 
Harvey's recognition of a speakers intentions concerning the singular terms themselves--e.g., 
the intention that 'Hesperus' mean 'the evening star' and the like--or intentions concerning the 
content of the utterance as a whole. One of the morals of the Lydia example and the simple 
sentences was that intentions of this sort either don't fix the right content or can't be plausibly 
ascribed to the speaker. However Lydia does have all sorts of intentions that do help us 
determine what she has said--e.g., the intention to report on the history of astronomical 
discoveries about Venus. It is these intentions, not ones about singular terms, that Harvey 
recognizes, and it is the mentalese predicates ascribing them that the conceptual role of Ref(x, 
y, z) links it with. 
This discussion may raise one additional worry about language understanding-the 
thought that the no-theory view makes our ability to recognize the circumstances in which 
certain utterances are true a mystery. After all, if (29) does express a family resemblance 
proposition, so that there is nothing that unifies the situations in which it is true other than that 
they are ones in which it is true, how is it that I recognize these situations when I encounter 
them? 
(29) Superman kissed Lois before Clark did. 
This question is connected with the more general problem of how we recognize whether a 
family resemblance concept applies or not. Our mastery of family resemblance concepts 
cannot involve applying necessary and sufficient conditions, as there are none. Nevertheless, 
Wittgenstein was right in suggesting that we do use such concepts (Wittgenstein 1958, 66-71, 
76-79). However this worry is not one raised by the failure of compositionality, and so I shall 
leave the issue for now and return to it in section 5 of this chapter. 
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3.3.5 What does Harvey show? 
In summary, the example of Harvey shows that it is possible for an information 
processor to understand a language that has no compositional theory of semantic content. 
Harvey's processing of his natural language in no way depends on it being possible to spell 
out by finite means the way in which the meaning of its complex expressions are determined 
by its syntax and the meanings of its constituent expressions. Of course Harvey is not meant 
to be a model of how we understand natural languages, as discovering that would be an 
empirical project (Schiffer 1987, 192). 
Harvey thinks in a neural language, and thus embodies the language-of-thought 
hypothesis. I think Schiffer is right to claim that this is not an essential feature of the example 
(Schiffer 1987, 205). Indeed some advocates of connectionism have claimed that one of the 
features which distinguishes their program from the traditional symbol-systems hypothesis is 
that in connectionist models mental representation is context sensitive and even at the level of 
syntax only approximately compositional. For example Paul Smolensky writes: 
while connectionist networks usmg distributed representations do describe mental 
states with the type of constituency required by (2a) [thoughts have composite 
structure-NMW], they do not provide an implementation ... of a symbolic language 
of thought. The context-dependency of the constituents, the interactions that must be 
accomodated when they are combined, the inability to uniquely and precisely identify 
constituents, the imperative to take seriously the notion that the representation of 
coffee is a collection of vectors knit together by family resemblance-all these entail 
that the relation between connectionist constituency and syntactic symbolic 
constituency is not one of implementation (Smolensky 1991,210). 
Smolensky's concern is to articulate some of the differences between connectionism and the 
language-of-thought hypothesis. However if he is right then on some connectionist models the 
syntax of the language of thought is not even compositional-i.e., a representation of cup with 
coffee may not formed out of context independent representations of cup and coffee?! In other 
words, on some connectionist models of thought it may be the case that even the item of 
syntax which is the mental analogue of the word 'coffee' varies from context to context. 
21 Not everyone agrees that these connectionist models do not employ compositional syntax-see Butler 1995 
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Information processors do not have to implement a Fodorian language-of-thought in order to 
do without compositionality. 
4. Central uses and speaker meaning 
I now want to give one last airing to the view that philosophical semantics should be 
concerned with the central or core uses of language, and that the problem cases I have 
discussed are examples of peripheral uses, or that the issues they raise are issues for speaker 
meaning, and thus pragmatics rather than semantics. I hope that the arguments of the previous 
chapter have convinced the reader that the distinction between pragmatically provided 
information and semantically provided information cannot be mapped onto the distinction 
between what is said and what is merely implied. In this section however, I want to consider 
whether the distinction between central and non-central uses can be sustained in any other 
way. 
The naIve view is the most defensible of the contemporary views discussed in chapter 
three. Even if we assume that there is some solution to the Lydia puzzle to be had, the other 
views must either attempt to accommodate the simple sentence counterexamples of chapter 
four or claim that there is some essential difference between the anti-substitution intuitions 
involved in belief ascriptions and those operative in these cases. This claim is unsupportable. 
In contrast the naIve view simply rules that all anti-substitution intuitions concerning singular 
terms are the result of a mistake. The pragmatic explanation of the origins of these intuitions 
may appear difficult to give, but since the naIve view takes the position that the intuitions are 
fundamentally confused in any case, this might be thought no surprise. 
Unfortunately a great deal of the plausibility of the Salmon and Soames defense of the 
naIve view rests on mapping the distinction between what is said and what is merely implied 
onto the distinction between pragmatically provided information and semantically provided 
information. If the naIve view is to be maintained another account of the origin of our 
inability to correctly identify what is literally said by the various puzzle sentences must be 
found. 
4.1 Speaker-meaning 
One possibility might be to claim that anti-substitution intuitions concern speaker-
meaning rather than expression meaning, but that language users systematically confuse 
Chapter 7: The new no-theory theory 245 
speaker-meaning with expression meaning. The naIve VIew, one might claim, offers an 
account of the expression meaning of sentences containing singular terms. In contrast, our 
intuitions concern what the speaker means by a given sentence A, rather than what A means. 
Now if one takes this approach then speaker-meaning cannot itself serve as a foundation for 
expression meaning, and thus one cannot rely on the distinction between speaker-meaning and 
expression meaning that lies at the heart of a Gricean approach to meaning. On that approach 
an expression gains a meaning-say <j>--in virtue of it being an expression which by 
convention is used to speaker-mean $. In order for expression meaning to be sufficiently 
different from speaker-meaning to support the naIve theory the distinction needs to be drawn 
in a different way. 
Perhaps what is wanted is something like Evans' distinction between what a speaker 
denotes by a use of a name NN and what the name NN denotes (Evans 1973, 1). The parallel 
would thus be a distinction between what a speaker means by an utterance of a sentence and 
what the sentence means. As in the case of Evans' distinction for names what a speaker means 
by a sentence would be occasion relative-it would be an account of utterance meaning, 
whereas what a sentence means would be context independent. However, it becomes 
immediately clear that this will not do, as the presence of indexicals means that many 
sentences of English and other natural languages do not have semantic content independently 
of being uttered in a particular context. Since the naIve theory assigns semantic content to an 
indexical in a given context it is not merely a theory of context independent-i.e., linguistic-
meanmg. 
The final possibility is that the distinction is supposed to match the ordinary 
distinction captured by the phrase 'what he said was ... , but what he meant was ... '. However, 
if this is the distinction then it cannot do the job that the naIve theory needs for the reasons 
outlined at the end of chapter four and in the last chapter. On the ordinary notion of what is 
said sentences like (12) and (12*) say different things. 
(12) Superman is more successful with women than Clark Kent. 
(12*) Superman is more successful with women than Superman. 
The point of the naIve theory is to deny that our intuitions about what is said match onto the 
actual semantic content of the sentences. 
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4.2 Limning the world 
A second possibility might be to claim that, appearances to the contrary, the puzzle 
cases are all intentional contexts. One might claim that in as far as the sentences in question 
are read as imparting information about the state of the world rather than information about 
our psychological reactions to that state of affairs, substitution is permitted?2 Roughly, the 
suggestion would be that the semantic content of an utterance describes a state of affairs, but 
that an utterance also implies that people will react to that state of affairs in certain ways. 
Thus the difference between (7) and (7*) is not a difference in the way they describe the 
world is being but a difference in how we would expect people to react to that state of affairs. 
(7) Clark went to the fancy-dress party as Superman. 
(7*) Superman went to the fancy-dress party as Superman. 
However, the naIve theorist might continue, it is absurd to think that any claims about the 
reactions of others are part of what is literally said by (7) or (7*). What causes the confusion 
is that we are sometimes more interested in the facts about how people will react than we are 
in facts about the state of the world. To borrow a phrase from Quine, one might thus conclude 
that in as far as we are engaged in "limning the true and ultimate structure of reality" the naIve 
view provides all the semantics we need (Quine 1960,221). 
The major difficulty with this view is that it is unclear why we should think that 
people would react differently to a situation (and not the description of the situation) when it 
is described by (7) than they do when it is described by (7*) if (7) and (7*) genuinely describe 
the same situation. It is as if we attempted to maintain that merely uttering (34) rather than 
(35) could result in someone who hadn't heard my utterance reacting differently to the colour 
of snow. 
(34) La neige est blanche. 
(35) Snow is white. 
22 This line of argument was suggested to me by Philip Catton's comments in conversation that substitution 
seems to be allowable when we are tracking the world but not when we are tracking ourselves. 
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The problematic simple sentences cannot be assimilated to the case of attitude ascriptions. In 
the case of the latter it is not unreasonable to think that there are some descriptions of the state 
of affairs that affects whether what is uttered seems true or false-namely the descriptions 
under which the person to whom the attitude is ascribed thinks of the situation. 
The defender of this strategy might maintain that the relevant causally active 
descriptions are not the utterances of (7) or (7*) but the ways of thinking of the situation that 
we conclude a witness would form as a result of perceiving the state of affairs in question. 
The difficulty here is it is mysterious why an audience enlightened about the identity would 
conclude that witnesses would form different mental representations of the situation unless (7) 
and (7*) actually describe different (albeit importantly similar) situations. Again, it would be 
peculiar for an audience to reach a similar conclusion about a witness's mental representations 
of the colour of snow on the basis of my uttering (34) rather than (35). The difference 
between (7) and (7*) is parallel to the difference between (34) and (36), not that between (34) 
and (35). 
(36) La neige est rouge. 
The final difficulty with this strategy is that while it is implausible to claim that 
utterances of (7) and (7*) literally say anything about how observers would think about the 
situation, it is not implausible to claim that (6) and (6*) are making claims about how the 
astronomers think of the situation. 
(6) No ancient astronomers believed that Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
(6*) No ancient astronomers believed that Hesperus is Hesperus. 
Thus this defense, even if was successful, is really another defense of the claim that there is a 
difference between the simple sentences and propositional attitude ascriptions. The defender 
of the naIve view would still owe us a explanation of why it the apparent difference between 
sentences like (6) and (6*) is merely apparent. 
4.3 Literal and metaphorical uses 
Finally, one might try to suggest that the reading on which the paired sentences differ 
in truth value is not a literal one but a metaphorical one. The reason we cannot seem to 
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specify the content of (6) and (7) is the same reason as we cannot specify what is said by a 
metaphor. Consider (37). 
(37) She wanted to think of a metaphor so badly she could taste it. 
It would be impossible to specify what situations would count as wanting to think of a 
metaphor this badly. Metaphors just don't seem to work by specifying the circumstances in 
which they are true. 
Obviously there is a great deal that could be said about metaphorical speech and the 
basis on which we judge a particular utterance to be metaphorical. However the short way to 
deal with this approach is to point out two obvious difficulties. First of all, the claim that the 
utterances are metaphorical cannot accommodate the unenlightened utterer of sentences 
containing co-referential proper names. The unenlightened utterer intends to say something 
that is literally true, and the unenlightened audience understands the utterance as a literal one. 
As a consequence the defender of this strategy seems to be saying that the sentences in 
question are read as metaphorical because the audience judges that the literal meaning cannot 
be what is meant, but if this is the case the same problem arises as for the conversational 
implicature approach-in order to make that judgement the audience must know what the 
literal meaning is. Secondly, since the purported metaphors are so pervasive the naIve theorist 
owes us an explanation of why they have neither become dead metaphors nor resulted in a 
bifurcation of meaning for one or more of the words involved. 
I can think of no other way in which the distinction needed by the naIve theorist could 
be defended. However, I have not and cannot argue that such a distinction is not possible. 
Perhaps some ingenious defender of the naIve view will come up with an account of the 
distinction between the semantic content and the conversational implications of the puzzle 
sentences that does explain how we could confuse the two. Accordingly in the last section of 
this chapter I will raise some questions about why we would want to avoid dealing with the 
hard cases even if the distinction is defensible. Before doing that I want to address the charge 
that the no-theory theory of names is merely defeatist. 
5. Things we do with names 
The decision to give up the claim that we can give a precise account of the semantic 
contributions of proper names is not to be taken lightly. However, it also should not be 
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regarded with the kind of philosophical dread that it seems to be. After all, why should we 
think that one unified account should be available? The primary motivation seems to be the 
belief that in order for us to use language-in particular, in order for us to process novel 
utterances-there must be a semantic theory which we acquire as implicit knowledge. 
However the extent to which this is true seems to support only the claim that there are rules 
which determine the content of an utterance on the basis of the content of its parts. The weak 
compositionality that was exploited by Schiffer's Harvey example is of this kind. There seems 
to be no reason to think that language use requires that the semantic content of all the basic 
terms be specifiable by finite means. 
Does this mean, as Schiffer suggests (Schiffer 1987, 270-271), that philosophers of 
language should shut up the shop and go home? No-the mere fact that natural languages tum 
out not to be very well behaved is not a reason for despair. It was long thought, for example, 
that arithmetic must be axiomatizable, but the discovery of its incompleteness by Godel has 
not led to wide scale abandonment of arithmetic as somehow less useful. There is no 
consistent complete axiomatization of the theory to be had, and perhaps we find that 
aesthetically unpleasing. In a sense semanticists are searching for a similar axiomatization of 
the theory of meaning for natural languages-get the right principles (compositionality, 
semantic innocence), the right account of information content, the right division between 
pragmatics and semantics and, voila, we have recursively specified the truth conditions 
(meaning, etc) of every expression possible in the language. It turns out that natural languages 
are simply not well enough behaved for such an account. Perhaps the unfortunate 
consequence of the expressive power of natural languages is a lack of a single theory of 
meamng. 
Let me press the analogy to arithmetic a little further. The ability to express peculiar 
family resemblance propositions like (38) is an advantage of natural languages. 
(38) Clark kissed Lois before Superman did. 
Circumstances in which (29) are true really are similar to each other, and that one of them 
obtains may be important information for me to have. It will allow me to understand Lois's 
behaviour, for example. Furthermore, the extra information that he did it while dressed up as 
Superman at a fancy-dress party, or while wearing his glasses, may not be particularly 
relevant. However, the ability to express these sorts of propositions comes at a price, just as 
the ability to go beyond the resources of first-order logic comes at a price. In the case of 
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arithmetic this price is incompleteness. In the case of natural languages it is the absence of an 
axiomatizable meaning theory. We should not assume that such a language would be 
unusable, any more than unaxiomatizable arithmetic is unusable. Nor is this to say that 
semanticists should close up shop. The inability to give a complete description of something 
is not the inability to say anything about it at all. 
One reason for thinking that the no-theory view is defeatist is that raised earlier-the 
thought that the no-theory view makes our ability to recognize the circumstances in which 
certain utterances are true a mystery. How do we recognize whether a family resemblance 
proposition is true or not? The essence of the problem is to explain what allows us to 
recognize a given appearance of, for example, the individual Clark/Superman as a 'Superman' 
appearance. It is, I admit, a genuine difficulty, and I don't really have the slightest idea how to 
solve it. The point I do want to make however is the difficulty is perfectly general-it is not a 
puzzle special to the no-theory view of names. The puzzle arises elsewhere in the semantics 
of natural language in connection with family resemblance terms and also in connection with 
adjectives, another aspect of natural language that causes difficulties for advocates of 
compositional theories of semantic content. The problem with adjectives is that practically all 
of them have noun-dependent conditions of applicability, not just evaluative ones like good. 
Ran Lahav gives a long series of examples from which these are just a sample: 
a red apple ... needs to be only red on the outside, but a red hat needs to be red only 
on its external upper surface, a red crystal is red both inside and outside, and a red 
watermelon is red only inside. For a book to be red is for its cover but not necessarily 
for its inner pages to be red; while for a newspaper to be red is for all of its pages to be 
red. ... What is square in a square face are the contours of the chin, cheeks and 
forehead as they appear from the front, while a square house is square when looked at 
from above, ... A slow animal is one who runs slowly, a slow student one who grasps 
slowly (Lahav 1989,264-265) 
Furthermore, the fact that for some parings there seem to be no applicability conditions at 
all-when, for example, does one have a gentle computer?-seems to be merely a matter of 
lack of interest in and opportunity for assigning them. If, to use one of Lahav's examples, rats 
regularly changed in appearance, some abruptly and some slowly, we might naturally apply 
the phrase 'gradual rat' to the slow changers (Lahav 1989,266). 
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It does not seem to be possible to capture the applicability conditions in any general 
account of each adjective. The most prominent attempts serve only to reduce the problem of 
adjectives like 'red' to other adjectives like 'salient' or 'interesting' (Lahav 1989, 267, 271). 
Our ability to recognize whether an adjective applies to a novel item is thus mysterious in that 
it seem to rely on analogies and similarity relationships. To summarize, the no-theory view of 
names claims that our understanding of some uses of proper names exploits an ability which, 
despite its mysteriousness, we have independent reason to believe human beings possess. 
Singular terms are not the only reoccurring problem for semantics-various paradoxes 
continue to resurface again and again, recreating themselves in altered forms in face of 
apparent dissolution. In face of the realization that the only successful strategies for evading 
the paradoxes limit the expressive power of language, some philosophical logicians have 
argued that we ought to study the paradoxes, understand how they work, but give up the 
attempt to get rid of them. Paradox might well be seen as an interesting semantic phenomena 
in its own right, rather than a mistake to be dissolved. 
Perhaps a similar approach could be applied to proper names. We might seek to 
understand their peculiar behaviour-perhaps even model it-but give up on the attempt to 
provide one account of all their uses. There may be many things we do with names. 
6. Real life, hard cases, and philosophical semantics 
The advantage of treating names as highly context-sensitive expressions is that it 
confronts the hard cases of philosophical semantics head on. One should not make the mistake 
of thinking that the naIve view has an account of the puzzle phenomena. The naIve theorist 
does not have a complete account of the information imparted by the use of proper names and 
other singular terms until she gives an account of (a) what the conversational implicatures are 
and (b) how they arise. Most of my criticisms of this aspect of the naIve view focused on the 
possibility of giving an account of how the conversational implicatures arise that does not 
undermine the claim that we confuse them for the literal content of the utterance. However the 
same problems which motivate the no-theory theory of the semantic content of proper names 
suggest that the naIve theorist will have similar difficulties when she attempts to give an 
account of what the conversational implicatures are. This is the implication of Jennifer Saul's 
example of Lydia and the astronomers--( 6) is just as much a puzzle for the naIve theorist as 
for anyone else. 
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(6) No ancient astronomers believed that Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
It seems likely therefore that a mature naIve view will have to settle for giving a no-theory 
account of the conversational implicatures. Since both the no-theory view and the naIve view 
will thus give roughly the same account of the conversational phenomena as a whole, it seems 
the advantage should go to the view which also accommodates our intuitions about the truth-
values of a whole class of utterances?3 
Secondly, we should not think that the naIve view has the advantage when it comes to 
instances in which co-referential terms can be substituted, My position is not that we can 
never specify the semantic content of a particular use of a singular term or the circumstances 
in which an utterance containing a singular term is true. There is nothing wrong in saying that 
a particular utterance of a singular term has its reference as its semantic content. The mistake 
is in thinking that the semantic content of a singular term is always specifiable. 
The main complaint against the naIve view's treatment of the semantic content of 
proper names is really its irrelevance. It simply doesn't address the features of utterances that 
are relevant to our normal practices of communicating-to everyday saying, asking, 
suggesting, noticing, etc. Furthermore it simply refuses to take seriously the hard cases of 
philosophical semantics. 
The view that proper names and other singular terms are highly context sensitive 
expressions arises when one does take hard cases and real world use of language seriously. 
The resulting semantic theory is one for real natural languages used by real people. It may be 
messy, but it is also relevant. 
23 A similar point is made by Crimmins (1992, 34). 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The question with which I began was a simple one-what semantic contribution is 
made by a proper name to the semantic content of the utterances in which it occurs. The 
conclusion that I came to is that the question itself misfires. There is no one semantic 
contribution made by a proper name. The assumption that names do make a uniform semantic 
contribution is one shared by all the traditional and contemporary treatments of names. It is 
thus not surprising that we have not arrived at a satisfactory account. 
The central claims defended in this dissertation are threefold. First of all, the 
problematic behaviour of proper names is not confined to propositional attitude contexts. 
There are wide array of simple sentences-what would usually be regarded as extensional 
contexts-in which the semantic contribution made by the name varies widely. In some cases, 
like that of (1), it seems natural to say that the semantic content contributed by a name is a 
description or property. 
(1) The constitution of the u.s. gIves Clinton the right to appoint supreme court 
justices. 
In this case the name 'Clinton' contributes the content of 'the president' to the proposition 
expressed by (1). In other similar cases a name might have an object as its content, but not the 
object that is its referent. This is what is going on when we use (2) to claim that David's car is 
parked out back. 
(2) David's parked out back. 
These sorts of examples are usually not considered by philosophers, perhaps because of the 
ease with which we can explain what they say by other means. However, as I argued in 
chapter seven, we should not confuse the claim that (2) means that David's car is parked out 
back with the claim that what was strictly and literally said by (2) was something else. 
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Other simple sentences like (3) and (4) exhibit more puzzling behaviour. 
(3) Clark kissed Lois before Superman did. 
(4) I've never been to Leningrad but I visited St. Petersburg last week. 
We have strong intuitions that (3) and (4) say something different that their counterparts (3*) 
and (4*). 
(3 *) Superman kissed Lois before Superman did. 
(4*) I've never been to St. Petersburg but I visited St. Petersburg last week. 
However we encounter serious difficulties when we try to give an account of the semantic 
content of (3) and (4). In order to get the right truth-conditions the various attempts to 
accommodate these sentences had to posit the existence of aspects of an individual or object 
that were more than just ways of thinking about or describing that individual or object. These 
aspects have to be able to walk, be successful with women, be visited by tourists, etc. 
Whatever worries we have about the metaphysical commitments of these accounts, 
they face a more important objection. On these accounts an utterance of (3) or (4) can only be 
used to say something about the aspect rather than the individual if the utterer was enlightened 
about the identity. However, it is clear that an utterance of (3) by an unenlightened speaker 
would still communicate something different from an utterance of (3*) by that same speaker, 
as would utterances of (5) and (5*). 
(5) Clark went into the phone booth and Superman came out. 
(5*) Superman went into the phone booth and Superman came out. 
Accounts which depend on the enlightened/unenlightened distinction are thus in no better 
position than those that claim that the a semantic theory need to accommodate the intuitions 
associated with substitution in propositional attitude contexts but need not accommodate the 
problematic simple sentences. As I argued in chapter three, such distinctions are not 
sustainable. 
The second central claim defended in this dissertation is that language users can 
distinguish between what is said by an utterance and what is merely implied. The naIve 
theory, which wishes to deny this, faces a number of obstacles One of the main difficulties for 
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the naIve theory is that much of the support for the view that co-referential names have the 
same semantic content even in attitude contexts comes from our own judgements about what 
is said. Naive theorists point out that I can often make a faithful report of what is believed by 
someone using a co-referential name even in a case where he doesn't know that the names are 
co-referential. This what is going on in cases like the Marcus/Barcan example, in which (6), 
(6*) and (6***) seem to say the same thing even when the subject doesn't know about the 
relevant identity: 
(6) I believe that Ruth Barcan invented the new theory of reference. 
(6*) He believes that I invented the new theory of reference. 
(6**) He believes that Ruth Marcus invented the new theory of reference. 
It seems, argues the naIve theorist, that in each case exactly the same information is 
reported-that my report is a faithful account of what our unnamed philosopher believes-
even if he does not know that Ruth Barcan and Ruth Marcus are one and the same person. 
If our intuitions about what is semantically encoded by such utterances are sometimes 
correct, the naIve theorist needs to provide a means for distinguishing intuitions about content 
from intuitions about what is merely implied. However, our best candidate for a principled 
way to make such a decision is the availability principle, which maintains that our intuitions 
about the distinction should be preserved. All the other candidates either allot too much or too 
little to the class of pragmatic implicatures. 
Finally, I also defend the view that in some cases it is impossible to specify the content 
of a particular use of proper name by independent means. Sometimes our use of a proper 
name may not reflect any genuine properties. We may be able to go some way to explaining 
our use of a name on a given occasion by explaining about the double life of the individual or 
the noncontiguous appearances of the object or the political origins of the names of the city. 
However telling this story does not serve to give the content of the name. This phenomena 
arises in connection with both simple sentences like (3) and propositional attitude contexts. 
(3) Clark kissed Lois before Superman did. 
Saul's Lydia example exhibits this property. Understanding that there are two names for 
Venus and that the discovery that they named the same planet was an astronomical one is 
enough to enable Lydia to utter (7) and communicate that the seasonal-cycle astronomer 
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would be a counterexample, but it is not enough to allow us to specify the content of her 
utterance. 
(7) No ancient astronomers believed that Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
The right way to understand these cases is to recognize that there may be nothing that unifies 
the circumstances in which (7) (or (3)) is true other than that they are circumstances in which 
(7) (or (3)) is true. The problem is not that we cannot point to the features that make the 
utterances true in a particular circumstance, but that we cannot give an independent account of 
what makes something a circumstance in which (7) (or (3) )is true. Sentences like (7) and (3) 
express what I have called/amity resemblance propositions. The circumstances in which they 
are true resemble each other, and this family resemblance is the content of the proposition 
expressed by them. 
It is the claim that sometimes the semantic contribution of a proper name cannot be 
specified at all that implies that names do not make a uniform semantic contribution to the 
utterances in which they occur. If the problem was merely that names seemed to contribute 
different kinds of content on different occasions one might hope that these uses could 
eventually be unified under a finitely expressible rule. However the fact that sometimes the 
content is itself not specifiable means that we cannot even offer a finitely expressible 
disjunctive rule. 
Collectively these three claims put to rest the notion that proper names make a 
uniform contribution to the semantic content of the utterances in which they occur. But this 
conclusion raises a new question-what is the relationship between the linguistic meaning of 
proper names and their semantic content? The right answer is that the linguistic meaning of 
names underdetermines their semantic content. The linguistic meaning of a proper name 
brings the practice of using that name for a certain individual or in a particular way to mind. 
Pragmatic processes take us from this linguistic meaning to semantic content. The outcome of 
these processes is not determined by the linguistic meaning, but merely constrained by it. 
The main implication of the no-theory account is that if we wish to better understand 
names we should not be asking questions about their semantic properties. The more 
interesting questions turn out to concern the details of the pragmatic processes that take us 
from meaning to content. 
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